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Abstract 
Abstract 
This thesis consists of three studies examining the sources of momentum profits in equity 
market. This thesis extracts from both risk-based and behavioural based theories in 
searching for explanations to the existence of momentum payoffs. 
Chapter 2 examines whether business cycle variables and behavioural biases can explain 
the prof"itability of momentum trading in three major European markets - France, 
Germany and the UK. Unlike previous studies, the chapter nests both risk-based and 
behavioural-based variables in a two-stage model specification in an attempt to explain 
momentum profits. The findings show that, although momentum profitability in 
European markets is unexplained by conditional asset pricing models, it is attributable to 
asset mispricing that systematically varies with global business conditions. In addition, 
behavioural variables do not appear to matter much. Thus risk factors, which are 
undetected thus far and are largely attributable to the business cycle, could explain the 
momentum payoffs in European stock markets. 
Chapter 3 examines whether limits to arbitrage, overconfidence, divergence in investors' 
opinion, and risk factors can explain the persistence in momentum profits. The results 
reveal that momentum profits: (i) are driven almost entirely by loser stocks that are 
difficult to short; (ii) the investors' inability to short-sell loser stocks defeats the original 
theme of momentum trading that argues for a self-financing hedge portfolio and; (iii) the 
persistence in momentum profits is caused by limits to arbitrage rather than investors 
under-reacting to firm-specific information. Overall, momentum profits are caused by 
mispricing due to limits to arbitrage and overconfidence, and divergence in opinion does 
not play a role in overvaluation. 
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Abstract 
Chapter 4 examines the role of analyst bias and uncertainty in explaining momentum 
profits internationally. Momentum payoffs around the world are large and significant 
among higher uncertainty stocks, decrease monotonically as uncertainty decrease. Within 
each of the uncertainty group, the extreme winner and loser portfolios arc among higher 
analyst bias groups. The results suggest that analysts who are concerned for their 
reputations report forecasts in favour with client's beliefs and hence greater analyst bias 
when there is greater uncertainty. The extreme winner and loser stocks continue to move 
to same directions reflecting investors' belief rather than the true set of information. In 
addition, the findings show that by forming a momentum strategy that buys low 
uncertainty winner and sells high uncertainty loser earns higher profits (includes most 
Asian countries) than the Jcgadeesh-Titman (1993) momentum strategy. Thus investment 
strategies can be formed based on systematic behavioural biases among different groups 
of market participants. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Efficient market hypothesis and the momentum anomaly 
An efficient market is a market in which 'prices always fully reflect available 
information' (Fama, 1970, p. 383). Plainly speaking, it means that the past movement or 
direction of the price of a stock or market cannot be used to predict its future movement. 
The hypothesis is that stock prices instantaneously and unbiasedly adjust to new 
information, which is seen as an implication of rational, utility-maximising investor 
behaviour in competitive markets. Fama (1970) states that for a market to be efficient, 
'there are no transaction costs in trading securities, all available information is costlessly 
available to all market participants, and all agree on the implications of current 
information for the current price and distributions of future price of each security' (p. 387). 
Expectation of future price is thus simplified by assuming that investors have 
homogeneous beliefs. The theory also implies a belief that stock price changes are 
independent of each other and have the same probability distribution, but over time 
maintains an upward trend. In short, the idea that stocks take a random and unpredictable 
path. The random walk model of asset prices is an extension of the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH), as are the notions that the market cannot be consistently beaten and 
'free lunches' are generally unavailable. 
Theoretical challenges to the EMH question the assumed rationality of investors. 
Drawing on the 1970s pioneering work of cognitive psychologists Kahneman and 
Tversky (1974), the mid 1980s and early 1990s economists (see Black, 1986; De Long et 
al., 1990a) speculated that many traders (e. g. noise traders') act not on information but on 
premonition and that the market absorbs no more rationality of calculation than it does 
Noise traders are investors whose beliefs and preferences conform to psychological factors rather than 
normative economic models. 
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mere noise. More recent theorising on investor behaviour has considered the nature of 
investor attitudes towards risk and the way investors make decisions using attention and 
memory more than probabilistic analysis, thus investors act irrationally in making the 
investment decisions. 
In reality, there are a lot of imperfections in the market. First, a market is normally 
characterised by non-instantaneous availability and incomplete dissemination of 
information to all participants. This may prevent the price from incorporating the 
information fully and instantaneously. Secondly, there are positive information and 
trading costs and other institutional constraints in the market. Jensen (1968) looks at the 
fund managers' performance and finds that any advantage that the portfolio managers 
might have is consumed by fees and expenses. This has led Jensen (1978) to define an 
efficient market as 'A market is efficient with respect to information set 0t if it is 
impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of information set 0 t. By 
economic profit, we mean the risk-adjusted returns net ofall costs'(p. 96). 
Over the past twenty years there has been. a growing body of literature that raises doubts 
as to the efficiency of the capital markets. According to this literature, a number of 
trading strategies exist which generate abnormal returns based solely on publicly 
available information. In particular, weakness from market ineffiýiency has been 
documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), their trading strategy (momentum strategy) 
involves taking long (short) positions in firms which experience large positive (negative) 
abnormal returns in the previous quarter, and states that such price behaviour is consistent 
with positive feedback trading. In addition, Fama and French (1996) concede that 
momentum trading is the only CAPM-related anomaly that their three-factor model fails 
to explain. Subsequently, a number of behavioural models based on irrationality and 
psychological theories have developed in attempts to explain the momentum anomaly 
(see for example Barberis and Thaler, 2003). This thesis therefore proposes to examine 
12 
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the sources and implications of the momentum strategies. 
1.2 Asset pricing model 
Testing for market efficiency is difficult. It requires the market to be able to incorporate 
new information in prices instantly and the success of the asset pricing model in 
measuring the true risk factors. Flaws in asset pricing, however, cast doubts about the 
reliability of the existing empirical research - both the work that appears to contradict 
market efficiency as well as that which supports it. The continued search for appropriate 
risk factors to explain the apparent anomalies inform the study in chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 investigates whether the apparent profitability of momentum trading can be 
explained by business cycle variables and behavioural characteristics in three major 
European markets namely France, Gen-nany and the UK. Considering the increased 
debate and evidence on the role of investors' behaviour in explaining cross-sectional and 
time series patterns of stock returns, this chapter enhances the conditional model of 
Avramov and Chordia (2006) to incorporate behavioural characteristics. In addition, 
given the prominence of price momentum in international stock markets, this chapter 
applies the conditional asset pricing model of Avramov and Chordia (2006) in assessing 
the possible business cycle patterns within momentum profits in European markets. This 
offers an out of sample test of Avramov and Chordia's (2006) model in the context of 
momentum in stock returns in three major European markets. 
The findings of chapter 2 suggest that momentum profits in Europe are largely 
attributable to asset mispricing that systematically varies with global business conditions. 
This confirms that the idiosyncratic component of stock returns does not play any 
prominent role in explaining momentum profits in European markets, but business cycle 
variables may offer a better explanation. In addition, the results of the Avramov and 
13 
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Chordia (2006) model that incorporate behavioural variables display a mixed role for 
behavioural variables across the countries, illustrating that investors' behaviours are less 
likely to be correlated with the business cycle and are unlikely to explain momentum 
profits. Moreover, the inclusion of behavioural variables does not affect the notion that 
momentum patterns are risk-based. Overall, the findings of chapter 2 suggest that the 
profitability of momentum strategies in Europe could be explained by risk factors, which 
are undetected thus far and are largely attributable to the business cycle. 
1.3 No free lunch and limits to arbitrage 
In an efficient market, 'prices are right' in that they are set by rational agents. And there is 
'no free lunch', which means that no investment strategy can earn excess risk-adjusted 
returns, or average returns greater than are warranted for its risk. Barberis and Thaler 
(2003) suggest that even when an asset is wildly mispriced, strategies designed to correct 
the mispricing can be very risky (e. g. fundamental risk), rendering them unattractive. As 
a result, behavioural finance states that 'prices are not right'. However, prices distant 
from fundamental value do not necessarily mean that there are any excess risk-adjusted 
returns for the taking. Not only arbitrageurs find that the strategies are risky but every 
investor does as well. Even if there is no fundamental risk, there is risk associated with 
unpredictable sentiment. 
From the theoretical point of view, there are reasons to believe that arbitrage is a risky 
process and therefore that it is only of limited effectiveness. Also, there is some empirical 
evidence of limited arbitrage provided, such as twin shares, closed-end fund, ADR's and 
index inclusion. In addition, De Long et al. (1990a) show that noise trader risk is 
powerful enough that, even with this single form of risk, arbitrage can sometimes be 
limited. As a result, the theory of limited arbitrage could cause deviations from 
" For surveys of the vast literature on capital market inefficiencies, including discussions of the reasons 
why mispricings are not easily arbitraged away, see Shleifer (2000) and Barberis and Thaler (2003). 
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fundamental value and contradict the assumption of EMH. The notions of 'no free lunch' 
and limited arbitrage underlie chapter 3 which examines whether momentum profits are 
caused by limits to arbitrage and overconfidence, and whether momentum profits could 
be exploitable. 
Using a unique sample of data on UK ownership distribution from the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Register published by Hemmington-Scott to capture 
short selling activities, Chapter 3 finds that momentum profits come from loser stocks. 
There is strong evidence of a positive relationship between short-sale constraints and the 
magnitude of momentum profits. The known risk factors cann ot explain the momentum 
profits. However, the results are inconsistent with Miller's (1977) view that stocks that 
are subject to both short-sale constraints and high divergence in opinion are initially 
overvalued and generate low subsequent returns. This thesis finds that momentum profits 
are linked with short sale constraints but not with divergence in opinion. On the other 
hand, excessive optimism together with self attribution bias leading to overvaluation and 
therefore low subsequent returns explains the momentum profits. Overall, momentum 
profits are caused by mispricing due to limits to arbitrage and overconfidence, and 
momentum profits would hardly be exploitable due to the absence of short sales. 
1.4 Behavioural explanations 
The consistent profitability of the momentum strategy poses a strong challenge to the 
efficient market hypothesis, and considerable numbers of papers have explored some 
behavioural explanations for the strategy's existence. Jcgadecsh and Titman (1993) claim 
that the positive stock return autocorrelation is driven by either underreaction or a 
delayed overreaction that can be attributed to what DeLong et al. (1990b) called positive 
feedback trading. As investors persistently and irrationally under-react to firm specific 
information, rational investors can profit from their irrational counterparts. Daniel et al. 
15 
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(1998) and Hong and Stein (1999), each employing different behavioural or cognitive 
biases, suggest that over-reaction is the source of momentum profits. Barberis et al (BSV, 
1998) and Zhang (2006) suggest that investors under-react to new information and stock 
prices continue to move in the same direction. 
Chapter 4 attempts to propose a new behavioural explanation for the profitability of 
momentum strategies based on global data. Using a sample of 22033 stocks covering 41 
countries over the periods from 1983 to 2002 for the US, and from 1987 to 2002 for the 
rest of the world. Chapter 4 finds that momentum payoffs around the world are large and 
significant among higher uncertainty stocks, decreasing monotonically as uncertainty 
decreases. Within each of the uncertainty groups, the extreme winner and loser portfolios 
are among the higher analyst bias groups. The results suggest that analysts who are 
concerned for their reputations report forecasts in accordance with clients' beliefs and 
hence greater analyst bias when there is greater uncertainty. The extreme winner and loser 
stocks continue to move in the same directions reflecting investors' beliefs rather than the 
true set of information. In addition, the findings show that by forming a momentum 
ýqýýthat buys low uncertainty winn_ers. -and-sells, 
higil pricertainty losers investors earn 
ýLigher I its (including most Asian countries) Lhan under the Jegadeesh-Titman 
'prof 
momentum strategy. Thus investment strategies can be formed based on systematic 
behavioural bias among different groups of market participants. 
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2. Profitability of momentu ra strategies in international markets: 
The role of business cycle variables and behavioural biases 
2.1 Introduction 
iegadeesh and Titman (1993) report that a trading strategy that buys stocks that have 
recently performed well and shorts stocks that have recently performed poorly can 
generate significant positive returns. The successes of momentum trading strategies have 
challenged the rational expectations based predictions of modem finance theory as they 
violate the central theme of the efficient market hypothesis that past stock returns cannot 
be used in generating excess returns. Fama and French (1996) concede that momentum 
trading is the only CAPM-related anomaly that their three-factor model fails to explain. 
The profitability of momentum strategy is not limited to the US market; it has been 
evident in many markets around the world. For instance, Rouwenhorst (1998) examined 
twelve European countries from 1980 to 1995 and reports that taking long positions on 
winner portfolios and short positions on loser portfolios can generate a risk-adjusted 
return of more than I% per month'. 
While the existence of momentum in stock returns is well documented, there is 
considerable controversy in the literature about the sources and the interpretations of the 
apparent profits. In particular, both risk and investor behaviour based explanations have 
been put forward. Regarding risk-based explanations, Grundy and Martin (2001) use the 
Fama and French three-factor model to adjust for cross-sectional differences in risk. They 
report that neither the cross-sectional variability in required returns nor the reward for 
bearing industry risk can fully explain momentum profits. Apparently at odds with this 
view, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) find that momentum is driven by business cycle 
variables 4. By applying a predictive regression framework, they identified a possible path 
for rational pricing theories to explain momentum profits. They show that the profitability 
3 The literature on the profitability of momentum trading is very extensive. Interested readers are advised 
to consult Swinkels (2004) for an excellent survey of the literature on this issue. 
4 The motivation of using the business cycle/macroeconomic variables to explain momentum profits is 
because previous studies such as Fama and French (1989) and Pontiff and Schall (1998) show that 
macroeconomic variables can successfully predict market returns, therefore could be applied to firm-level 
momentum. 
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of momentum strategies is due to the cross-sectional differences in expected returns and 
that momentum profits are only a compensatio r bearing business cycle risk. However, 
Cooper et al. (2004) show that the predictive regression model of Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) cannot explain momentum profits following up-turns, even though it 
to some extent explains the cross section of stock returns following down-turns. 
Therefore, the ability of the business cycle to explain momentum profits remains 
unresolved. On the other hand, Cooper et al. (2004) find that momentum strategies are 
only profitable following period of UP market states, suggesting that the results are in 
line with the overreaction models of Daniel et al. (199ý) and Hong and Stein (1999). 
According to Daniel et al. (1998), the level of overconfidence increase during up-markcts 
will produce stronger over-reaction and therefore higher medium term momentum. 
Meanwhile, Hong and Stein (1999) suggest that due to the drop in risk aversion during 
wealth increase leads to stronger delayed overreaction, therefore greater momentum. 
Nevertheless, some behavioural finance theorists argue that the persistence in momentum 
profits may be attributed to the disposition effect, implying that investors are reluctant to 
sell losers and eager to dispose of winners (see Shefrin and Statman, 1985). Ranguelova 
(2001) points out that the disposition effect operates entirely through the selling 
behaviour of individual investors. As a result, momentum profits could exist in both UP 
and DOWN market states. 
Although the findings of Grundy and Martin (2001) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) 
are apparently at odds, they are not inconsistent. In particular, Avramov (2004) shows that 
return predictability based on explanatory variables in predictive regressions can be 
attributable to either predictable asset mispricing or predictable risk premiums or both. As 
a result, the findings of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) do not necessarily trace 
momentum profitability to risk based asset-pricing models. Avramov and Chordia (2006) 
overcome the limitations of Chordia and Shivakumar's (2002) model and extend the 
literature further by examining "... the empirical performance of conditional asset pricing 
models in a framework where factor loadings may vary with firm specific market 
capitalization and the book-to-market ratio as well as with business cycle related 
variables. " (p. 1). Based on such a model they report a business cycle pattern to 
18 
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momentum profits and conclude that the profitability of momentum strategies is 
attributable to a systematic rather than idiosyncratic component of stock returns. Overall, 
they show that momentum profit in the US is entirely captured by asset mispricing that 
varies with macroeconomic variables' 
The primary motivation of this chapter is twofold. First, considering the increased debate 
and evidence on the role of investors' behaviour in explaining cross-sectional and time 
series patterns of stock returns, this chapter enhances the conditional model of Avramov 
and Chordia (2006) to incorporate behavioural characteristics. In addition, this chapter 
starts by investigating whether momentum profits in European stock markets can be 
predicted using the business cycle variables in the framework of Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002). 
Second, given the prominence of price momentum in international stock markets, this 
chapter applies the conditional asset pricing model of Avramov and Chordia (2006) in 
assessing the possible business cycle patterns within momentum profits in European 
markets. This offers an out of sample test of Avramov and Chordia's (2006) model in the 
context of momentum in stock returns in three major European markets - France, 
Germany and the UK. 
Overall, this chapter makes two major contributions. First, it examines conditional 
pricing in European stock malLe ýsi the context of explaining momentum profitability, 
whereas previous work focused ' 
on US markets. Second, it nests both risk-based as well 
as behavioural-based variables" in a robust two-stage specification. The results help in 
bridging the gap of the unresolved issues on how risk and behavioural variables 2lay 
ayoffs from momentum trading. parts iý generatinU 
5 Wu (2002) shows that it is possible to capture return momentum by incorporating conditional information 
(lagged macroeconomic variables and a conditional version of the Fama-French threc-factor) into asset 
pricing. Although he sh 
* 
ows that risk is not linear when cross-sectional restrictions are imposed, the risk 
exposures remain unidentified. Unlike Wu (2002), Avramov and Chordia (2006) investigate individual 
stocks, rather than portfolios, and allow alpha to vary with business conditions. The variation in alpha 
captures momentum profitability. 
6 The behavioural variables used in the chapter include the dispersion in analysts' earnings per share (EPS) 
forecasts, the mean forecast error and the analyst coverage. These are in essence firm-specific variables. 
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In summary, this chapter demonstrates that momentum strategies are profitable in all 
three major European markets. An application of the predictive regression framework of 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) cannot capture momentum profits. However, when the 
conditional asset pricing model of Avramov and Chordia (2006) is applied, momentum 
profits are found to be related to model mispricing that varies with business cycle 
variables. This confirms that t hým-ar. e, husiness-cycle-pattems-within-momg. ntunLpr! 2f, t, SI 
but not all risk factors that are responsible for momentum in stock returns are identified. 
These findings are consistent with the evidence reported by Avramov and Chordia (2006) 
for the US markets. Moreover, the performance of the Avramov-Chordia model in 
European markets is robust to the inclusion of behavioural variables. The role of 
behavioural variables is mixed across countries, illustrating that such variables arc less 
likely to be correlated to the business cycle and unlikely to be able to explain momentum 
profits. Therefore, it would be premature to reject the ability of rational expectations 
based asset pricing models to explain momentum in stock returns. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section explains the models and 
section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 discusses the profitability of momentum trading 
strategies and the possible sources of momentum profits. Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Momentum strategies and business cycle 
2.2.1 Price momentum strategies 
To offer comparability of the results with the evidence reported in the literature, this 
chapter starts by examining the presence of price momentum in the sample countries. The 
chapter follows Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) in constructing the momentum strategies. 
One month is skipped between the formation and holding periods to avoid capturing any 
short-term price reversals or bid-ask bounce effects detected in previous studies 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995). Portfolios are formed (rebalanced) each month. Equally 
weighted holding period returns are estimated for all deciles and for winner minus loser 
(W - L) portfolios. Overlapping portfolios are constructed to increase the power of the 
tests (see, Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, for an explanation). The Newey and West (1987) 
procedure is used to control for heteroscedasti city and autocorrelation in standard errors. 
20 
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2.2.2 Business cycle model 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show that business cycle variables can explain 
momentum profits 
Qý]ýTherefbre, 
the chapter starts by employing a business cycle 
model similar to that of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) to investigate whether 
momentum profits in Europe are explained by a set of such vari ables. The 3-month 
Treasury bill yield (YLD), the value-weighted market dividend yield (DIP), the default 
risk premium (DET) and the term spread (TERM are included in the business cycle 
model. Table 2.1 presents the details (definition, measurement and source) of these 
variables for each sample country. One-month ahead-predicted returns for each sample 
stock are obtained using equation (2.1) as in Chord ia and Shivakumar (2002): 
4 
+I (pi, j BCj,, -, + J. 1 
where, Rjj is return (inclusive of dividends) of firm i in month t, BC is the vector ofj (for 
j=I to 4) macroeconomic variables representing business cycle variables (DIV, YLD, 
TERM, and DET), and cjj is the error term of stock i at time t. For each month/stock 
observation, the parameters of the model ((pij, j =0 to 4) are estimated using the previous 
60 monthly returns '. These time-varying coefficients are used to estimate the 
one-month-ahead predicted return for each stock. Next, the stocks are ranked using the 
predicted returns and long and short positions taken accordingly. The stocks are held for 
6 months from the month of portfolio formation. 
7 This chapter follows Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) to restrict the sample to stocks that have at least 24 
observations in the estimation period in order to avoid spurious parameter estimates. 
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Table 2.1 Business cycle variables, sources and their measurement 
Country 
Short-term Market Dividend Corporate Bonds Long-term financial securities Yield government bonds 
UK FTA Debenture and 
3-month Treasury Dividend yield on Loan 
Stock Redemption U. K. Gross 
UK bill Financial Times all Yield 
(1977.1-1995.10) and Redemption Yield 
Share Price Index Corporate Bond Yield on 20-year Gilts 
(1995.11-2002.6) 
Dividend yield on Germany 3-month FIBOR Germany DS-Markct Corporate bonds rate' 
constituents 
Long Term 
Government Bond 
Yield (9-10 Years 
Maturity) 
Dividend yield on Obligations private sector Government 
France Call money Rate France DS-Market yield ratC2 Guaranteed Bond 
constituents Yield (EP) 
Notes: 
1 Source: the Economist 
2 Source: Banque de France 
Unless otherwise indicated, all data are obtained from Datastream 
Measurement of variables: 
1. YLD is measured by the rate of return on short-term financial securities. 
2. DIV is measured by dividend on value-weighted broad based market index. 
3. DEF (default risk premium) is measured as 'the yield on corporate bonds' less 'the yield long-term 
government bonds'. 
4. TERM (term spread) is measured as 'the yield on long-term government bonds' less 'the yield on 
short-term financial securities'. 
2.2.3 Business cycle, known riskfactors andfirm characteristics 
The extant literature on the profitability of style investing shows that stock returns are 
dependent on firm characteristics. On the other hand, severaLas -models 
(for §Lsýing 
instance, the CAPM, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, and the Fama-French three factor 
model) ýre used in-estimating-ft risk agLsted x ectR4 returns. If the known risk factors 
and business cycle variables are sufficient in explaining the variation in stock returns, the 
explanatory power of firm characteristics should be insignificant. 
In search for an asset pricing model that can explain momentum profits, this chapter 
employs the two-pass cross-sectional regression based on the framework of Avramov and 
Chordia (2006). In their model, individual stocks are used to avoid any data-snooping 
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biases that are frequently present in portfolio based asset pricing tests. It also avoids any. - 
loss of information that coulcLpotentially arise when stocks are sorted into portfolios. 
Some conditional asset pricing framework in the literature, for example Wu (2002), only 
condition time-varying risk on market-wide information. However, in the first-pass time 
series regressions of Avramov and Chordia (2006) model, the factor loadings are allowed 
to vary with firm characteristics (size and book-to-market ratio)' and business cycle 
conditions as in equation (2.2): 
4333 
(2.2) &, =aj, O+ZajjBC -, 
FFj,, +Lg,. jBM,,, -IFFj,,, +Ap J,, -, +Lp,,, 
FF,,, +LrjSizq,, 
J. 1 J. 1 J-1 
where, Rij is the return on stock i at time t, BC is the vector of business cycle variables 
identified earlier, FF vector represents the Fama-French three factors', Size is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalisation, and BM is the natural logarithm of book-to-market 
ratio. 
In the second-pass cross-sectional regressions (equation 2.3), the returns that are adjusted 
for known risk factors and business cycle variables (R, ',,, obtained from equation 2.2) are 
regressed on firm specific variableg (firm size, book-to-market ratio and past raw 
returns): 
> 
-, + c,., .ý 
YJCCJ, I-l + 
2ý il., iPR., j (2.3) R, =Co + 
j. 1 M. 1 - 
(the dependent variable) is the sum of constant and residual return (ajo+ ýtjj) where, Rj' 
of equation (2.2). CCjit represents a vector of firm characteristici (forj = 1,2; firm size, 
book-to-market ratio) for security i at time t. PR, jj represents three sets of past 
it can also be argued that size and especially book-to-market ratio have behavioural implications. 
I thank Stefan Nagel for providing the UK 3-factor data. I also thank Kenneth French for making the 
ffML data for Germany and France available. Details about the construction of the variables can be 
obtained from http: //mba. tuck. dartmouth. edu/paees/faculty/ken. french/. I have constructed my own series 
of SMB for France and Germany following Fama and French (1996). 
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cumulative raw returns ( for m=I to 3) over the second through third (RET2-3), fourth 
through sixth (RET4-6), and seventh through twelfth (RET7-12) months prior to the 
current month to capture the medium term momentum returns. If the predictive power of 
firm characteristics is represented by the known risk factors (FF) and business cycle 
variables (BC) in equation (2.2), the coefficients of firm characteristics (yj,, ) and past 
cumulative returns (ii. j) in equation (2.3) should be insignificant. If the cross-sections of 
expected returns (aio + gij of equation 2.2) continue to experience momentum after 
adjusting for the business cycle variables and Fama-French three factors, the coefficients 
of past return variables (il .. ) should be significant and ositive. This would d alcAhc p JO& 
failure of the business cycle and-the Fama-French Mactor models to explain momentum 
profits. Statistically significant coefficients of firm specific variables (yj) and/or the firms' 
own past cumulative returns (il. ) would imply that these variables could explain the 
cross-section of individual stocks' business cycle and risk-adjusted returns. On the 
contrary, insignificant yj and il. would suggest that the business cycle model, controlled 
for known risk factors, could capture the effects of size, book-to-market ratio, and 
momentum in stock returns. 
2.2.4 Behavioural characteristics and stock returns 
A growing body of literature on behavioural finance (see for example Barberis and Thaler, 
2003) suggests that momentum in stock returns is driven by investors9 behaviour and 
divergence in opinions. If so, the variables representing business cycle, known risk 
factors and firm characteristics may not be able to explain fully stock returns and 
momentum profits. No prior study, to my knowledge, has combined both risk factors and 
behavioural characteristics. This chapter contributes to the literature by examining the 
impact of investors' behaviour on the explanatory power of the business cycle model by 
revising equation (2.3) to equation (2.4) that incorporates three measures of investor 
behaviour: 
(2.4) R, ', = Co + 1, vj., CCj +1 iiIPR, + EtkBFk., 
', 
+ ei', 
j=I m-1 k-1 
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,, 
(the dependent variable), CCjjj(company characteristics), and PR,,,,,., (past where, R, * 
cumulative raw returns) are identical to those in equation (2.3). The newly introduced 
vector BFk, jj represents k (for k=I to 3) measures of behavioural variables. The measures 
of behavioural variables are: (a) the dispersion in analysts' earnings per share (EPS) 
forecasts (Disp), (b) the mean forecast error (MFE), and (c) the analyst coverage (Cov). 
The choice of these three behavioural factors is motivated by three behavioural theories 
that have been proposed to explain momentum returns. Daniel et al. (DIIS, 1998) suggest 
investor overconfidence causes over-reaction and generates momentumjhqover-reaction 
in vrices will eventually be corrected in the long run as investors observe future news and 
realize their-aror. As a result, increased ovcrconfjdence generates momentum ii-tfi-e-slio-if 
run and reversal in the long run. This chapter employs mean forecast error as Jackson 
(2005) to capture analyst optimism, i. e. the level of (over)conridence. 
Hong and Stein (HS, 1999) argue that private information diffuses only gradually through 
the marketplace leading to an initial under-reaction to news; subsequently positive serial 
correlation in returns attracts the attention of the momentum traders who trade actively 
and ovcr-react. Eventually, prices revert back to their fundamental levels. Hong, Lim, and 
Stein (2000) use residual analysts' coverage as a proxy for the rate of information 
diffusion to test the HS model, found that the diffusion of information is lower for 
momentum stocks. 
Barberis et al (BSV, 1998) show that investors are subject to a conservatism bias which 
causes them to under-react to earnings and other corporate news, causing short-run 
positive autocorrelation, but when they observe trends of earnings rising, the positive 
signal causes them to switch to over-reaction, causing long-run negative autocorrclation. 
In particular, investors exhibit conservatism and underreact to information that contains a 
high weight when adjusting their beliefs. Doukas and McKnight (2005) use dispersion in 
analysts' forecast to proxy the weight of information. 
If momentum returns that are not explained by business cycle variables and known risk 
factors are related to behavioural variables then their coefficients (Xk) will be statistically 
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significant. In addition, a significant (non-zero) Co would suggest that these variables 
(business cycle variables, known risk factors, firm characteristics, past returns and 
behavioural variables) cannot fully explain company returns and hence there are other 
risk factors that are yet to be identified. 
2.3 The sample 
The sample includes all stocks listed (including subsequently delisted) in the French 
(Paris Bourse), German (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) and the UK (London Stock 
Exchange) stock markets between January 1977 and December 2002. The initial sample 
consists of 1,996 stocks for France, 3,063 stocks for Germany, and 4,816 stocks for the 
UK. The models used require at least three years' monthly share price data reducing the 
final sample to 1,531 stocks for France, 1,622 stocks for Germany, and 3,845 stocks for 
the UK. 
Dispersion in analysts' EPS forecasts (Disp), mean forecast error (MFE) and analyst 
coverage (Cov) that are used to represent behavioural variables are obtained/derived from 
I/B/E/S Historical Summary file. I/B/E/S records the analysts' EPS forecasts for the 
sample countries from 1987 onwards only. Therefore, in the model that requires this set 
of data, a shorter period (1987-2002) is analysed. The dispersion in analysts' forecasts 
is measured by the standard deviation of forecasted EPS scaled by the stock price per 
share at the beginning of the month of forecast. To estimate the standard deviation of the 
EPS forecast, at least two analysts are required to follow the sample stock (company). 
The mean forecast error is the difference between the average forecasted EPS and the 
actual EPS of the year, deflated by the absolute value of the mean EPS forecast. The 
analysts' coverage is set equal to the number of analysts that supply one-year EPS 
forecasts. If the number of analysts following any company is not available, the coverage 
is set to zero. 
The differential information hypothesis (Freeman, 1987) suggests that larger (smaller) 
companies are followed by more (fewer) analysts. It implies a high degree of correlation 
between the size of a firm and the intensity of its analysts' coverage. Therefore, the 
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chapter controls for the effects of firm size on analysts' coverage and measures it by the 
residual (eit) of equation (2.5): 
(2.5) ln(AC,., ) = ao + a, ln(Size,,, ) + el,, 
where, AQ, is (I+number of analysts) of firm I at month I and Sizejj is the market 
capitalization of firm I at the beginning of month t. Stock returns (111) are defined as the 
first difference of the natural log of the monthly return index (includes capital gains as 
well as dividend payment). Unless otherwise stated, all data are collected from 
Datastream. The states of the business cycle (expansionary and contractionary periods) 
are obtained from the website of Economic Cycle Research Institute 
(http: //www. businesscycle. com). 
2.4 The results 
2.4.1 Price momentum 
To examine the profitability of price momentum, the commonly used 6x6 strategy is 
used, f6flowing the methodology outlined in Jcgadeesh and Titman (1993). For each 
month t, sample stocks in each country are grouped into deciles based on their 6-month 
form ation-peri od returns. The portfolios are held for 6 months. Equally weighted returns 
are estimated for two extreme (winner and loser) portfolios for each month. The results 
(Table 2.2) show that this strategy generates (statistically significant) monthly profits of 
2.10%, 1.82% and 1.44% for the UK, Germany and France respectively. Except in the 
case of France, a large portion of momentum profits comes from loser stocks. The 
apparent profitability of this strategy is consistent with the extant evidence reported in the 
literature. In addition, focusing on the US, previous studies show negative momentum 
profitability over January (for example, Jcgadeesh and Titman (1993), Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) and Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007)). That is, at least 
in US markets, January cannot trigger momentum. Thus, the chapter also examines 
whether January records negative payoffs in the European markets investigated. 
Momentum profits for January and non-January months are estimated separately. For all 
three countries, the average monthly momentum returns for both January and 
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non-January months are positive and statistically significant. Although momentum 
payoffs in January are not negative in Europe, they are lower than in non-January months, 
indicating that the January effect does not 'oil the wheels' of momentum. 
The chapter also examines whether the profitability of momentum strategies identified 
above is related to the business cycle conditions. For both expansionary and 
contractionary periods, stocks are grouped into deciles and returns from two extreme 
portfolios (winner and loser) are analysed. Table 2.2 presents momentum profits during 
different periods of business cycle for a6x6 strategy. The estimates show that 
momentum profits are positive and signiricant during both expansionary and 
contractionary periods in all three countries. These estimates contradict the findings of 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) for the US that momentum prorits are positive during 
expansionary periods and insignificant during recessionslo. Further analysis of each 
market's expansionary and contractionary stages of business cycle during the sample 
period (not reported in the table) reveal evidence of country and business cycle stage 
specific variations in the profitability of momentum trading. In the UK, during 
expansionary (contractionary) periods momentum gains originate largely from winner 
(loser) portfolios. However, there were no such patterns in the cases of France and 
Germany. The variation in the source of momentum prorits with the stages of business 
cycle in the UK indicates that during the expansionary (contractionary) periods most 
investors continue to be optimistic (pessimistic) about the stocks that are performing well 
(poor) in the recent past while they remain almost neutral about others. This suggests a 
possibility that the momentum profits are time varying and associated with the business 
cycle in the UK kutnotin. France-and-Germany. -One possible reason that the results of 
UK is differ from Germany and France might be due to the institutional difference of the 
.,, 
which are capital market oriented economies compared to France and Germany, UK 
which is bank oriented economies. Nevertheless, such contemporary relation between 
momentum profits and the stages of business cycle does not confirm the predictive ability 
of the business cycle model. This requires further analysis as presented in the next 
section. 
10 Appendix 2 shows the performance of momentum strategies for each of the business cycle in details. 
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Table 2.2 Payoffs (Raw returns) of Price Momentum Strategies 
The average monthly returns (raw) from the 6x6 momentum trading strategy are reported. For each month 
t, sample stocks in each country are grouped into deciles based on their 6-month formation-period (from 0 
to t-2) returns. The portfolios are held for 6 months. Equally weighted returns of two extreme (winner and 
loser) portfolios for each month arc estimated. The states of business cycle (expansionary and 
contractionary periods) are obtained from the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI). The column 
entitled 'O/o>O' shows the percentage of winner minus loser (W-L) cases that are positive. The p-values (in 
parenthesis of column 'O/o>O') represent the significance level of sign test that measures whether the 
proportion of positive cases is significantly more than 50%. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on the 
Newey-West autocorrelation consistent standard errors. *(**) denotes significance at the 5(10)% level. The 
sample period is January 1977 to December 2002. 
Country No. of Sample Winner (W) Loser(L) W-L %>O f inns (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (P-value) 
January 1.56 -0.28 1.85 76.00 
(2.59*) (-0.40) (4.25*) (0.01) 
Non-January 0.87 -1.26 2.13 83.96 
(2.79*) (-2.98*) (6.83*) (0.00) 
UK 4816 Expansions 1.18 -0.56 1.74 80.64 
(3.34*) (-1.24*) (5.94*) (0.00) 
Recessions 0.34 -2.99 3.34 95.55 
(I. 11) (-3.77*) (5.96*) (0.00) 
Overall 0.93 -1.17 2.10 83.28 
(3.10*) (-2.90*) (6.65*) (0.00) 
January 0.81 -0.70 1.51 70.83 
(2.4 8 *) (-0.69) (1.51) (0.06) 
Non-January 0.34 -1.50 1.84 81.04 
(1.91**) (4.91 *) (5.85*) (0.00) 
Germany 3063 Expansions 0.68 -0.73 1.41 80.39 
(1.89**) (-1.73**) (4.0 1 *) (0.00) 
Recessions -0.30 -3.05 2.75 79.77 
(-0.85) (-2.65*) (4.74 *) (0.00) 
Overall 0.38 -1.44 1.82 80.20 
(1.41) (-2.96*) (6.04*) (0.00) 
January 0.82 -0.26 1.08 78.07 
(2.21 *) (-0.35) (1.26) (0.00) 
Non-January 0.86 -0.62 1.48 79.17 
(4.34*) (-2.83*) (5.33*) (0.01) 
France 1996 Expansions 0.71 -0.64 1.35 75.96 
(1.83**) (-1.39) (4.34*) (0.00) 
Recessions 1.40 -0.40 1.80 86.66 
(3.07*) (-0.64) (4.14*) (0.00) 
Overall 0.85 -0.59 1.44 78.16 
(2.81 *) (. 1.63) (5.4 8 *) (0.00) 
2.4.2 The role ofpredicted and stock-specific returns in momentum 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) argue that momentum in individual stock returns is 
related to business cycle risk in the economy. If their model holds for the sample 
countries and the business cycle can explain momentum profits, the holding period 
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returns not explained by the business cycle model should not be significantly different 
from zero. To examine this proposition, momentum portfolios are formed on raw returns. 
However, the holding period returns are adjusted for the one month ahead predicted 
return obtained from the business cycle model (equation 2.1)! '. The unexplained portion 
of the returns is defined as the intercept plus the residual (i. e. yio + eit) of equation (2.1). 
The intercept (9jo) is considered not predictable as it may capture part of returns from the 
formation period. Predicted returns are defined as actual returns less unexplained returns. 
Thus, this model controls for any differences in average returns that are not related to 
business cycle. 
Table 2.3 (panel A) reports the average holding period returns from momentum strategies 
that are controlled for business cycle effects. The estimates show that the profits are 
statistically insignificant for the UK (-0.47%) but significant for Germany (4.64%) and 
France (3.56%). These findings indicate that the predictive power of past returns is 
limited to the portion of returns that is predictable by business cycle variables for the UK, 
but not for France and Germany. However, it is also possible that the business cycle 
model simply captures the information contained in past raw returns. Hence, whether the 
momentum profits are attributable to the predicted part of the business cycle model or the 
unexplained portion of the returns is further investigated. If momentum payoff is 
attributable only to the predicted portion of returns, then no momentum profits should be 
earned by sorting stocks on the basis of their returns or on the unexplained part of returns. 
To compare the profitability of momentum strategies based on the components of returns 
predicted by business cycle variables with the profitability of strategies based on the 
unexplained component of returns (or stock-specific returns), as in Grundy and Martin 
(2001), all stocks are ranked into quintile portfolios according to their compounded 
stock-specific returns (unpredicted) during the six-month formation-period. The predicted 
and stock-specific returns are estimated as follows. Using equation (2.1), 
one-period-ahead predicted returns for each stock are obtained. The unexplained (or 
stock-specific) return is defined as the sum of the intercept and residual of the business 
Appendix 3 shows the descriptive statistics of business cycle variables used in this chapter. 
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cycle model (i. e. 9jo + cij of equation 2.1). The momentum strategy based on these 
stock-specific returns takes a long (short) position on the stocks with the highest (lowest) 
stock-specific returns during the formation period. The holding period starts one month 
after the end of the formation period and stocks are then held for the subsequent 
six-month period. Table 2.3 (panel B) presents the monthly profits from portfolios based 
on stock-specific (unexplained) returns. The estimates show that payoffs from this 
momentum trading are not significantly different from zero in any of the sample countries. 
However, the strategies based on predicted returns (panel C, Table 2.3) seem to generate 
positive and significant profits for the UK (1.10%) but not for France and Germany. 
These 
- 
results confirm the findings of the preceding section that momentum profits can be 
12 A two-way dependent sort is conducted between momentum portfolios based on past raw returns and 
predicted returns. The effects of conditioning on the state of the market are also analysed. Both 
investigations, however, confirm the earlier conclusions. 
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Table 2.3 Payoffs from Momentum Strategy and the Business Cycle 
Business-cycle adjusted holding period (6-month) returns from two extreme deciles are reported in all three 
panels. Portfolios in panel A are formed on raw returns (R) during the formation period. Portfolios in panel 
B are formed on stock-specific returns that are not predicted by business cycle. Portfolios in panel C are 
formed on the returns predicted by the business cycle model. Business-cycle-adjusted returns and predicted 
returns for each stock i (and for each month 1) are computed by estimating equation (2.1): 
4 
(2.1) R1,1 = (pi, +Z (pi, j BCj,, -, + ej,, J. 1 
Where, BC represents business cycle variables (DIV, YLD, TERM, and DEF). The adjusted return is given 
by the unexplained portion of the model (i. e. 91, o + ej, I), while the predicted return (PR) is actual minus 
unexplained. The model parameters are estimated using data from time 1-1 through 1-60. The column 
entitled 'O/o>O' shows the percentage of winner minus loser (W-L) cases that are positive. The p-values (in 
parenthesis of column '%>O') represent the significance level of the sign test that measures whether the 
proportion of positive cases is significantly more than 50%. T-statistics, given in parenthesis, are adjusted 
for autocorrelation and hcteroscedasti city. *(**) denotes significance at the 5(10)% level. The sample 
period is January 1979 to December 2002 and firms that have a minimum of three years'data are included. 
Panel A: Sort on raw returns, R; adjusted payoffs are (pio + C1, & 
Winner (W) Loser (L) W-L %>O 
Country (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (P-value) 
4.57 5.04 -0.47 59.26 UK (4.41 *) (2.97*) (-0.23) (0.00) 
Germany 3.50 -1.14 4.64 64.68 (2.41 *) (-0.75) (4.18*) (0.00) 
France 11.29 7.34 3.56 56.67 (7.52*) (3.92*) (2.60*) (0.05) 
Panel B: Sort on (pi. 0 + c1j; payoffs are raw returns, 
Winner (W) Loser (L) W-L %>O 
Country (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (P-value) 
-0.31 -0.15 -0.17 48 70 UK (-0.70) (-0.47) (-0.74) . (0.71) 
Germany -0.01 -0.23 0.22 53.02 (-0.04) (-0.65) (0.86) (0.39) 
France 0.05 0,03 0.02 45.69 (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.21) 
Panel C: Sort on predicted return, PR; Ta offs are raw returns, R. y Its 
Country Winner (W) Loser (L) W-L %>O (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (P-value) 
UK 0.20 -0.90 1.10 72.86 (0.58) (-2.21 *) (4.40*) (0.00) 
Germany -0.04 -0.16 0.12 56.47 (-0.11) (-0.49) (0.49) (0.06) 
France 0.17 -0.12 0.29 59.05 (0.44) (-0.35) (1.01) (0.01) 
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2.4.3 The effects of conditioning on the state of the market 
A recent paper by Cooper et aL (2002) documents that momentum strategies arc 
significantly influenced by market conditions, given that prorits of momentum strategies 
are substantially higher when the market is bullish. Additionally, they illustrate that using 
the macroeconomic model suggested by Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) fails to explain 
the asymmetries in the momentum prorits. Thus, the aim of this section is to investigate 
how the state of the market affects the profitability of momentum strategies in the sample 
countries. 
For the reported results, the equal ly-wei ghted returns of all securities listed on the 
London Stock Exchange for the UK, Frankfurt Stock Exchange for Germany and the 
French Stock Market over the 36 months prior to the beginning of the strategy's holding 
period have been employed. If the market's three-year mean return is non-negative 
(negative), the state of the market is defined as UP (DOWN). Consideration has also been 
given to a two-year and a one:. year definition of the market's state. 
In Panel A of Table 2.4, the average raw returns to the momentum strategy that follow 
three-year UP market is 1.65% in the UK, 1.29% in Germany and 1.22% in France. 
Besides, the performances of the momentum strategy under two-year and one year UP 
states are similar in all three countries. In addition, Panel B shows that profits can also be 
earned following DOWN market. All three DOWN states in the sample countries provide 
significantly positive payoffs, which are higher than UP states and associated with higher 
standard deviations. Contrary to the results documented by Cooper et al. (2002) that 
momentum profits exclusively follow UP periods, the results do not support the view that 
by conditioning on the state on the market has dramatic impact on the momentum profits. 
In order to examine the robustness of the macroeconomic model (2.1) in explaining the 
profits of momentum strategies in the UK". Table 2.5 presents two-way dependent sorts, 
stocks in each month are first sorted into deciles based on their predicted returns (t to t+5) 
13 The previous sections suggest that the macroeconomic model does not explain momentum profits in 
Germany and France. Thus, this chapter only focus on the performance of model in explaining the UK 
momentum profits. 
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from the business cycle model (2.1), each of these deciles are then further sorted based on 
the raw returns in the formation period (1-7 to t-2). The average monthly return to each of 
the 100 portfolios over the holding period Q to t+5) is reported, and separated into UP 
and DOWN markets at time t-1. Finally, the average payoffs to momentum strategy 
within each of the predicted return deciles are also reported. 
Panel A of Table 2.5 shows that within each of the predicted return deciles, the mean 
returns are generally decreasing across the raw return deciles. Furthermore, the strategy 
that buys winners and sells losers based on raw returns is found to earn significantly 
negative payoffs for all ten predicted return deciles. Similar results are found in Panel B 
and suggest that there is no momentum profits after DOWN states. 
Unlike Cooper et al. (2002), who documented that there are significant momentum 
profits after UP states within all of the predicted return deciles. Rather, the results suggest 
that no profits could be earned in each of the predicted return decilcs, thus provide a 
strong belief that the macroeconomic model is capable to explain the momentum profits, 
there is no evidence on different perspective between UP and DOWN market in the UK. 
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Table 2.5 Two way dependent sorts: Ranked by Predicted Returns and then Raw 
Returns in UP and Down States in the UK 
For each month t, all stocks are first sorted into deciles based on their six-month (t to t+5) 
cumulative predicted returns from the business cycle model. Each predicted returns decile is then 
further sorted into deciles based on their raw returns over the prior six months (1-7 to t-2). 
Non-negative (negative) mean equal ly-weightcd returns of all securities listed on London Stock 
Exchange during month 1-36 to t-I define UP (DOWN) markets. The two-way dcpendent sorts 
result in 100 portfolios. All stocks are equally weighted in a portfolio. For each portfolio, the table 
reports the mean monthly returns (in %) over the holding period months t to t+5) following 
UP(DOWN) markets. The sample period is January 1979 to June 2002. t-statistics (in parenthesis) 
are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Predicted 
returns 
1 
(Low) 
2 3 
Panel A: Three-year UP markets 
Raw retums 
45678 9 10 
(Iligh) 
High - Low 
Q-stat) 
I (Low) -2.61 -3.22 -3.04 -3.48 -2.91 -3.08 -2.88 -3.18 -3.07 -3.50 -0.89 (-1.92) 2 -0.87 -0.89 -0.88 -1.06 -1.02 -1.16 -1.09 -1.14 -1.28 -1.83 -0.95 (-2.57)* 3 0.10 -0.38 . 0.31 -0.24 -0.35 -0.40 -0.58 -0.42 -0.76 -1.22 -1.32 (-3.87)* 4 -0.06 0.18 0.00 0.21 0.13 0.11 0.07 -0.09 -0.30 -0.62 -0.56 (-1.73) 5 0.64 0.43 0.98 0.51 0.48 0.41 0.38 0.15 0.39 -0.14 -0.78 (-2.22)* 6 1.29 0.74 0.88 0.90 0.74 0.76 0.49 0.48 0.36 0.00 -1.29 (-4.05)* 7 1.54 1.27 1.20 1.03 1.16 1.13 0.90 1.15 0.91 0.09 -1.45 (-4.51)* 8 1.84 1.60 1.69 1.47 1.58 1.60 1.40 1.37 0.91 0.44 -1.40 (-4.13)* 9 2.73 2.32 2.17 2.14 2.25 1.92 1.88 1.67 1.42 1.01 -1.73 (-4.71)* IO(High) 4.20 3.42 3.21 3.15 2.72 2.83 2.96 2.56 2.09 1.49 -2.71 (-5.06)* 
Predicted 
returns 
1 
(Low)_ 
2 
Panel B: Three-year DOWN markets 
Raw returns 
345678 9 10 
(Ifigh) 
H igh - Low 
(1-stat) 
I (Low) -4.63 -5.33 -5.97 -5.72 -6.64 -5.24 -5.77 -6.09 -5.95 -6.10 . 1.47 (-1.90) 2 -1.54 -2.20 -2.46 -2.50 -2.95 -2.86 -2.81 -3.24 -3.26 -2.51 . 0.98 (-1.53) 3 -1.32 -1.42 -1.68 -1.56 -1.49 -1.62 -1.83 -1.44 -1.62 -2.05 . 0.73 (-1.20) 4 -0.41 -0.52 -0.64 -0.72 -0.81 -0.74 -0.75 -0.85 -0.76 -0.97 -0.56 (-0.96) 5 0.33 0.09 0.31 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 -0.19 -0.10 -0.37 -0.52 -0.85 (-1.63) 6 1.15 0.56 0.36 0.51 0.50 0.65 0.24 0.21 0.29 0.15 -1.00 (-2.19)* 
7 1.25 0.82 1.14 0.85 0.79 0.92 0.89 0.98 0.69 0.45 -0.80 (-1.65) 
8 2.07 1.44 1.46 1.45 1.42 1.54 1.32 1.29 1.21 1.10 -0.97 (-1.83) 
9 2.50 2.13 1.94 2.02 2.05 1.90 1.87 1.96 1.88 1.68 -0.82 (-1.41) 
10(fligh) 4.59 3.64 3.20 3.52 3.25 3.42 3.29 3.44 3.41 2.73 -1.86 (-1.99)* 
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2.4.4 Decomposition ofmomentum profits 
Thus far, this chapter finds that employing a macroeconomic multifactor model can 
explain momentum profits in the UK, while the model fails to explain the momentum 
profits in'Germany and France. This section follows Chordia and Shivakumar (p. 1009, 
2002) to decompose the momentum profits to provide a robustness test for the preceding 
sections. This section is based on the following model: 
LM 
(2.6) ult +I Ak At + 1: Otm zmt + eu 
k-I M-I 
where r is the return on security i, ýLj, is the expected return on security i conditional on 
the information set at time t. fk, is the return on the factor mimicking portfolio k, PA 
is the factor loading of security I on factor k, e,, is the firm-spccific component of return, 
z., represents industry portfolio returns orthogonal to the returns on the factor-mimicking 
portfolios, and 0 im is stock i's sensitivity to the return on industry m. 
During construction, the K factor portfolios, the industry components, and the 
idiosyncratic terms are contemporaneously uncorrelated. We therefore assume 
E(fitfkt-, ) = 0, for all I#k; 
E(ei, fj, 
-, 
)=O, forall I#j; 
E(z, 
nlz,,, -, 
)=O, forall mon; 
E(z,,, 
tfkt-h)=O, forallm, kandh=±1; 
E(eitfkl-h) = 0, for all i, k, and h =: Ll; 
E(e,, z,,,, -h) = 
0, for all i, m, and h= ±1; 
where E(e,, ) =0 for all i, and E(z,,,, ) =0 for all m. 
Momentum strategies are formed based on the previous sections. For each month t, all 
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stocks in each country are allocated into deciles based on their six- month formation 
period from t-7 to t-2. Decile portfolios are formed monthly by weighting equally all 
firms in that decile ranking. The position is held for the following six. month period (t to 
t+5). In order to obtain a profitable self- financing momentum strategy, past winner have 
to continue to outperform and past losers have to continue to underperform. The expected 
momentum profits are: 
(2.7) E[(r,, -r, )(r,, -, -r> 
where a bar over a variable denotes its cross-sectional average. 
Based on the assumed return-generating process, the momentum profits can be 
decomposed as followed: 
K-2 
(2.8) E[(ri, - Ft)(rt-I - FI-1)] ý-- (pil - Tt)(pit-I - ; 71-1) + Y, (Pik - flk ) Cov(fkl, fkt-1) 
k-I 
m 
(0j" 
M=l 
")2 
COV(Z Z .. 
+ Cov(ei,, e,, -, 
) 
Average over all N stocks, the momentum profits equal 
i Ar L Al 
2 COV(, 
mt, , nt_, 
) 
., 
(, u,, -+1: a" Cov(fkt, 
fkt-0 + Za (2.9) -1: 6k 0. N j=1 k=l M-1 
N 
L Cov(ei,, ei, -, 
) 
N j=1 
where 
2 
and a2 are the cross-sectional variances of the portfolio loadings and the I 07A 0. 
industry sensitivities, respectively. 
Equation 2.9 decomposes expected momentum profits into four components. The first 
component , (pi, - A)(, u,, -, - 
T, 
-, 
) , is the cross-sectional variance of expected returns. 
If stocks that have expected returns that are higher than the cross-sectional mean, during 
both portfolio formation and holding periods, this component will increase momentum 
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L 
profits. The second component , Laý, C6v(fkt, fk, _j) , is the serial correlation in the k=1 
M 
factors. The third component, ZaO. Cov(zmtpzmt_j), is the serial correlation in the 
M=1 
industry return components. The last term , Cov(e,,, e,, -, 
) , is the average serial 
correlation of the idiosyncratic component of returns, determined by stock price reactions 
to firm-specific information. 
I 
Table 2.6 reports the results of the decomposition of momentum proflits. The main 
contribution to the UK momentum profits is due to the cross-sectional variance of 
expected returns (86.75%). Further, the cross-sectional variance of expected returns 
remains as the main contribution to the momentum profits within both winner and loser 
portfolios. Rather, the situation with respect to France and Germany are very different. 
This chapter does not find any clear contribution for the momentum strategies in 
Germany and France. Yet, this chapter does not find any main sources of momentum 
profits in the winner portfolio. Rather, the findings show that the main contribution to 
momentum profits in France and Germany are due to underreaction to firm-spccific 
information from the loser portfolios. To sum up, the decomposition of momentum 
profits thus reinforce the previous sections that momentum Profits are driven by the 
cross-sectional variation of expected returns in the UK, while underreaction to 
firm-specific information is the main source of momentum profits in France and 
Germany. This section also f"inds that the underreaction phenomenon is more pronounced 
for the losers than for the winners. 
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Table 2.6 The decomposition of momentum profits 
Momentum strategies are formed in the manner described in Table 2.2. The 
classifications of the expansionary and contractionary periods are obtained from the 
Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI). The percentage contributions (in 
parenthesis) are generated by dividing a, 8, (p, and Q by absolute value of the 
exnected profits, E(n). 
UK 
E(7r) Cr (P 0 
0.00131 0.00009 -0.00015 0.00026 Winner - Loser 0.00151 (86.75%) (5.96%) (-9.93%) (19.85%) 
0.00150 -0.00001 -0.00016 0.00019 Winner 0.00152 (98.68%) (-0.67%) (-10.52%) (12.50%) 
0.00112 0.00018 -0.00002 0.00034 Loser 0.00162 (69 . 14%) (11.11%) 
(-1.23%) (20.99%) 
Germa ny 
E(n) Cr 8 (P rl 
0.00007 0.00019 0.00004 0.00027 
Winner - Loser 0.00057 (12.28%) (33.33%) '(7.02%) (47.37%) 
0.00025 0.00008 0.00004 0.00018 
Winner 0.00055 (45.45%) (14.55%) (7.27%) (32.73%) 
-0.00010 -0.00015 0.00009 0.00061 Loser 0.00 (-22.22%) (-33.33%) (20.00%) (135.56%) 
France 
E(n) Cr q) (I 
0,00061 0.00011 -0.00015 0.00062 Winner - Loser 0.00119 (51.26%) (9.24%) (-12.61%) (52.10%) 
0.00016 0.00015 -0.00016 0.00014 Winner 0.00029 (55.17%) (51.72%) (-55.17%) (48.28%) 
0.00036 0.00012 -0.00009 0.00111 Loser 0.00150 (24.00%) (8.00%) (-6.00%) (74.00%) 
Notes: 
E(n) = E[(ri, - 
cy = (pl, 
K 
ö= 1 (ßik 2 COV(fkt 
9 
fkl-1) 
k-1 
ki 
(P = 2: (0,. - Ö. ), Cov(z.  Z., -, ) m-1 Cl = 
2.4.5 Time-varying riskpremia and conditional model 
The results based on the linear time series predictive regression framework, discussed in 
previous sections, show that momentum profits can bet-explained-by-theJ2ujiness cycle 
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for the_-U]UuLnot-for-aance-and__Germaýy- Although such approach accounts for 
time-varying expected returns, it does not allow factor loadings to vary with conditioning 
information. Therefore, to examine whether the predictability of the business cycle model 
in the UK is due to time-varying risk premia, or time varying asset pricing 
misspecification or both, the two-pass cross-sectional regression model of Avramov and 
Chordia (2006) is employed. This model allows for both risk and expected return to 
vary with conditioning information. 
The coefficients of the two-pass cross-sectional regression model (equation 2.3) arc 
reported in Table 2.7. Panel A shows the payoffs from the unconditional model (similar 
to Fama and Macbeth, 1973) where yy and &U (the coefficients of product terms) of 
equation (2.2) arc restricted to zero. Panel B presents the conditional model where size 
and book-to-market ratio are the conditioning variables for the factor loadings. In both 
models (panels A and B), the coefficients of past returns (RET 2-3, RET 4-6 and RET 
7-12) are negative but insignificant in most cases. Further, the cross-sectional averages of 
coefficients of determination (iZ2 ) in panel B are slightly lower than those in panel A 
indicating that the conditional model (panel B) is marginally better in explaining the 
impact of firm characteristics on risk-adjusted returns. The results show that when alpha 
varies with business cycle variables, the firm-level momentum returns have no impact on 
the cross-section of expected returns unrelated to business cycle. This does not suggest 
that momentum profit is a compensation for bearing business cycle risk, but it reflects an 
existence of a business cycle pattern within the profitability of momentum strategies. This 
evidence is consistent with the finding of Avramov and Chordia (2006) and suggests that 
there might be an unidentified risk factor related to the business cycle that captures the 
momentum in stock prices. These findings may also be interpreted in a way consistent 
with investors' behaviour based models. For instance, investors may under-react to good 
news during expansionary periods and over-react to bad news during recessions. In 
reality, both of these could drive price momentum. To examine whether investors' 
behaviour is responsible for momentum in stock prices, this section extendi-tii-e -MOdel to 
incorporate behavioural variables (see equation 2.4). 
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Table 2.7 Two-pass cross-sectional regression and time varying alpha 
Time-series average of individual stocks' cross-sectional OLS regression coefficient (equation 2.3) for all 
securities in the UK, Germany and France are reported. 
23 
R,, = CO + PR +e (2.3) YYjjCCjj"-1+I: 17., I M"'I-I V 
J. 1 M-I 
Where, Ri*, is the unpredicted component (aj,,, +pj, j) of time series equation (2.2): 
433.3 
(2.2) A,, =ai, o +2, ai, jBCj., -, +EA, jFFj,, +2, r,,, 
Size,,, 
-, 
FF,,, +2:, 61, jBMI,, -IFFj,, +A,,, J-1 J-1 J-1 J-1 
CCj,,, t is a vector of firm characteristic j 0=1,2 i. e. firm size, book-to-market ratio of security) of stock! at 
time t (i. e. ), PR,,,, i, t are the past cumulative raw returns of stock i over the second through third (RET2-3) 
fourth through sixth (RET4-6), and seventh through twelfth (RET7-12) months prior to the current month t. 
In equation (2.2) size is the logarithm of market capitalisation, BM is the logarithm of book-to-market ratio. 
BC is a vector of business cycle variables ((DIV, YLD, TEM, and DEF) and FF is a vector representing the 
Fama-Frcnch three factors. 
Equation (2.3) is estimated for two separate dependent variables generated by unconditional and 
conditional versions of equation (2.2). First, in estimating the unconditioned dependent variable vu and 5d of 
equation (2.2) are set to zero. The estimates of equation (2.3) based on this dependent variable are reported 
in panel A. Second, to obtain the conditioned dependent variable, size and book-to-market ratio in equation 
(2.2) are set to be the conditioning variables for the factor loadings. The estimates of equation (2.3) based 
on this dependent variable are reported in panel B. Vis the time-scries average of monthlyV. T-statistics 
(reported in parenthesis) are adjusted for autocorrelation and hcteroscedasti city. All coefficients are 
multiplied by 100. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10)% level. 
0 Panel A: Dependent va iable ( i'l ) is unconditional 
Country Intercept SIZE BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 iZ2 0 (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) ( 
1.213 -0.564 -0.860 -0.489 -0.461 -1.099 3 87 UK (6.5 8 *) (47.1 *) (-10.1*) (-0.86) (-0.89) (-2.16*) . 
Germany 1.094 -0.241 -1.067 2.109 4.390 . 1.313 4.55 (4.13*) (-6.90*) (-9.19*) (0.98) (1.13) (-0.26) 
France 0.568 -0.228 -0.765 -1.233 -1.050 -3.093 4.89 (1.61) (4.8 1 *) (-7.71 *) (-0.92) (-0.58) (-1.40) 
Panel B: Dependent variable (Ri*, ) is conditioned on size and book-to-markct ratio 
CI 
Intercept SIZE BM RET2-3 RET4.6 RET7-12 R2 ountry (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) 
1.173 -0.507 -0.493 -0.342 -0.586 -0.819 3 14 UK (5.64*) (- 12.6 *) (-5.44*) (-0.56) (-1.09) . (-1.66) 
Germany 
1.707, -0.285 
* 
-0.791 -3.723 -0.447 -11.164 4.05 * (6.92*) (-6.15 ) (-7.11 *) (-1.31) (-0.13) (-2.51 ) 
2.603 -0.382 -0.292 -1.903 -3.912 -6.364 4 65 France (8.33*) (-8.50*) (-3.30*) (-1.32) (-2.13 *) . (-2.30*) 
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The dependent variables (unconditional and conditional) of equation (2.4) are derived 
with and without imposing the values of Yjj and Sjj equal to zero in equation (2.2). Panel 
A of Table 2.8, where the dependent variable is derived by restricting yjj and (5ij equal to 
zero (unconditional), shows that the coefficients of prior returns (RET2-3, RET4-6 and 
RET7-12) remain negative (significant or insignificant). The, results suggest that the 
inclusion of behavioural characteristics in the model does not Kfect-the-notioq_ that 
momentum patterns are risk-based, and they are linked to business cycle. 
Panel B of Table 2.8 presents the conditional model with size and book-to-market ratio 
being the conditioning variables for the factor loadings. The sample of panel B'is also 
subdivided into three groups: portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in 
the worst performing 30%, portfolio P2 contains the middle 40%,, and portfolio P3 
includes the best-performing 30%. The sub-sampling allows to examine how winner and 
loser stocks behave individually with the business cycle. The overall results suggest that 
g, i icients. e-.: _q 
the coefr _pf prior returns when 
behavioural 
variables are included in thq_mqdet (equation 2.4). The coefficients remain negative and, 
in most cases, significant. These negative and significant slopes of prior returns suggest 
that the conditioning information (i. e. business cycle variables and Fama-French three 
factors) over-explain the momentum profits. Such findings are in line with the findings of 
Grundy and Martin (2001) who documented that momentum strategies based on 
Fama-French three factors 
The role of behavioural variables is mixed across the countries examined, having 
relatively stronger influence in France and the UK than in Germany. Such indings 
illustrate that the behavioural variables are less likely to be correlated ajt! j_t4QIqsJiness 
cycle, and hence behavioural variables are unlikely candidates in explaining momentum 
profits. 
The results based on sub-samples show that much of the coefficient of Prior returns 
(negative and significant) are from portfolio 2 (P2). This suggests that the 
over-explanatory power by the conditioning information and risk factors concentrates on 
the non-momentum stocks, except for RET7-12 where, in most cases, the returns are 
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negative and significant. This implies a reversal in conditioning information adjusted 
momentum profit within a year. Overall, these results confirm the chapter's earlier 
findings that there are indeed business cycle patterns within momentum profits, even after 
controlling for investors' behaviour and prior price trend. "' 
2.4.6 Industry momentum 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) claim that industry effects are almost entirely 
responsible for the momentum effect in the US, while Grundy and Martin (2001) 
document that industry momentum and individual stock momentum are distinct 
phenomena. This section analyses the relationship between the business cycle and 
industry momentum profits and examine whether it is the industry returns or the 
component of returns predicted by macroeconomic variable that better explains 
individual stock momentum. 
For each month t, all stocks are used to compute equally weighted industry returns. Table 
2.9 shows the 10 industry classifications. The time series of industry returns is then used 
to form the winner and the loser portfolios. The winner (loser) portfolio is the equally 
weighted return of the top (bottom) industry with the highest (lowest) raw returns in the 
six-month formation-period from 0 to t-2. The momentum profit is then computed over 
the holding period Q to t+5). 
14 Equation (2.2) was revised to equation (2.2') to incorporate behavioural variables. 
4333 
(Z2') ý,, Sbg FF +Y-8,,, Bg, 4FF,,, +ALET, +, V&1; 4 +ýCbý., +144 J=I J-1 ý-I I't J-4 
Where, BC is a vector of business cycle, variables, FF is a vector representing the Fama-French three 
factors, Size is the logarithm of market capitalisation, BM is the logarithm of book-to-market ratio, Disp is 
the dispersion of analysts' forecasts, MFE is the mean forecast error, and Cov is the analyst coverage. The 
results, however, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.7 (panel B). 
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Table 2.8 Two-pass cross-sectional regression, time varying alpha and behavioural 
variables 
Equation (2.3) is estimated for two separate dependent variables generated by unconditional and 
conditional versions of equation (2.2) (see Table 2.7). First, in estimating the unconditioned dependent 
variable vj and Sy of equation (2.2) are set to zero. The estimates of equation (2.3) based on this dependent 
variable are reported in panel A. Second, to obtain the conditioned dependent variable, size and 
book-to-market ratio in equation (2.2) are set to be the conditioning variables for the factor loadings. The 
estimates of equation (2.4) based on this dependent variable are reported in panel B. 
233 
(2.4) Ri, =Co +IvjCCI +Eim, iPRm, 1, f +2:, 
t, BF, +e, 
j=I m=I k-1 
Where, Rj*, is the unpredicted component (aj,,, +, uj,, ) of time series equation (2.2) as in Table 2.7. CCj, i, t is 
a vector of firm characteristic ja=1,2, i. e. firm size, book-to-market ratio of security) of stock i at time t. 
PR,, i, t are the past cumulative raw returns of stock i over the second through third (RET2-3) fourth through 
sixth (RET4-6), and seventh through twelfth (RET7-12) months prior to the current month t. BFk, i represent 
investors' behaviour that are measured by (a) the dispersion in analysts' EPS forecasts (Disp) measured by 
the standard deviation in EPS forecasts scaled by the stock price per share at the beginning of the forecast 
month; (b) mean forecast error (MFE) estimated as the difference between the average forecasted EPS and 
the actual EPS deflated by the absolute value of the mean forecasted EPS; and (c) analyst coverage (Cov) 
measured by the number of analysts providing one year ahead EPS forecasts. Portfolio PI is an equally 
weighted portfolio of stocks in the worst-performing 30%, portfolio P2 contains the middle 40%, and 
portfolio P3 includes the best-performing 30%. Vis the time-series average of monthly'R. T-statistics 
(reported in parenthesis) are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. All coefficients are 
multiplied by 100. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10)% level. 
0 Panel A: The dependent variable ( Ri. t ) is unconditional 
Intercept SIZE BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Disp MFE COV -2 Country (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) 
UK -1.01' -0.11 -0.10 -1.33 -0.31 -0.58 -5.73 -22.37 
0.42 9.85 (-0.95) (-0.56) (-0.32) (-0.80) (-0.22) (-0.42) (-0.60) (-1.08) ( 0.50) 
-0.06 -0.28 -1.41 -5.50 -7.62 -32.05 -0.58 -1.67 45*80 13.59 Germany (-0.06) (-2.32*) (-3.27*) (-0.82) (-1.11) (-3.66*) ( 1.02) (-5.61*) (1.32) 
France "6.28 0.49 0.32 -10.79 -0.60 -10.78 -0.23 -28.34 -1.35 22.72 (-9.85*) (4.03*) (0.88) (-1.52) (-0.14) (-2.24*) (-0.70) (-1.50) (-0.08) 
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Table 2.8 continued 
Panel B: The dependent variable ( Ri*t ) is conditioned on size and book-to-market ratio 
UK 
Intercept 
(T-stat) 
SIZE 
(T-stat) 
BM 
(T-stat) 
RET2-3 
(T-stat) 
RET4-6 
(T-stat) 
RET7-12 
(T-stat) 
Disp 
(T-stat) 
MFE 
(T-stat) 
Covt 
(T-sta 
iZ2 N 
8.70 -0.58 -0.58 -4.93 0.24 -17.52 -76.68 98.28 1.52 33 57 P3 (7.29*) (-2.83*) (-1.47) (-1.66**) (0.08) (-7.03*) (-2.48*) (1.04) 1.15) . 
P2 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -5.06 -2.67 -21.27 
9.45 -1.43 0.01 24.61 (0.24) (-1.66**) (-0.88) (-2.41 *) (-1.52) (-11.34*) (0.62) (-0.09) (0.01) 
Pi -14.37 
1.17 0.87 -1.01 0.72 -16.15 181.19 183.45 -4.75 31.38 
(-3.53*) (1.34) (0.73) (-0.78) (0.23) (-4.45*) (0.95) (1.09) (-1.54) 
Overall -1.70 -0.03 -0.62 -2.26 -1.31 -1.92 -8.71 
19.26 , 1.44 5.31 (-3.20*) (-0.29) (-4.49*) (-1.77**) (-1.25) (-2.21*) (-1.14) (2.30*) (-2.49*) 
German 
Intercept 
(T-stat) 
SIZE 
(T-stat) 
BM 
(T-stat) 
RET2-3 
(T-stat) 
RET4-6 
(T-stat) 
RET7-12 
(T-stat) 
Disp 
(T-stat) 
MFE 
(T-stat) 
Cov 
R2 
(T-stat) N 
7.87 -0.51 -1.63 -2.15 10.08 -104.70 0.06 -2.73 23.39 P3 (6.20*) (-3.82*) (-2.76*) (-0.46) - (0.87) (-8.5 1 *) (0.09) (-4.06*) 
31.22 
(0.57) 
2.44 -0.40 -0.62 -3.98 7.48 -172.20 -0.27 -1.66 -54.29 31 52 P2 
(1.30) (-3.03*) (-0.83) (-0.82) (0.70) (-10.97*) (-0.43) (-3.34*) . (-0.96) 
Pi -10.78 
0.39 -2.28 0.91 -4.62 -104.16 0.29 -2.98 -9.65 29.25 (-2.09*) (0.62) (-2.33*) (0.10) (-0.39) (-6.94*) (0.63) (-2.32*) (-0.87) 
Overall -0.56 -0.18 -1.91 
1.34 3.21 -13.26 -0.07 -2.22 0.95 8.49 (-0.71) (-2.17*) (-6.71*) (0.33) (0.54) (-1.71**) (-0.42) (-7.07*) (0.16) 
France 
Intercept 
(T-stat) 
SIZE 
(T-stat) 
BM 
(T-stat) 
RET2-3 
(T-stat) 
RET4-6 
(T-stat) 
RET7-12 
(T-stat) 
Disp 
(T-stat) 
MFE 
(T-stat) 
Cov 
(T-stat) N 
0.38 0.87 -3.74 -30.17 -72.94 -215.47 0.62 -54.82 62.44 P3 (0.05) (0.63) (-1.05) (-1.20) (-1.58) (-1.42) (0.16) (-0.98) 20.90 (0.47) 
P2 -8.92 
1.50 -1.42 -21.43 -57.96 -224.67 0.99 -14.96 -349.36 14 34 (1.41) (1.72**) (-0.94) (-1.64**) (-2.20*) (-3.99*) (0.48) (-0.37) . (- 1.93 * *) 
Pi 
19.86 -2.99 -3.11 27.01 28.96 -52.47 -20.77 56.54 -878.68 23 82 (0.98) (-0.94) (-0.64) (0.56) (0.34) (-0.25) (-1.91**) (0.60 . (. 1.43) 
Overall -4.03 
0.33 -0.77 -4.77 -2.80 -10.77 -1.59 -19.33 20.85 9 14 (4.73 *) (3.09*) (-4.04*) (-2.00*) (-0.84) (-1.81**) (-6.09*) (-4.38* . ) (1.85**) 
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Table 2.9 Datastream's industrv classifications' 
INDC3 Definitions 
BASIC Basic Industries 
CYCGD Cyclical Consumer Goods 
CYSER Cyclical Services 
GENIN General Industries 
ITECH Information Technology 
NCYCG Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
NCYSR Non-Cyclical Services 
RESOR Resources 
TOTLF Financials 
OTHERS Companies without classifications 
' Industry data were obtained from Datastream to construct the industry portfolios. Ten industries were 
used according to Datastream's industry classification, Datatype INDC3. 
Table 2.10 (Panel A) reports the average profits to the industry momentum, in line with 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). The profits are significantly positive in all three 
countries. While the industry momentum profits are lower than the individual momentum 
profits in the UK and Germany, the case of France is opposite. Panel A also presents the 
industry momentum profits that are based on the predicted return from the business cycle 
in equation (2.1). The results show that momentum profits based on predicted returns are 
significantly positive in the UK only. This result is consistent with those of the price 
momentum. 
In order to examine if price momentum is caused by the industry effect or if it is a 
separate phenomena, this section firstly investigates if industry momentum fully explains 
price momentum and secondly test whether the price momentum, by taking into account 
the industry effects, can be explained by the business cycle model. Table 2.10 (Panel B) 
reports the raw returns to the momentum strategy based on industry-adjusted returns. The 
industry-adjusted returns are calculated as the stock returns in excess of the industry 
returns. The results indicate that, even after adjusting for industry returns, the average 
momentum profits are significantly positive in all three countries. The findings thus 
suggest that industry momentum does not fully explain price momentum, so the two 
effects are in effect separate. Panel B also reports the industry-adjusted momentum 
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profits that are based on the predicted returns obtained from the one-period-ahead 
forecasts of the business cycle model. The results suggest that, even after adjusting for 
the industry effect, the relationship between p rice momentum and the business cycle 
remains significant in the UK only. 
Table2.10 Industry Momentum Strategy 
The 10 industry classifications used in this study are obtained from Datastream's 
industry-classification (datatype INDC3). The time series of industry returns is then used to form 
the winner and the loser portfolios. For each month t, all stocks are first sorted into deciles based 
on their six-month (t to t+5) industry returnsfindustry-adjusted returns in (Panel A/Panel B). For 
each stock i and for each month t, the industry-adjusted returns are calculated as the stock returns 
in excess of the industry returns. The winner (loser) portfolio is the equally weighted return of the 
top (bottom) industry with the highest (lowest) raw returns in the six-month formation-period 
from t-7 to t-2. The momentum profit is then computed over the holding period Q to t+5). Raw 
payoffs indicate the strategy's raw monthly returns during the holding period, while Predicted 
returns show the holding period profits that sorted by predicted returns. Predicted returns are 
computed in the manner described in Table 2.3. The column titled '%>O' is described in the 
manner as Table 2.2. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are adjusted for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. *(* *) Denotes significance at the 5(l 0)% level. 
Panel A: Payoffs from a Momentum Strategy Based on Industry Returns 
Raw Payoffs 
w L W-L %>O 
0.75 -0.69 IA3 67.58 UK (2.97*) (-1.74**) (5.37*) (0.00) 
0.10 -0.82 0.92 56.66 Germany (0.38) (-1.81) (3.08*) (0.03) 
Predicted return 
w L W-L %>O 
0.33 -0.40 0.73 63.85 
(1.65) (-1.76**) (2.57*) (0.00) 
-0.22 1.03 0.12 56.84 
(-0.11) (0.32) (0.58) (0.04) 
France 0.95 -0.73 
1.68 65.87 0.92 0.66 0.27 58.55 
(2.50*) (-1.60) (4.99*) (0.00) (2.14*) (1.45) (0.91) (0.01) 
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Table 2.10 continued 
Panel B: Payoffs from a Momentum Strategy Based on Industry-adjusted Returns 
Raw Payoffs Predicted return 
w L W-L %>O w L W-L %>O 
0.50 0.02 0.48 60.51 0.45 0.08 0.37 62.24 
UK (2.38*) (0.07) (2.09*) (0.00) (1.95**) (0.45) (2.18*) (0.00) 
0.18 -0.37 0.54 56.88 0.15 0.08 0.07 50.83 Germany (1.07) (-0.87) (2.04*) (0.03) (0.42) (0.23) (0.28) (0.85) 
0.68 0.07 0.61 58.54 0.20 0.59 -0.39 54.63 France (1.70) (0.20) (2.20*) (0.00) (0.45) (0.75) (-0.31) (0.18) 
One interesting question, which seems to be omitted in the literature, is whether industry 
momentum would be subsumed by price momentum? It may not be surprising to find that 
the industry momentum profits are being subsumed by price momentum if the observed 
industry momentum is a composition of the price continuation from individual stocks 
rather than the industry that experiences momentum. To test this conjecture, industry 
momentum profits are regressed on the business cycle variables including default spread 
(DEF), term spread (TERM), dividend yield (DIP) and the three month t-bill yield (YLD), 
the Fama-French three factors and price momentum. Table 2.11 (Panel A) confirms the 
previous section results, showing that the business cycle model fails to explain the 
industry momentum in Germany and France. In contrast, the intercepts are statistically 
insignificant in the UK indicating some explanatory power. Adding Fama-French 
three-factor and price momentum to the business cycle model in Panel B results show 
that the intercepts are statistically insignificant in all three countries. Such effect, however, 
is solely due to the price momentum suggesting that the observed industry momentum is 
actually subsumed by momentum at the individual stock level. 
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Table 2.11 Time series regressions of industry momentum profits on business cycle 
variables, Fama-French three-factor and price momentum 
This table presents the coefficients of regressions of industry momentum profits (Rp) on business 
cycle variables in Panel A; business cycle variables, Fama-French three-factor, and price 
momentum in Panel B. Business cycle variables are default spread, term spread, dividend yield 
and the three month t-bill yield. The industry momentum is computed in the manner described in 
Table 2.10. Vis the time-series average of the monthly adjusted R. t-statistics (in parenthesis) 
are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10)% 
level. 
Panel A: Rp= ao+ Pi, DIV+ P2., DEF+ P3, TERM+ P4. r YLD +cý 
, ao Pi 02 P3 P4 K2 
UK 
0.016 1.056 -0.405 -1.033 -0.743 0.136 (1.21) (2.07*) (-1.78**) (-3.89*) (-1.09) 
Germany 0.028 -0.221 -0.287 -0.654 4.119 0 117 (2.11 (-0.60) (-1.38) (-1.88**) . (4.96*) 
France 0.026 0.458 -0.228 -0.269 -1.228 0 027 (3.41 *) (1.33) (-1.57) (-1.11) . (-2.20*) 
Panel B: Rp = uo +pI DIV + P2 DEF + P3 TERM + P4 YLD 
+ yi(R. t - Rrt) +Y 2 SMB + Y3 IIML + Y4 WML + r, 
(XO pI P2 P3 N Y1 72 Y3 74 2 
. 0.007 -0.012 0.071 -0.219 -0.106 0.038 0.043 0.065 0.767 UK (-0.69) (-0.02) (0.35) (-0.86) (-0.22) (1.09) (0.95) 0.445 (0.75) (7.03*) 
Germany -0.015 -0.346 0.158 0.079 1.615 0.057 0.133 -0.089 1,039 0.596 (-0.89) (-1.31) (0.80) (0.22) (1.17) (1.20) (3.27*)(-1.74**) (8-18*) 
France 0.005 0.401 -0.189 -0.059 -0.793 0.001 0.000 0.014 1.091 0369 (0.47) (0.96) (-0.97) (-0.19) (-1.20) (0.02) (0.00) (0.25) (4.38*) 
2.4.7 Intra-industry momentum 
Although the previous section finds that both price and industry momentum profits are 
present in all three countries, it will be interesting to see if momentum exits within each 
of the industries. The successful of intra-industry momentum will indicate that industry 
effects fail to explain price momentum. Further, it will be valuable for practitioners' 
interests as this provides an alternative trading strategy that involves lower transaction 
costs, as lesser stocks are required to form the winner/loser portfolios. To my knowledge, 
this chapter is the first to investigate intra-industry momentum strategies and their 
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relationship with business cycle within the context of Europe. 
Table 2.12 shows that intra-industry momentum strategies are presented in all three 
countries. In fact, some of the intra-industry momentum profits in the UK and Germany 
are even higher than industry momentum. The findings provide an alternative trading 
strategy suggesting that momentum profits exist within each of the industries. However, it 
is worth noting that as the intra-industry momentum appears to be profitable in almost 
every industry, it raises the question if such effect is caused by price momentum. To test 
this conjecture, intra-industry momentum profits are regressed on the business cycle 
variables including default spread (DEF), term spread (TERM, dividend yield (DIP) and 
the three month t-bill yield, (YLD), the Fama-French three factors and price momentum. 
Table 2.13 reports that almost all the intercepts are statistically insignificant. Such cffcct, 
however, is contributed to the price momentum suggesting that the observed 
intra-industry momentum is subsumed by momentum at the individual stock level. 
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Table 2.12 Intra-Industry Momentum Strategies 
The 10 industry classifications used in this study are obtained from Datastream's 
industry-classification (datatype INDC3). The winner (loser) portfolio is the equally weighted 
return of the top (bottom) 30% industry with the highest (lowest) raw returns in the six-month 
formation-period from t-7 to t-2. The momentum profit is then computed over the holding period 
(t to t+5). Raw payoffs indicate the strategy's raw monthly returns during the holding period, 
while Predicted return show the holding period profits that sorted by predicted returns. Predicted 
returns are computed in the manner described in Table 2.3. t-stat. are t-statistics that adjusted for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasti city. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10)% level 
Raw Payoffs 
w L W-L (t-stat. ) 
BASIC 0.84 -0.12 0.95 (4.36*) 
CYCGD 0.60 -0.29 0.88 (3.82*) 
CYSER 1.08 -0.45 1.52 (6.74*) 
GENIN 0.62 -0.45 1.06 (4.82*) 
UK ITECH - 1.03 -0.63 1.66 (4.49*) 
NCYCO 1.06 -0.33 1.39 (7.06*) 
NCYSR 1.21 -0.47 1.67 (4.79*) 
RESOR 0.35 -0.40 0.75 (2.51 *) 
TOTLF 0.77 -0.18 0.95 (4.30*) 
OTHERS 0.16 -1.80 1.96 (5.79*) 
BASIC 0.37 -0.37 0.74 (4.08*) CYCGD 0.41 -0.72 1.13 (5.59*) CYSER 0.60 -1.12 1.72 (5.73 *) 
GENIN 0.26 -0.81 1.07 (4.75*) 
ITECH -1.41 -3.30 1.89 (2.13 *) Germany NCYCG 0.45 -0.17 0.62 (3.69*) NCYSR -0.12 -1.37 1.25 (2.91 *) RESOR 0.42 -0.22 0.64 (3.54*) TOTLF 0.64 -0.01 0.65 (3.16*) OTHERS -0.06 -0.87 0.81(l. 58) 
BASIC 0.90 0.36 0.54 (2.06*) 
CYCGD 0.74 -0.51 1.25 (4.28*) 
CYSER 1.24 0.12 1.12 (4.33*) 
GENIN 0.93 -0.11 1.04 (4.27*) 
ITECH 
France 
1.14 -0.37 1.52 (3.50*) 
NCYCG 0.80 0.17 0.64 (3.07*) 
NCYSR 1.06 0.28 0.78 (2.14*) 
RESOR 0.57 -0.29 0.86 (2.29*) 
TOTLF 0.84 0.07 0.77 (3.50*) 
OTHERS -0.13 -0.77 0.64(l. 19) 
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Table 2.13 Time series regressions of intra-industry momentum profits on business 
cycle variables, Fama-French three-factor and price momentum 
This table shows the coefficients of regressions based on the following model: Rp = ao + PI DIV+ 
P2DEF + P3 TEPM + P4 YLD + yi (R, t- Rf t)+ 72 SMB+ *Y3HML+74 TVML + c, The dependent 
variable (Rp) is the intra-industry momentum profits. Business cycle variables include default 
spread (DET), term spread (TERAI), dividend yield (DIP) and the three month t-bill yield (YLD). 
The three Farna-French factors are the excess market return (R mt -R ft), size factor (SMB) and 
book-to-market factor (HML). Price momentum (WML) is contrasted in the manner as Table 
2.2. The intra-industry momentum is computed in the manner described in Table 2.12. V is the 
time-series average of the monthly adjusted R2. * Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
ao Pi P2 P3 P4 71 72 73 Y4 2 
UK 
BASIC -0.015* 0.338 -0.066 -0.013 0.776* 0.016 -0.015 0.031 0.377* 0.39 
CYCGD -0.006 0.022 0.056 0.139 -0.019 0.010 0.037 0.039 0.409* 0.43 
CYSER 0.003 -0.059 0.023 0.091 0.051 0.012 0.005 0.026 0.560* 0.72 
GENIN -0.005 0.222 -0.029 -0.064 0.108 0.005 0.011 0.029 0.392* 0.60 
ITECH 0.000 -0.63ý 0.442 0.067 -0.892 0.014 0.029 -0.056 0.569* 0.30 
NCYCG 0.003 0.056 0.016 0.022 -0.093 -0.002 -0.001 -0.056 0.349* 0.26 
NCYSR 5 0.01 -1.603* 0.349 0.556 1.171 -0.030 -0.071 -0.171 1.112* 0.49 
RESOR 1 0.010 0.483 -0.218 -0.650* -1.275* -0.019 -0.101 -0.078 0.579* 0.32 
TOTLF -0-011* 0.176 -0.083 -0.042 0.649* -0.006 -0.005 0.025 0.693* 0.73 
OTHERS 0.002 0.428 -0.209 -0.163 1.009* -0.023 -0.010 -0.157 0.508* 0.28 
Germany 
BASIC -0-006 0.085 0.084 0.139 0.004 -0.001 0.012 -0.026 0.290* 0.27 
CYCGD -0-009 -0.101 0.228 0.477* 0.406 0.008 -0.020 -0.004 0.317* 0.29 
CYSER -0.004 -0.045 0.093 0.098 1.143* 0.021 0.024 0.008 0.799* 0.56 
GENIN 0.002 0.011 -0-005 0.072 0.124 -0.002 0.023 0.009 0.419* 0.48 
ITECH 0.128* 0.033 -1.878* -3.207* -0.780 0.068 -0.017 0.001 0.228* 0.40 
NCYCG -0.003 0.185 -0.012 -0.111 -0.125 -0,003 0.006 -0.012 0.391* 0.41 
NCYSR 0.030 0.035 -0.493 -1.041 3.006* 0.014 0.018 -0.066 0.834* 0.34 
RESOR 0.024 -0.341 -0.167 -0.359 0.284 0.013 -0.034 0.009 0.098 0.10 
TOTLF -0.012 0.063 0.129 0.346 -0.073 -0-009 -0.032 -0.045 0.339* 0.33 
OTHERS 0.007 1.462 -0.322 -0.029 1.110 -0.104 -0.025 -0.126 -0.653* 0.17 
France . 
BASIC -0-011* -0.119 0.135 0.252 0.316 0.010 0.003 -0.028 0.424* 0.18 
CYCGD 0.024 -0.147 -0.102 -0.184 -0.148 0.048 -0.017 0.031 0.329* 0.11 
CYSER 0.012 -0.075 -0.090 0.138 0.128 -0.029 -0,037 0.036 0.461 * 0.28 
GENIN 0.000 0.077 0.003 0.040 0.157 0.011 0.000 0.008 0.444* 0.27 
ITECH 0.038* -0.826 0.180 -0.601 -0.948 0.049 0.011 -0.103* 0.198 0.16 
NCYCG 0.029* 0.965* -0.633* -0.589* -1.013* -0.045 0.008 0.023 0.286* 0.32 
NCYSR 0.010 0.994* -0.501* -0.305 -0.715 0.013 -0.069 0.015 0.177 0.10 
RESOR 0.047* 0.978* -0.907* -0.369 -0.535 -0.002 -0.032 0.005 0.454* 0.18 
TOTLF 0.022 0.033 -0.224* -0.082 -0.541 0.019 0.018 -0.002 0.354* 0.27 
OTHERS -0.075* 0.134 0.880* 1.267* 1.552* -0.021 -0.033 -0.064 0.370* 0.46. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates whether the apparent profitability of momentum trading can be 
explained by business cycle variables and behavioural characteristics in three major 
European markets namely France, Germany and the UK. The results show evidence of 
price momentum in all three countries. However, possibly due to some limitations 
inherent in the model, the predictive regression framework of Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002) based on business cycle variables cannot capture momentum profits in these 
markets. The conditional asset pricing model of Avramov and Chordia (2006), that 
allows factor loadings to vary with firm specific variables, overcomes some of the 
limitations of the predictive regression model of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). 
Therefore, this chapter also applies the Avramov and Chordia (2006) model to the 
European markets investigated. In line with the findings of Avramov and Chordia (2006), 
the chapter finds that momentum profits in Europe are largely attributable to asset 
mispricing that systematically varies with global business conditions. This confirms that 
the idiosyncratic component of stock returns does not play any prominent role in 
explaining momentum profits in r-gpga 
offer a better explanation. 
Inspired by the recent developments in the behavioural finance literature, especially by 
the ongoing debate on the role of investors' behaviour on price momentum, the Avramov 
and Chordia (2006) model is extended to incorporate behavioural variables. The results 
display a mixed role for behavioural variables across the countries, illustrating that 
investors' behaviour are less likely to be correlated to business cycle and unlikely to 
explain momentum profits. Moreover, the inclusion of behavioural variables does not 
affect the notion that momentum patterns are risk-based. This confirms that the findings 
of Avramov and Chordia (2006) hold for the major European financial markets and their 
model is robust to the inclusion of behavioural variables. Thus, the profitability of 
momentum strategies in Europe could be explained by risk factors, which are undetected 
thus far and are largely attributable to the business cycle. 
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3. Limits to Arbitrage, overconfidence and Momentum Trading 
3.1 Introduction 
Momentum trading strategies that take advantage of persistence in stock price 
movements short stocks that have recently performed poorly (out-of-favour stocks) to 
buy stocks that have recently performed well (favoured stocks). These strategies have 
attracted considerable attention from both practitioners and academics alike. In the UK, 
about 23 per cent of institutional traders are characterised as momentum traders (Keim, 
2004). The importance of this trading strategy for practitioners is also evident from the 
introduction of momentum indexes to measure the intermcdiate-term momentum cffects". 
In the academic literature, profits from momentum trading strategies represent one of the 
main challenges faced by modern neo-classical based finance theory. Success of this 
strategy suggests that excess returns can be earned by observing prior changes in stock 
prices and thus rejects the prediction of the efficient market hypothesis. Momentum in 
stock returns has been observed internationally (see, for instance, Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993; Griffin et al., 2003) and attempts have been made to explain its causes. However, 
issues, such as what causes continuation in stock returns and whether momentum profits 
are genuine and exploitable or are only reflecting some kind of markct 
imperfection/friction, have remained unresolved. This study addresses these issues. 
Fama and French (1996) concede that their three-factor model fails to explain 
continuation in returns. Similarly, after controlling separately for systematic risk, size, 
price, book-to-market ratio, and the Fama-French three factors, Liu et al. (1999) confirm 
that significant momentum profits exist in the UK. Thus, the observed momentum in 
stock prices is not due to risk differences or firm specific factors. Alternative 
explanations of momentum in stock returns include market under-reaction to firm 
specific information (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Chan ct al., 1996); gradual diffusion 
of information (Hong and Stein, 1999; Hong et al., 2000); investors' behaviour (Barberis 
et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998); cross-sectional dispersion in unconditional and 
conditional expected returns (Conrad and Kaul, 1998; Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002); 
15 See, www. momentumindex. com. 
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market frictions such as trading costs, price impact and liquidity (Korajczyk and Sadka, 
2004; Lesmond et al., 2004). Similarly, Hong et al. (2000) show that momentum profits 
are driven almost entirely by short-side portfolios and Ali and Trombley (2006) report 
that momentum profits are positively related to short-sale constraints. 
Meanwhile, an alternative model that based on overconfidence and self attribution has 
been introdu. Ced by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (DIIS, 1998) who suggest 
that over-reaction/overvaluation is the source of momentum profits. DIIS suggest 
investors are overconfident about their private information, and therefore overweight 
their private information and under-react to public signals. When public information 
confirms investors' private information their confidence increases, investors continue to 
overreact to their priors because of biased self-attribution. The over-reactio, n in prices will 
eventually be corrected in the long run as investors observe future news and realise their 
error. As a result, increased overconfidence generates momentum in the short run and 
reversals in the long run. Along this line, Zhang (2006) use proxy of information 
uncertainty variables such as firm size, firm age, analyst forecast dispersion, leverage, 
return volatility, and cash flow volatility, shows that greater information uncertainty leads 
to relatively lower future stock returns following bad news and relatively higher future 
returns following good news, indicating that uncertainty prevents timely information 
incorporation into stock prices. The difference between the behaviour arguments such as 
DHS overconfidence model and Zhang (2006) information uncertainty arguments is that, 
the behaviour arguments focus on how investors with different biases react to information, 
while information uncertainty arguments focus on how information flow due to 
uncertainty, and therefore do not specify what kind of biases. 
Miller (1977) theorised that stocks that are subject to both short-sale constraints and high 
dispersion in opinion are overvalued and generate low subsequent returns. This view rests 
on the argument that due to short-sale constraints, pessimistic traders cannot enter into 
the market and, hence, only optimistic investors continue to trade (buy) driving prices up, 
leading to overvaluation. Such overvaluation is maintained until the divergence in 
opinion is narrowed, at which point more investors realise that the stock is overvalued 
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and start off-loading their holdings. If this prediction holds, stocks that were initially 
overvalued should earn low (negative) subsequent returns. Thus, Miller's views on the 
effects of short-sale constraints (a case of limits to arbitrage) and the divergence in 
opinion on the value of stocks can be extended to examine the possible reason(s) and 
exploitability of momentum profits". Along this line, Ali and Trombley (2006) link an 
index of short-selling constraints to momentum profits, and this index includes both 
institutional ownership (the variable used here to measure short-sale constraints) as well 
as share turnover (the variable used here to measure differences of opinion). Chen, Hong, 
and Stein (2002) suggest that changes in breadth of ownership (which proxies for short 
sale constraints but is also correlated with differences of opinion in their model) are 
strongly related to momentum profits. 
However, there is a fundamental problem of Miller's overvaluation hypothesis that the 
second condition - divergence in opinion - must be high in order to drive prices up. The 
problem lies in the fact that under any circumstance of disagreement, all stocks would 
only be bought by optimistic investors, so the number of pessimistic investors could only 
be observed from the short side. But if short selling is prohibited, the number of 
pessimistic investors is unobservable. As a result, the number of investors between 
optimistic and pessimistic is unknown. To illustrate the problem, if there are ten investors 
in the market, disagreement among investors is at the highest level if five are optimistic 
and five are pessimistic. Miller's hypothesis is correct only when the number of 
pessimistic investors is higher than the number of optimistic investors, since then it will 
fulfil the second condition that high disagreement leads to high overvaluation. On the 
other hand, if there are more optimistic investors than pessimistic investors, then a lower 
disagreement would means that more optimistic investors will buy and push prices 
upward. In spite of its plausibility, no prior study has explicitly examined the implications 
of both conditions of Miller's theory (limits to arbitrage and divergence in opinion) on 
momentum returns. This study fills this gap. 
16 Although some recent studies (for instance, biether et al., 2002; Chen et. al., 2002) attempt to examine 
the overpricing hypothesis they do not consider the consequences of interaction between short-sale 
constraints and divergence in opinion simultaneously. 
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The distinction between Miller's Hypothesis and the DHS model is that, there are 
pessimistic investors in Miller's hypothesis, but these investors are constrained from 
shorting the stocks, whereas the DHS model suggests that representative investors who 
are overconfident drive the momentum effect. The ultimate question that lies between 
these two theories is to what extent do pessimistic investors contribute to overvaluation? 
The primary contribution of this study is to test whether the evidence is consistent with 
DHS model in addition to Miller's Hypothesis. 
More specifically, this chapter aims to address three main questions that are still 
unresolved: (i) what are the sources of momentum prorits? (ii) to what extent are 
momentum profits linked to overconfidence, limits to arbitrage and divergence in opinion? 
and (iii) are the apparent momentum profits exploitable? 
Given the nature of equity ownership distribution, trading strategies adopted by major 
investors, opportunities available to professional investors to engage in short-selling and 
the availability of measures of variations in investors' opinion, the UK stock market is an 
excellent platform to test for the above issues on momentum in the context of Miller's 
proposition. Unlike many other developed markets, the UK financial institutions (active 
traders) hold a large proportion of equity traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
Recent statistics (The Office for National Statistics, 2006) suggest that at the end of 
December 2006, domestic institutions were holding 41.1 per cent (E762.8 billion) of 
equity traded on the LSE, only 12.8 per cent (L238.5 billion) were owned by individual 
shareholders and the rest were owned by foreign investors. Among the domestic 
institutions, insurance companies and pension funds are the major players in the market. 
Given that only one in four UK institutional investors are momentum traders" and 
short-selling is a professional activity used by institutional investors", opportunities to 
short-sell (arbitrage opportunities) should have implications on stock returns. D'Avolio 
(2002) shows that institutional investors are the main providers of stock loan supply. 
Therefore, using the details of institutional ownership this chapter can test for the 
17 Keim (2004) categorises 23 per cent of institutional investors as momentum traders. 
" See Financial Services Authority (2006) for further details. 
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implications of arbitrage opportunities on momentum prorits. Similarly, proxy measures 
of divergence in opinion (for example, analysts' forecasts) are also available for the UK. 
All of these offer an excellent opportunity to examine the implications of limits to 
arbitrage and divergence in opinion on momentum profits on the LSE. 
This chapter arrives at several, conclusions. First, using alternative proxies of limits to 
arbitrage this chapter find that momentum profits are driven almost entirely by loser 
stocks that are costly or impossible to short. The absence of their exploitability could 
explain the persistence in price momentum. Second, the limits in short-selling loser 
stocks defeat the idea of constructing a self-financing (hedge) portfolio to profit from 
momentum trading. High costs and/or the impossibility of short-sciling out-of-favour 
stocks prohibit arbitrageurs from taking an appropriate position to exploit the profit 
opportunities and correct overpricing. Third, momentum profits originate from initial 
overvaluation brought about by excessively optimistic investors in the presence of limits 
to arbitrage (short-sale constraints), whereas, divergence in opinions do not play any role. 
The findings suggest that Miller's overvaluation hypothesis fails to explain tile 
momentum profits. On the other hand, empirical evidence has been provided to support 
the DHS model that momentum profits are caused by overconfidence and self attribution 
bias. Finally, the known risk factors fail to explain the momentum profits. Therefore, 
momentum profits are caused by limits to arbitrage and overconfidence, hence, they are 
not easily exploitable. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses limits to 
arbitrage and divergence in opinion and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 
describes the data and methodology. Section 3.4 empirically examines tile relation 
between momentum profits and short-sale constraints and ovcrvaluation. Section 3.5 
provides tests of the DIAS overconfidence model. Section 3.6 presents tile cross-scctional 
regressions. Section 7 examines the relation between short sales constraints and the value 
premium. Section 3.8 concludes the chapter. 
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3.2 Theories and hypotheses development 
3.2.1 Miller ý overvaluation hypothesis 
Miller (1977) shows that when there is a high level of uncertainty among investors about 
the value of a security, short-sale constraints could prevent pessimistic investors' opinion 
being incorporated into stock prices. In this scenario, optimistic investors can buy or 
continue to hold the stocks driving the prices up. However, due to short-sale constraints, 
pessimistic investors face limits on the sale side trade resulting in supply constraints and 
failure to bring the prices down. On balance, this leads to overpricing. Therefore, Miller's 
hypothesis requires two conditions to be satisfied: (a) short-sale constraints and; (b) 
divergence in investors' opinion. In a system where short-selling is permitted (both by 
regulations and transaction costs) pessimists. can sell additional shares to optimists. This 
improves the supply causing the stock price to fall. However, Jarrow (1980) argues that 
the price of an individual stock can increase or decrease when short sales are allowed. For 
a strategy of buying favourable stocks with the proceeds from the short-sale of 
out-of-favour stocks to be profitable, the long position must outperform the short-position 
after accounting for transactions costs and the risks associated with short-sclling. In 
reality, the costs and the risks of short-selling a stock could be prohibitive and, hcnce, we 
cannot be sure whether prices of stocks will change to reflect the balance of opinion. 
Moreover, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggest that, under rational market conditions, 
other investors will identify the existence of short-sale constraints and will alter their own 
beliefs in a way to prevent the existence of overvaluation on average. Since the 
theoretical arguments on short-sale constraints and the ovcrvaluation or undervaluation of 
stocks are inconclusive, the overpricing hypothesis is an empirical issue. 
Miller's view is important to stock market anomalies that consist of short-side portfolios 
like value vs. growth, contrarian, and momentum trading strategies. If both growth stocks 
(in value vs. growth strategy) and loser stocks (in momentum trading) are impeded by 
short-sale constraints, the stocks will be overpriced resulting in lower subsequent returns. 
These low returns may be sufficient to produce the existence of an 'illusory premium'. 
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3.2.2 Limits to arbitrage and overvaluation 
Direct costs of short-selling (a measure of arbitrage opportunities) are difficult to measure; 
therefore, studies use proxy measures. The costs of short-selling reflected in the stock 
loan market can be considered as a measure of constraints in selling short. Several studies 
(see, for example, D'Avolio, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2002) have analysed the market for 
borrowing stocks, however, their sample periods are rather short. On the other hand, 
Jones and Lamont (2002) analysed the NYSE 'loan crowd' rebate rate" as the proxy for 
the cost of short-selling with a longer sample period. Their findings suggest that stocks 
that are expensive to short or that enter the lending market with high valuations tend to 
have low subsequent returns. 
Some studies (see, for example, Figlewski, 1981; Dechow et al., 2001) measure the 
demand for short-sales with short-interest. However, this measure also suffers from some 
limitations. Short-interest represents the net short positions outstanding in the stock as of 
the settlement date, stocks that are difficult and expensive to short will have low 
short-intere 
' 
st. Stocks that are impossible to short have an infinite shorting cost; however, 
the level of short-interest is zero. To illustrate, Lamont and Thaler (2003) examine a 
sample of technology carve-outs that appeared to be overpriced. They show that the 
apparent overpricing and the implied cost of shorting fall over time, while the level of 
short-interest rises. As such, short-interest can be negatively correlated with the demand 
for shorting, overpricing, and the cost of shorting. These limitations weaken the 
reliability of empirical findings based on short-interest. 
Another proxy measure of short-sale constraints is lack of institutional ownership. 
D'Avolio (2002) shows that stocks with low institutional ownership are likely to be 
'special' and expensive to borrow. This view rests on the principle of demand and supply 
of stocks in the stock-loan market. Short-sellers must borrow the stocks and return them 
on demand. The cost of shorting is likely to be lower for stocks with substantial 
institutional ownership, since it is easier to find alternative lenders of such stocks. Nagel 
(2005) employs institutional ownership as a proxy for short-sale constraints, and finds 
19 The rebate is the interest earned on the proceeds from the sale of borrowed shares. 
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that the book-to-market effect, in particular the underperformance of growth stocks, is 
primarily concentrated in stocks that' are difficult to short. lie suggests that the 
overpricing hypothesis is behind the book-to-market anomaly. Similarly, 'Phalippou (2007) 
confirms that the value premium is created by a few overvalued stocks that are difficult to 
sell short, and suggests that limited arbitrage, rather than risk, plays a major role in the 
existence of the value premium. Ali and Trombley (2006) report that momentum profits 
are higher from stocks that experience high short-sale constraints and the results are 
mainly driven by loser stocks. Although they suggest that momentum returns are 
positively related to the cost of short-selling, they do not test the hypothesis that 
divergence in opinion drives the price/prorit of stocks that are difficult to short. Therefore, 
this chapter hypothesises that 'there is a positive association between momentum profits 
and short-sale constraints'. 
3.2.3 Interaction between short-sale constraints and dispersion In opinion 
Another factor that Miller (1977) attributes to overvaluation is high divergence in opinion. 
Scherbina (2001) used dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts (I/B/E/S) as a proxy for 
divergence in opinion and shows that the highest dispersion in opinion portfolio earns a 
lower average return than the lowest dispersion in opinion portfolio. Chen et al. (2002) 
used breadth of ownership as a proxy for divergence in opinion and found that when few 
mutual fund managers have long positions in a given stock (low breadth of ownership), 
prices are high relative to fundamentals and that when the breadth decreases, subsequent 
returns decline. Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) contend that exchange-traded options 
mitigate short-sale constraints and examined the effects of option listings on the prices of 
underlying securities. They considered four measures of dispersion in investors' belief". 
Their results generally support the conjecture that stock options mitigate the short-sale 
constraints that would otherwise lead to overvaluation. Diether et al. (2002) show that 
stocks with higher dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts earn significantly lower 
future returns than otherwise similar stocks. Such results suggest that disagreement in 
20 The four proxies of dispersion in investors' opinion they used are: (a) the standard deviation of weekly 
(five-day) raw returns from day 1-250 to date 1-6; (b) the standard deviation of the error terms of the market 
model estimated from day 1-100 to date 1-6 relative to the event date; (c) the ex ante mean daily trading 
volume and; (d) the dispersion of analysts' forecast. 
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investors' opinion is priced at a discount as we would expect under Miller's hypothesis. 
Previous studies on the overpricing hypothesis do not consider the interaction of 
short-sale constraints and differences in opinion simultaneously - i. e. they do not 
examine the central theme of Miller's hypothesis. This chapter tests for the implications 
of such an interaction on momentum returns. This section hypothesises that 'momentum 
profits are high when both short-sale constraints and divergence in investors' opinion arc 
hight. 
3.2.4 Overconfidence and momentum profit 
Stocks with good past performance tend to attract investors' attention. 13chavioural 
models predict that traders are either slow to react or over-rcact to good news. The 
optimistic investors, usually less sophisticated", tend to rely on their own private 
information/beliefs in determining the firm's future cash flows. As noted by Daniel ct al. 
(1998), when public information confirms investors' private information their conrldcncc 
increases. Disconfirming public news draws less attention and the investor's confidence 
in their private signals remains unchanged. It is also consistent with a particular type of 
representativeness bias, the law of small numbers in which people expect even a small 
sample to reflect the properties of the entire population 22 . In this case, if investors 
perceive some good news about a firm, they will continue to believe that tile stock will do 
well in the future. This belief will escalate his/her confidence level, create the sclf 
attribution bias and lead to excessive optimism about the firm. In addition, short-sale 
constraints prevent a timely incorporation of bad news into prices. In other words, the 
negative opinion of pessimistic investors is not incorporated in market price. This 
suggests a testable proposition that 'there is a positive association between momentum 
profits and short-sale constraints and high momentum profits are associated with more 
good public news'. 
Tests of the above propositions are important as they shed light on how the mispricing 
21 Indeed, Barber and Odean (2007) show that small investors are more likely to trade in stocks that have 
had recent extreme performance, possibly due to attention effects. 
22 To illustrate, suppose that an investor sees many periods of good earnings, the law of small numbers 
leads her to believe that earnings growth has gone up, and thus earnings will continue to remain high in the 
future. 
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arises that eventually generates the predictability of stock returns, and indeed, tile 
momentum profits. This chapter examines whether Millcrs overpricing hypothesis based 
on JjMjtS to arbitrage and the DIIS model based on ovcrconridencc can explain the 
underperformance of loscr stocks and the momentum anomaly. 
3.3 Data and methods 
3.3.1 Data 
For the reasons stated earlier, the LSE is an excellent platform for testing the implications 
of limits to arbitrage and divergence in investors' opinion on momcntum profits. On the 
LSE, the regulations on short-sclling are fairly rclaxcd for institutional investors". TlIcy 
also hold a large fraction of stocks traded on the LSE and are activc in short-selling. 
Although direct observations on short-sale contracts are not available, as cvidcnt from the 
studies of D'Avolio (2002) and Nagcl (2005), the distribution of institutional ownership 
(hereafter 10) offers an excellent proxy of the possibilities of stock loan supply". 
Therefore, this chapter uses ownership distribution as a measure of constraints to sell 
short; stocks with lower institutional holdings experience highcr short-sale constraints. 
The data on ownership distribution comes from the PriccwatcrhouscCoopcrs Corporate 
Register published by flemmington-Scott. For each company, this unique database 
records the name of each shareholder and his/her proportion (per cent) of share holdings 
(ordinary share capital). To improve the comparability of my results with US studies that 
use the ýDA/Spcctrum Institutional Holdings (13F) database, this chapter extract 
quarterly institutional holdings from the 11cmmington-Scott databases". This chapter 
then match (manually) the ownership database with Datastrcam'6. First, for each company, 
institutions that arc holding 3 per cent or more of its equity shares are identified. Then, 
the total institutional holding of the company is estimated by adding the holdings of all 
institutions identified in the first step. If no record of institutional holding is available, it 
23 See Financial Services Authorities (2006) for further details. 
24 For an excellent discussion on the relation between short-sale constraint and institutional ownership see 
Nýgel (2005). 
25 For the definition of institutional investors, this chapter follows the CDA/Spectrum Institutional Holding 
database in order to provide comparable results. 
26 While merging these data bases this chapter uses Lexis-Ncxis and FAMC to identify company name 
changes. 
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is considered zero. The sample excludes financial companies. The final sample consists 
of 86,151 observations for 2,556 unique firms from January 1993 to December 2002. 
This choice of sample period has been guided by the availability of ownership data at the 
time of data collection 27 
3.3.2 Residual institutional ownership (RIO) 
Earlier evidence (see, for example, Nagel, 2005) shows a high degree of association 
between firm size and institutional ownership (INST). Therefore, as in Nagel (2005), this 
section measures short-sale constraints by residual institutional ownership adjusted for 
firm size". Given that the degree of institutional ownership is a proportion ranging from 
0 to 1, the residuals will not be normally distributed. Therefore, before controlling for the 
firm size a logit transformation is applied on INST (equation ý3.1)). 
(3.1) Logit (fNST)it = log 
INSTi,, (I 
- INSTj', 
If INST is below 0.0001 or above 0.9999 it is replaced with 0.0001 and 0.9999 
respectively. In equation (3.1) i, t represents firm i at time t (quarter). To control for any 
size effect, this section estimate equation (3.2): 
(3.2) Logit (INST) i, t =a+ PInSit + ct 
Where, Sij is the market capitalisation of firm i at time t. This cross-scctional equation is 
estimated for the period between January 1993 and December 2002. The residual (ct) of 
equation (3.2) is the residual institutional ownership (RIO). This allows us to measure the 
variation in institutional ownership, holding the firm size fixed. 
3.3.3 Momentum trading strategies 
For the computation of momentum profits, this chapter follow the most common used 6x 
27 Appendix 4 reports the summary statistics on firm characteristics used in this chapter. 
2' The method used in this sub-section is based on Nagel (2005). 
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6 momentum strategy", for instance, for each month t, all stocks are allocated into three 
(or five) portfolios (P=I to 3) based on their six-month formation-period Q-7 to 1-2) 
returns. Portfolio PI (i. e. P=I) is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the 
worst-performing 30 per cent stocks, portfolio P2 (i. e. P=2) contains the middle 40 per 
cent stocks, and portfolio P3 (i. e. P=3) comprises the best-performing 30 per cent stocks. 
The position is held for the following six-month period (to to 1+5). This chapter employs a 
one month gap between the formation and the holding period to avoid the momentum 
effect with short-term price reversals and the bid-ask bounce effects established by 
previous studies (see, for example, Jegadeesh, 1990; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995). 
Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise stated, equally weighted portfolio returns have 
been used. 
3.3.4 Divergence in investorsopinion (Disp)and trading volume (VO) 
This section measures the divergence in investors' opinion by the dispersion in analysts' 
earnings per share (EPS) forecasts". The dispersion in analysts' EPS forecasts is defined 
as the standard deviation of EPS forecasts scaled by the stock price per share at the 
beginning of forecast's fiscal year. Both the standard deviation of EPS forecasts and 
corresponding share prices are obtained from the I/B/E/S Summary History file. To allow 
for the calculation of standard deviation, only the stocks followed by at least two analysts 
are included in the sample. Data on trading volume are obtained from Datastream. 
Trading volume is measured as the ratio of the number of shares traded to the number of 
shares outstanding. 
3.3.5 Analyst recommendations (Req) 
Analyst recommendations rate stocks as 'strong buy, ' 'buy, ' 'hold, ' 'sell, ' and 'strong 
sell. ' Analysts also use other labels such as 'market underperform' and 'market 
outperform, ' or 'underweight' and 'overweight, ' to convey their opinions,, but I/B/E/S 
standardizes the recommendations, and converts them to numerical scores where 'I' is 
strong buy, '2' is buy, and so on. This section then group the sample into three parts: 1) 
29 This chapter also reports the 30, W, M and l2xl2 momentum strategies in Appendix 5, momentum 
profits from the 6x6 strategy is indeed the highest. 
'0 Diether et al. (2002), among others, use analysts' EPS forecasts as a measure of divergence in opinion. 
66 
Chaptcr 3 
Buy portfolio which contains both 'strong buy' and 'buy' recommendation, 2) Hold 
portfolio which contains recommendation of holding the stock, 3) Sell which contains 
both 'strong sell'and 'sell' recommendation. 
3.3.6 Analystforecast revisions (FRev) 
Analyst forecast revisions for the current month are split into 'up revision', 'no change' 
and 'down revision'. This chapter standardizes the forecast revision, and converts them to 
numerical scores where 'P is 'up revision', V is 'no change', and '-P is 'down revision'. 
Forecast revisions are unadjusted for stock splits using the adjustment factors because of 
the split-adjustment bias detailed in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) provided by 
I/B/E/S. 
3.4 Momentum profits, short-sale constraints and overvaluation 
3.4.1 Short-sale constraints and gross returnsfrom momentum trading 
To examine the hypothesis that 'there is a positive association between momentum profits 
and short-sale constraints', this section sort all stocks into quintiles at the end of each 
month t based on their returns during the six month formation period Q-7 to t-2). This 
section then group the stocks of each price momentum category into five portfolios 
(equal stocks) on the previous quarter's RIO obtained from equation (3.2)". Portfolios are 
formed at different points during the year. Such overlapping portfolios increase the power 
of tests (see Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). To avoid the momentum effect with very 
short-term price reversals and the bid-ask bounce effects, this section allows for a one 
month gap between the formation period and the holding period. The portfolios are held 
for the subsequent six months (to to t+5). Newey-West (1987) standard errors (adjusted 
for serial dependence caused by the use of overlapping lagged data) are used. 
The results in Table 3.1 (panel A) support the predictions that momentum profits are most 
pronounced in loser stocks with high short-sale constraints. The average difference 
31 In a further test, this chapter replaces residual institutional ownership with institutional ownership (i. e. 
without adjusting for size). The results are qualitatively similar. 
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between the monthly returns of winner (P5) and loser (PI) portfolios in the lowest RIO 
quintile is 1.81 per cent (T-statistic = 4.98). In contrast, the differences between returns of 
PS and PI in R104 and R105 portfolios are statistically insignificant. The results (panel A) 
also show that almost all of the contribution to momentum profits comes from loser 
stocks. Besides, momentum returns (P5-PI) decrease monotonically with the increase in 
RIO quintiles suggesting that momentum of loser stocks can be exploited by selling the 
stocks short. This confirms the importance of opportunities to short-sell in exploiting 
momentum profit. Figure 3.1 depicts the momentum profits against the RIO quintiles and 
confirms that momentum profits from the lowest two quintiles are caused by the tendency 
of loser stocks to lag behind. This evidence supports the hypothesis that 'there is a 
positive association between momentum profits and short-sale constraints. 
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Table 3.1 Raw Returns by Price Momentum and Short-sale Constraints 
Average monthly raw returns (per cent) of portfolios composed on price momentum and three 
measures of short-sale constraints are reported. At the end of each month t, all stocks are allocated 
into five price portfolios (PI, P2,..., P5) based on their returns during the six month 
formation-period Q-7 to t-2). Stocks in each price portfolios are grouped into five further 
portfolios for each measure of short-sale constraints. The measures of short-sale constraints are: 
(a) previous quarter's residual institutional ownership (RIO), Panel A; firm size (S), Panel B; and 
the presence of exchange-traded options and/or futures, Panel C. RIO is the residual of equation 
(3.2). Firm size (S) is measured by market capitalisation. All portfolios are equally weighted. The 
position is held for six-months Q to t+5). T-statigics (in parentheses) are based on Newey-West 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10) per cent level. 
The sample period is January 1993 to December 2002. 
Panel A: Residual Institutional Ownership (RIO) 
RI01 RI02 R103 R104 R105 1-11105 (Low) (Iligh) 
P1 (Loser) -1.81 -1.64 -1.27 -1.45 -1.16 -0.65 (-1.80**) 
P2 -0.99 -0.98 -0.91 -1.17 -0.96 -0.02 (-0.07) 
P3 -0.87 -1.20 -0.71 -1.29 -0.93 0.07(0.20) 
P4 -0.58 -0.60 -0.65 -0.85 -0.72 0.14(0.41) 
PS(Winner) 0.00 -0.38 -0.45 -0.70 -0.64 0.64(l. 53) 
P5-Pl 
1.81 1.26 0.83 0.76 0.52 1.30 (3.79*) 
(4.98*) (3.24*) (2.01*) (1.85**) (1.23) 
Panel B: Size (S) 
Si S2 S3 S4 S5 Sl-S5 (Low) (Iligh) 
Pl (Loser) -2.53 -2.24 -1.92 -1.79 -1.33 -1.20 (-2.40*) 
P2 -0.73 -1.24 -1.82 -1.44 -0.91 0.18(0.51) 
P3 -0.52 -0.75 -1.00 -0.89 -0.60 0.08(0.28) 
P4 -0.15 -0.31 -0.39 -0.40 -0.23 0.08(0.29) 
P5(Winner) -0.16 -0.23 -0.27 - -0.43 -0.07 -0.09 (-0.24) 
P5-Pl 2.37 2.01 
1.64 1.37 1.26 1.11 (2.88*) 
(5.13*) (5.27*) (3.79*) (2.94*) (3.00*) 
Panel C: Individual ontions and futures 
Without options and With options and/or 1-0 futures =1 futures =0 
Pl (Loser) -2.14 -0.47 -0.35 (-1.09) 
P2 -0.78 0.13 -0.91 (-3.25*) 
P3(Winner) -0.17 0.18 -2.01 (-3.61 *) 
P3-PI 
1.97 0.65 
(4.86*) (1.63) 
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Figure 3.1 Residual Institutional Ownership and Momentum Proli(s 
'file graph corresponds to the result ol-Fable 3.1 (Panel A). At the end (O'each month i, all stocks 
are allocated into qUintile based oil their six-month l'Ormation-period From 1-7 to 1-2 and by 
proxies of short sales constraints: the end ofthe previous quarter residual institutional ownership 
(RIO). Quintile portl'()Iios are lornied monthly by Welghting C(ILIally all fill'HIS ill that L111111111C 
ranking. The position is held I'M the 1`61lowing six-month period (I to it 5). This figure reports the 
strategy's mean raw returns during the holding period. 
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This chapter examines file robLIStncss ofthe above findings using alternative measures oI' 
short-sale constraints. Some earlier studies Oor example, Chen et al. (2002) and I )icIIICI- 
et al. (2002)) SLIggCSt that III-III SiZC Call he a Proxy I11CaSLII-C of' stocks available for 
short-selling. Therel'ore, to examine whether momentum profit is firin si/e dependent this 
section groups the sample stocks on their market CapItaliSatiOII alld CS(III1atC 11101110111,1111 
prof-its. The rcsults show that momentum prol'it is inversely related to hrm size and most 
of' the profits come 1rom loser stocks (Table 3.1, pancl 11). This rcconfirills that loser 
stocks that have short-sale constraints make I substantive cownhution to momentum 
profits. Next, it is also possible that the presence of' exchange-traded optlows and/or 
I'LItUres can serve as I route to short-sales, and therelore, I-C(ILICC (lie C011SCLIIICIICCS 01' 
constraints in short-sclling. Only 108 sample firms have individual traded options and/or 
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futures. To maintain a reasonable number of stocks in each portfolio this section sorts 
thern into three groups (as opposed to quintiles). PI includes the worst performing 30 per 
cent stocks, P2 includes the middle 40 per cent stocks, and P3 includes the best 
performing 30 per cent stocks. The results in Table 3.1 (panel C) show that stocks that 
have individual options and futures experience significantly lower momentum profits 
than other stocks. These results reconfirm earlier findings that stocks, especially the loser 
stocks, with short-sale constraints generate higher momentum profits. 
Overall, short-sale constraints play a significant role in generating momentum profits. 
Considering Nagel's (2005) view that size can proxy for many other things, rather than 
just the short-sale constraints, and only limited observations are available on individual 
options and futures I believe that the RIO can serve as the best proxy (among the 
available alternatives) of short-sale constraints. Moreover, RIO accounts for size effects. 
Therefore, this chapter measures short-sale constraints by RIO in furthcr analysis. 
3.4.2 Short-sale constraints and excess returnsfrom momentum trading 
It is possible that the observed momentum profit discussed in the previous section is 
simply a manifestation of differences in risk premium rather than excess returns. To 
account for this possibility, this section estimates excess returns that are adjusted for three 
benchmark returns, viz. (a) market-adjusted, (b) Fama-French three-factor adjusted, and 
(c) industry adjusted. The market-adjusted return (raw return less the market return) of 
each stock is estimated for the end of each month t. Portfolios are formed on such market 
adjusted returns. Although the excess returns (Table 3.2, panel A) are smaller than gross 
returns, the overall findings support the earlier findings that the momentum profits come 
from loser stocks that face higher short-sale constraints. This evidence suggests that risk 
differences cannot explain momentum profits. 
Contemporary finance literature advocates the superiority of the Fama-French three 
factor model against other single factor models (see, for instance, Davies et al., 1999). 
Therefore this section estimates the returns that are adjusted for three risk factors as in 
equation (3.3): 
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(3.3) Rp, t=a+, 6m, (Rmt-RF)I+, BSMBSMBt+, 
8HmLHMLI+eI 
,t 
is raw return from portfolio p (for p=I to 25, as in Table 3.1), RM, is market Where, Rp. 
return measured by the FTSE All share index, RF is the risk-free rate measured by the 
return on three-month Treasury bills, SMB and HML are small minus 
big, and high 
minus low as defined in Fama and French (1996)32 -A significant a 
(alpha) in equation 
(3-3) represents excess return that is not explained by the three risk factors. Table 
3.2 
(panel B) documents the excess returns (alpha of equation 3.3) for each of the 25 
portfolios. The estimates confirm that the adjustment for risk using the thrce-factor model 
does not alter the earlier conclusion that momentum prorits originate largely from loser 
stocks with high short-sale constraints (i. e. low RIO). In fact, the three risk factors 
adjusted returns are slightly higher than the raw returns. In summary, this suggests that 
the Fama-French three factor model cannot explain momentum profits. 
Finally, some earlier studies show that stock returns could be industry specific reflecting 
business cycle conditions. To allow for this possibility, this chapter estimates the industry 
ad . usted excess return of each stock (stock return minus return on industry portfolio)". 
This method implies that stocks are as risky as their industry, peers. The results in Table 
3.2 (panel Q show that part of the industry adjusted momentum prorlis comes from 
winner stocks but a substantial part of momentum profits comes from loser stocks. More 
importantly, momentum profits are concentrated mainly in high short-sale constraint (low 
RIO) stocks. Therefore, the results reported in earlier paragraphs are not driven by 
industry effects. Overall, the results that loser stocks characterised by short-sale 
constraints contribute most in momentum profits continue to hold even after controlling 
for known risk and industry factors. 
32 1 thank Stefan Nagel for providing the factor returns data. Since his data is only available until 2001,1 
follow his methodology to construct the factors for the year of 2002. His methodology is important as the 
construction of the factors captures the unique characteristics of UK data (see also Dimson et al. 2003 for 
details). 
33 The industry classifications are obtained from Datastream (INDC3). 
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Table 3.2 Excess Returns by Price Momentum and Short-sale Constraint 
Average monthly excess returns (per cent) of portfolios composed on price momentum and 
short-sale constraint are reported. Short-sale constraint is measured by the RIO, the residual of 
equation (3.2). At the end of each month t, all stocks are allocated into five price portfolios (PI, 
P2,..., PS) based on their returns during the six month formation-period (1-7 to t-2). Stocks in 
each price portfolios are grouped into five further portfolios on each bench-mark adjusted returns. 
Bench-marks adjusted excess returns are estimated as: first, individual stock returns are adjusted 
for the market (FTSE All share index) returns, Panel A; second, individual stock returns are 
adjusted for Fama-French three factors, Panel B; and third, individual stock returns are adjusted 
for industry returns, Panel C. Industry portfolios are formed using the Datastream's 
industry-classification (data type: INDC3). All portfolios are equally weighted. The position is 
held for six-months (t to 1+5). T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on Newey-West 
autocoffelation consistent standard errors. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10) per cent level. 
The sample period is January 1993 to December 2002. 
Residual Institutional Ownership 
Momentum RI01 R102 RI03 R104 RI . 
05 RIOI -RIOS (Low) Ullgh) 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns 
PI (Loser) -2.18 -1.92 -1.68 -1.43 -1.23 -0.96 (-2.35*) 
P2 -1.24 -1.01 -0.98 -0.65 -0.59 -0.66 (-2.72*) 
P3 -0.74 -1.01 -0.42 -0.36 -0.08 -0.66 (-3.12*) 
P4 -0.40 -0.42 -0.27 -0.21 -0.07 -0.33 (-1.70**) 
P5(Winner) -0.09 -0.13 -0.03 0.14 0.01 -0.10 (-0.37) 
P5-pl 2.09 1.79 1.65 1.57 1.24 0.85 (2.17*) (6.20*) (5.77*) (5.09*) (4.17*) (3.51*) 
Panel B: Three-factor Adjusted Returns 
Pl (Loser) -2.26 -2.26 -1.69 -1.93 -1.66 -0.60 (. 1.81 * *) 
P2 -1.40 -1.41 -1.32 -1.61 -1.44 0.04(0.47) 
P3 -1.28 -1.58 -1.11 -1.71 -1.32 0.04(0.20) 
P4 -1.01 -1.01 -1.02 -1.30 -1.14 0.13(0.42) 
PS(Winner) -0.42 -0.66 -0.81 -1.08 -0.98 0.56(l. 55) 
1.84 1.61 0.88 0.85 0.68 1.16 (3.79*) P5 - Pi (5.01*) (3.82*) (2.03*) (1.86**) (1.24) 0 
Panel C: IndustrvAdiusted Returns 
Pl (Loser) -1.39 -1.35 -1.18 -0.59 -0.31 -1.08 (-4.54*) 
P2 -0.08 -0.22 -0.18 -0.38 -0.37 0.28 (2.10*) 
P3 0.36 0.14 0.34 0.06 0.08 0.28 (2.04*) 
P4 0.59 0.45 0.33 0.27 0.27 0.32 (3.17*) 
P5(Winner) 0.59 0.38 0.28 0.21 0.10 0.48 (2.37*) 
P5-pl 1.98 1.73 1.45 0.80 0.41 1.57 (5.72*) (5.09*) (6.47*) (3.66*) (1.92**) (1.42) 
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3.4.3 Divergence in opinion and excess returnsfrom momentum trading 
Miller (1977) suggests that stocks that are subject to both short-sale constraints and high 
divergence in investors' opinion are overpriced. To test this conjecture along with 
momentum profits, this section first sorts stocks in quintiles (for each I month) on the 
previous quarter's residual institutional ownership (RIO) -a proxy for short-sale 
constraints. Next, stocks in each RIO portfolios are sorted into three groups on dispersion 
in analysts' EPS forecasts during the three months prior to the first day of the portfolio 
formation period (Disp). RIO, a measure of short-sale constraints, is obtained from 
equation (3.2). Next, three equally weighted portfolios are formed on their prior price 
performance. Portfolio PI consists of the 30 per cent worst-performing stocks, portfolio 
P2 contains the middle 40 per cent, and portfolio P3 includes the 30 per cent 
best-performing stocks. This three dimensional analysis allows us to test the hypothesis 
that momentum profits are high when both short-sale constraints and divergence in 
investors' opinion are high. 
The estimates in Table 3.3 show that momentum profit is concentrated in low RIO stocks 
(high short-sale constraints), and is driven by loser stocks. Within each RIO portfolio, 
although momentum profit is most pronounced on the portfolio of stocks with high 
dispersion in analysts' EPS forecasts, there is no statistical difference between high 
dispersion and low dispersion portfolios (even among low RIO stocks). 
This result is consistent with the earlier findings that short-sale constraints are important 
in determining the magnitude of momentum profits. However, returns across divergence 
in opinion portfolios are not statistically important. The findings show that the 
overpricing hypothesis of Miller (1977) fails to explain the sources of momentum profits. 
As a robustness check, this chapter uses trading volume as an alternative proxy for the 
dispersion of investor beliefs. Table 3.4 reports the average monthly raw returns during 
the holding period Q to t+5). The result shows that momentum profits (P3-P I) are driven 
substantially by the loser stocks. In addition, momentum returns are concentrated on the 
lowest two RIO quintiles, and decrease monotonically across RIO quintiles. This result is 
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consistent with the earlier findings that short sales constraints are important in 
determining the magnitude of momentum profits. However, returns are statically 
insignificant across VO portfolios. Using alternative measures of divergence in opinion, 
this section shows that the overpricing hypothesis of Miller (1977) fails to explain the 
sources of momentum profits. 
Table 3.3 Momentum Returns by Short-sale Constraint and Divergence In Opinion 
(Dispersion in Analysts' EPS Forecasts) 
Average monthly raw returns (per cent) of portfolios composed on short-sale constraint and divergence 
in opinion are reported. Short-sale constraint is measured by the RIO, the residual of equation (3.2). 
Divergence in opinion on each stock is measured by the standard deviation in EPS forecasts made in 
3-months prior to the formation period scaled by the stock price per share at the beginning of the 
month of forecast. First, at the end of each month t, all stocks are allocated into three RIO portfolios. 
Second, stocks in each RIO portfolio are grouped into 3 further portfolios on divergence in opinion 
(Disp). All stocks belonging to each element of the (RIO x Disp) matrix are then grouped into three 
portfolios. The portfolios are PI (the worst performing 30 per cent), P2 (the middle 40 per cent), and 
P3 (the best performing 30 per cent). The position is held for six-months Q to t+5). All portfolios are 
equally weighted. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on Newey-West autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10) per cent level. The sample period is January 
1993 to December 2002. 
Dispersion in Analysts' EPS Forecasts portfolios 
Disp3 Disp2 Displ Disp3 - Displ RIO Portfolios (Iligh) (Low) 
P3 = -0.20 P3 = -0.32 P3 = -0 , 15 P3 - PI = 0.59 
RI01 (Low) PI = -2.49 PI= -2.04 
PI =-I , 72 (0.81) P3 - PI = 2.28 P3 - PI = 1.72 P3 - PI = 1.57 
(4.12*) (2.99*) (2.82*) 
P3 -0.08 P3 -0.48 P3 -0.67 P3 - PI =0.38 
R102 PI -1.54 PI -1.54 PI -1.71 (0.56) P3 - PI = 1.45 P3 - PI = 1.06 P3 - PI = 1.04 
(2.89*) (1.89**) (1.77**) 
P3 = -0.69 P3 = -0.22 P3 = -0.81 P3 -P1 =0.25 
R103 (High) PI = -1.00 PI = -0.55 PI = -0.87 (0.34) P3 - PI = 0.31 P3 - PI = 0.34 P3 - PI = 0.06 
(0.43) (0.63) (0.10) 
RI01 - R103 
P3 - PI = 1.97 P3 - PI = 1.07 P3 - PI = 1.50 
(2.66*) (1.45) (2.00*) 
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Table 3.4 Mean monthly momentum profits by residual institutional ownership and 
trading volume 
All stocks are first sorted each month t into quintile based on the end of previous quarter residual 
institutional ownership (RIO) and then 3-month period trading volume (VO) prior to the first day 
of the formation period Q-7 to t-2). RIO is obtained from a cross-sectional regression using eq. 
3.2. Trading volume is measured as the ratio of the number of shares traded to the number of 
shares outstanding. Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the 
worst-performing 30%, portfolio P2 contains the middle 40%, and portfolio P3 includes the 
best-performing 30%. This table reports the portfolio's mean raw returns during the holding 
period Q to t+S). t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on Newey-West autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors. *(**)denotes significance at the 5(10)% level. The sample period is January 1993 
to December 2002. 
V03 (Iligh) V02 VO I (Low) V03-VOI 
RIOI (Low) 
R102 
R103 
R104 
RIOS (Ifigh) 
P3 0.71 
P1 -2.06 
P3 - PI = 2.77 
(5.32*) 
P3 0.78 
PI -1.81 
P3 - PI = 2.58 
(4.92*) 
P3 = -0.03 
PI = -1.24 
P3 - PI = 1.21 
(2.5 5 
P3 0.20 
P1 -0.37 
P3 - PI = 0.57 
(1.07) 
P3 0.01 
PI -0.37 
P3 - PI = 0.38 
(0.78) 
P3 = 0.65 
PI =-1.78 
P3 - PI = 2.43 
(5.19*) 
P3 0.37 
PI -1.75 
P3 - PI = 2.11 
(3.74*) 
P3 = -0.0 1 
PI = -0.82 
P3 - PI = 0.81 
(1.36) 
P3 0.23 
PI -0.42 
P3 - PI = 0.65 
(1.20) 
P3 = -0.10 
PI = -0.66 
P3 - PI = 0.56 
(1.23) 
P3 0.09 
PI -1.91 
P3 - PI = 2.00 
(4.11 
P3 = -0.41 
PI = -2.03 
P3 - PI = 1.62 
(3.08*) 
P3 = -0.28 
PI = -0.84 
P3 - PI = 0.57 
(1.09) 
P3 = -0.29 
PI = -0.77 
P3 - PI = 0.48 
(0.94) 
P3 = -0.30 
PI = -0.79 
P3 - PI = 0.49 
(0.86) 
P3 - PI = 0.77 
(1.28) 
P3-PI =0.97 
(1.60) 
P3 - PI = 0.64 
(1.09) 
P3 - PI = 0.09 
(0.14) 
P3-PI =-0.11 
RIOI - R105 
P3-PI=2.40 P3-PI=1.87 P3-PI=1.51 
(3.79*) (3.99*) (2.76*) 
In summary, the findings of this section have major implications for trading. First, 
momentum returns are more likely to be 'paper' returns as these profits primarily come 
from loser stocks that are very costly or impossible to short. Second, investors' inability 
to short-sale loser stocks defeats the original idea of generating momentum profits from a 
self-financing (hedge) portfolio. The persistence in momentum in stock prices is therefore 
caused by limits to arbitrage rather than investors' under-reaction to firm-specific 
information reported in some earlier studies. Some behavioural finance theorists argue 
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that the persistence in momentum profits may be attributed to the disposition cfTect, 
implying that investors are reluctant to sell losers and eager to dispose of winners (see 
Sheffin and Statman, 1985). Ranguelova (2001) points out that the disposition effect 
operates entirely through the selling behaviour of individual investors. However, in this 
case, individual (unsophisticated) investors are not assumed to be subject to any irrational 
behaviour/bias in their selling decisions". This chapter only assumes that short-sale 
constraints prohibit arbitragcurs from immediately correcting mispricing. 
Institutional investors generally do not hold momentum (loser) stocks and less 
sophisticated individual investors are unlikely try to get involved in short-selling. These 
trading behaviours of investors help maintain persistence in momentum profits that come 
from loser stocks. The finding of Keim (2004) that only 23 per cent of institutional 
traders in the UK are characterised as momentum traders (50 per cent arc 
index/diversified traders and 27 per cent are valuc/fundamcntal traders) suggests that 
momentum strategies are less popular among British institutional investors. Finally, the 
findings suggest that Miller's overpricing hypothesis cannot fully explain the momentum 
profits. 
3.5 A test of DIIS's overconfidence model and momentum profit 
Discussions in the previous section confirm that momentum profit originates mainly from 
the underperformance of loser stocks, and the continued underperformance is 
concentrated in stocks with high short-sale constraints but not with high divergence in 
investors' beliefs. This section tests an alternative overvaluation theory developed by 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyarn (DIIS, 1998) suggesting that overconfidence and 
self attribution are the sources of momentum profits. DIIS suggest investors are 
overconfident about their private information, and therefore overweight their private 
information and under-react to public signals. When public information confirms 
investors' private information their confidence increases, investors continue to over-react 
to their priors because of biased self-attribution. This optimism, generally excessive, 
34 The problem of using the disposition effect to explain the persistence of momentum profits is that it 
requires investors to consistently reject selling their stock. While it may be true that individual investors are 
sometimes reluctant to sell assets that are trading at a loss, it is hard to believe that they always do so. 
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together with short-sale constraints leads to overvaluation resulting in subsequent low 
retums. 
To test this proposition, this section uses short-sale constraints to capture optimistic 
investors, since pessimistic traders cannot enter into the market and, hence, only 
optimistic investors remain in the market. This section employs analyst recommendations 
and analyst forecast revisions to capture good public information in which investors 
precise as confirmation signal, create an excess optimism and push prices upward and 
generate low subsequent returns. 
Table 3.5 examines whether analyst recommendations to 'Buy' are more pronounced for 
stocks with short-sale constraints and whether this contributes to momentum profits. This 
section performs a two dimensional analysis. First, the stocks are grouped into three 
portfolios based on their previous quarter's RIO. Second, stocks in each RIO portfolio are 
then grouped again into three portfolios on their analyst recommendation (Rcc) into 
'Buy', 'Hold' and 'Sell' recommendations prior to the formation period (1-7 to t-2). 
Finally, stocks within each clement of the matrix (RIO x Rcc) are then allocated into 
three further portfolios on the basis of their return performance during the formation 
period Q-7 to 1-2). Portfolio PI contains the worst performing 30 per cent stocks, P2 
includes the middle 40 per cent stocks, and P3 includes the best performing 30 per cent 
stocks. The holding period Q to t+5) returns (raw) of these portfolios arc reported in Table 
3.5. 
The results reconfirm that momentum profits are mostly concentrated within the lowest 
RIO portfolios of loser stocks. Table 3.5 further reveals ýhat for each RIO portfolio, 
momentum returns decline monotonically from 'Buy' to 'Sell' recommendations. These 
results show that investors might be initially optimistic, when they receive a buy signal 
from analyst recommendation, they become more confident and push prices up, stocks 
become overvalued and subsequent returns are low, resulting in momentum profits 
generated by the return continuation on loser stocks. 
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Table 3.5 Momentum Returns by Short-sale Constraint and Analyst Recommendation 
Average monthly raw returns (per cent) of portfolios composed on short-sale constraints and 
analysts' recommendation are reported. Short-sale constraint is measured by RIO, the residual of 
equation (3.2). Analyst recommendation on each stock is collected from I/B/E/S. First, at the end 
of each month t, all stocks are allocated into three RIO portfolios. Second, stocks in each RIO 
portfolios are grouped into three further portfolios on analyst recommendation (Rec) including 
'Buy', 'Hold', and 'Sell' groups. All stocks belonging to each element of the (RIO x Rec) matrix 
are then grouped into three portfolios. The portfolios are PI (the worst performing 30 per cent), P2 
(the middle 40 per cent), and P3 (the best performing 30 per cent). The position is held for 
six-months Q to t+5). All portfolios are equally weighted. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on 
Newey-West autocorrelation consistent standard errors. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10) per 
cent level. The sample period is January 1993 to December 2002. 
Analyst Recommendation (Rec) 
RIO Portfolios Buy Ifold Sell BUY - Sell 
P3 - PI = 2.46 P3 - PI = 2.01 P3 - PI = 0.72 P3 - PI = 1.74 
RIOI (Low) 
(3.65*) (3.95*) (1.18) (2.25*) 
P3 - PI = 1.89 P3 - PI = 0.79 P3-PI =0.86 P3 - PI = 1.02 
R102 (3.34*) (1.73**) (2.02**) (1.84**) 
P3 - PI = 1.23 P3 - PI = 1.16 P3 - PI = 0.44 P3 - PI = 0.79 
R103 (High) (1.94* *) 
(2.63*) (0.83) (1.23) 
R103 - R101 
P3 - PI = 1.23 P3 - PI = 0.84 P3 - PI = 0.27 
(1.80**) (1.47) (0.38) 
To examine whether momentum profits are concentrated in stocks with high short-sale 
constraints and 'with analyst forecast revision upward, Table 3.6 performs a two 
dimensional analysis. First, the stocks are grouped into three portfolios based on their 
previous quarter's RIO. Second, stocks in each RIO portfolio are then grouped again into 
three portfolios on their analyst forecast revision (FRev) into 'Up', 'No change' and 
'Down' revisions prior to the formation period (1-7 to t-2). Finally, stocks within each 
element of the matrix (RIO x FRev) are then allocated into three further portfolios on the 
bas. is of their return performance during the formation period (0 to t-2). Portfolio PI 
contains the worst performing 30 per cent of stocks, P2 includes the middle 40 per cent of 
stocks, and P3 includes the best performing 30 per cent of stocks. The holding period (t to 
t+5) returns (raw) of these portfolios are reported in Table 3.6. 
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The results show that momentum profits are concentrated on loser stocks within the 
lowest RIO portfolios and analyst forecast revision upward portfolios. For each RIO 
portfolio, momentum returns decline monotonically from forecast revision 'Up' to 
'Down'. The findings suggest that investors are initially optimistic, when they receive a 
forecast revision upward signal, they become overconfident and push prices up, stocks 
become overvalued and subsequent returns are low, resulting in momentum profits 
generated by the return continuation on loser stocks. 
Table 3.6 Momentum Returns by Short-sale Constraint and Analyst Forecast Revision 
Average monthly raw returns (per cent) of portfolios composed on short-sale constraints and 
analysts' recommendation are reported. Short-sale constraint is measured by RIO, the residual of 
equation (3.2). Analyst forecast revision on each stock is collected from I/B/E/S. First, at the end 
of each month t, all stocks are allocated into three RIO portfolios. Second, stocks in each RIO 
portfolios are grouped into three further portfolios on analyst forecast revision (FRev) includes 
'Up', 'No change' and 'Down' groups. All stocks belonging to each element of tile (RIO x FRev) 
matrix are then grouped into three portfolios. The portfolios are PI (the worst performing 30 per 
cent), P2 (the middle 40 per cent), and P3 (the best performing 30 per cent). The position is held 
for six-months (t to t+5). All portfolios are equally weighted. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based 
on Newey-West autocorrelation consistent standard errors. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10) 
per cent level. The sample period is January 1993 to December 2002. 
Analyst Forecast Revision (FRev) 
RIO Portfolios Up No Change Down Up - Down 
RI01 (Low) P3 - PI = 2.24 P3 - PI = 
1.83 P3 - PI =1.06 P3 -PI = 1.18 
(4.11 *) (3.71 *) (2.21 *) (1.91**) 
R102 P3 - PI = 1.61 
P3 - PI = 1.21 P3 - PI = 1.05 P3-PI =0.56 
(3.76*) (2.65*) (2.60*) (1.18) 
R103 (High) P3 - PI = 1.17 P3 - PI = 1.55 P3 - PI = 0.88 P3 - PI = 0.28 (2.75*) (3.20*) (1.67**) (0.52) 
R103 - R101 
P3 -PI = 1.06 P3 - PI = 0.28 P3 - PI = 0.16 
(1.90**) (0.54) (0.27) 
Overall, the findings of this section are consistent with the prediction that return 
continuation on loser stocks will be most pronounced with low institutional ownership 
(high short-sale constraints) and public good signals. The results show that stocks with 
high past returns, analyst recommendations to buy, and analysts revising their forecast 
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upward provide an environment in which unsophisticated investors accelerate their 
confidence level, this might lead to excessive optimism about the firm and subsequent 
momentum profits. 
Since the previous sections find that the profitability of momentum strategies are driven 
almost entirely by the loser stocks, it will be interesting to see what happens to these loser 
stocks in pre- and post-formation periods. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 plot the cumulative raw 
returns and mean monthly returns of loser portfolios under five quintile groups of 
residual institutional ownership respectively, in the 12-month prior to formation period 
Q-17 to t-7), formation period (0 to t-2), and 24-month holding period (t-I to t+23). The 
results show that positive returns could be earned in the 12-month prior to formation 
period only at the lowest RIO quintile and slight positive returns for R102. Given that the 
earlier results show that momentum profits can only be observed from the lowest two 
RIO quintiles, the results in this section thus indicate that loser stocks under short sales 
constraints are initially overpriced. Together, the 24-month holding periods show that the 
market eventually corrects the mispricings. This is consistent with behavioural models by 
Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) that momentum is initially an over 
reaction and is followed by a long-run reversal. Yet, Figure 3.2 and 3.3 show that the 
overreaction theory does not fully explain the long-run anomaly. There is strong long-run 
reversal in all RIO quintiles despite there being no early momentum. This finding is in 
line with Cooper et al's. (2003) finding that long-run reversal can appear without 
short-run momentum. 
81 
Chaptcr 3 
Figure 3.2 Cumulative momentum returns of loser portfolios under rive quintile groups of 
residual Institutional ownership 
At the end of each month t, all stocks are allocated into quintile based on their six-month 
formation-period from 0 to 1-2 and by the end of the previous quarter residual institutional 
ownership (RIO). RIO is obtained from a cross-sectional regression using eq. 2. Quintile 
portfolios are formed monthly by weighting equally all firms in that quintile ranking. The figure 
shows the cumulative returns of loser portfolios under five quintile groups of residual institutional 
ownership. The time scale is 12-month prior formation period (1-12), formation period (13-18), 
and 24-month post formation period (19-42). 
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Figure 3.3 Mean monthly returns of loser portfolios under rive quintile groups of residual 
institutional ownership 
At the end of each month t, all stocks are allocated into quintile based on their six-month 
formation-period from t-7 to t-2 and by the end of the previous quarter residual institutional 
ownership (RIO). RIO is obtained from a cross-sectional regression using eq. 2. Quintile 
portfolios are formed monthly by weighting equally all firms in that quintile ranking. The figure 
shows the mean monthly returns of loser portfolios under five quintile groups of residual 
institutional ownership. The time scale is 12-month prior formation period (1-12), formation 
period (13-18), and 24-month post formation period (19-42). 
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To examine the interaction between momentum profits and the previously identified 
momentum-related factors, this section conducts a series of cross-sectional regressions. 
This allows us to explore the above interrelationships while controlling for the predictors. 
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It also serves as a robustness check on the methodology of two/three dimensional 
analysis applied in previous sections. 
Cross-sectional regressions are estimated for each month t from January 1993 to 
December 2002. The coefficient estimates reported in Table 3.7 are the time-series 
averages of the monthly estimates. The dependent variable is the average monthly return 
over the six-months holding periods subsequent to the current month t. Explanatory 
variables are RIO, Prior return, Disp, Rec and FRev, as defined earlier. The t-statistics are 
based on the Newey-West autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
In Table 3.7 (Model 1), the average monthly returns over the six-month holding periods (t 
to t+5) are regressed on prior returns over the six-month formation period Q-7 to t-2) and 
RIO. The coefficient estimates are consistent with the earlier portfolio results suggesting 
the presence of momentum returns, and the strong negative relationship between 
momentum and residual institutional ownership. 
In Model 2, the average monthly returns over the six-month holding periods Q to t+5) are 
regressed on prior returns over the six-month formation period (1-7 to 1-2), RIO and Disp. 
The coefricient on RIO is -0.019 (t-statistic -2.10) and the coefficient on Disp is -0.021 
(t-statistic -0.92) confirming the previous results that momentum profits are most 
pronounced for both short-sale constraints but are not linked to divergence in opinions. 
Model 3 and model 4 look at the effect of analyst recommendation and analyst forecast 
revision in isolation and at its interaction with RIO and prior returns. The results show 
that momentum profits are strong in all cases. The findings continuous to establish the 
negative relationship between momentum and institutional ownership in both models. In 
addition, the findings suggest that momentum profits might link to overconfidence and 
self attribution bias. 
In Model 5, the average monthly returns over the six-months holding periods Q to t+S) 
are regressed on prior returns over the six-months formation period Q-7 to t-2), RIO, Disp, 
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Rec and FRev. The results show that each of these variables contain strong effects on 
future returns, except Disp, which measure for divergence in opinion. 
Table 3.7 Cross-sectional regression analysis 
This table shows average monthly regression coefficients from January 1993 to December 2002. 
The dependent variable is the average monthly return over the six-month holding periods 
subsequent to the current month t. RIO is the residual institutional ownership obtained from a 
cross-sectional regression using eq. 2. VO is the three-month period trading volume prior to the 
first day of the formation period Q-7 to t-2). Prior return is the average monthly returns over the 
six months prior to the current month t. Disp is the three-month period of analysts' forecasts 
dispersion prior to the first day of the formation period. Rec is the analyst recommendation. FRev 
is the analyst forecast revision. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on Newey-West 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10)% level. RI is 
the time-series average of the monthly adjusted R1. 
Model 
12345 
, 0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 0.001 Intercept (. 1.82**) (. 1.11) (-1.28) (-1.22) (0.22) 
-0.012 . 0.019 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016 RIO (-1.76**) (-2.10*) (-2.15 *) (-2.14*) (-2.29*) 
0.122 0.105 0.188 0.181 0.242 Prior return (4.80*) (4.21 *) (6.41 (5.72*) (3.22*) 
Disp -0.021 0.006 (-0.92) (0.43) 
Rec 0.001 0.006 (1.65**) (2.00*) 
FRev 0.001 0.002 (2.4 8 *) (2.43 *) 
Adj Rl(%) 2.86 6.68 5.66 6.06 21.32 
3.7 Short sales constraints and the value premium 
The previous section has established the strong link between momentum profits and 
short-sale constraints. It will be interesting to see if other zero-sum investment strategies 
based on the value premium/book-to-markct effect will also display such a pattern in the 
UK. First, this section sorts all stocks into quintiles at the end of each month t based on 
their returns during the six month formation period Q-7 to 1-2). This section then groups 
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the stocks of each book-to-markct category into five portfolios (equal stocks) on previous 
quarter's RIO obtained from equation (3.2). 
The results in Table 3.8 support the views that the value premium is most pronounced in 
low B/M stocks with high short-sale constraints. The average difference between the 
monthly returns of BM5 and BMI portfolios in the lowest RIO quintile is 2.09 per cent 
(T-statistic = 5.66). In contrast, the differences between returns of BM5 and BMI in 
R105 portfolios are statistically insignificant. The results also show that almost all of the 
contribution to momentum profits comes from low B/M stocks. The findings arc very 
similar to those of the momentum anomaly that this chapter has established earlier. In 
addition, the results arc consistent with NagcI (2005) that the book-to-markct cffect is 
primarily concentrated in stocks that are difficult to short. 
Table 3.8 Mean Monthly Portfolio Returns by Residual Institutional Ownership and 
Book-to-Market Effect 
At the end of each month t, all stocks are allocated into quintile based on their book-to-market 
ratio (B/M) at time I and by the end of the previous quarter residual institutional ownership (RIO). 
Decile portfolios are formed monthly by weighting equally all firms in that decile ranking. The 
position is held for the following twelve-month period (t to t +11). This table reports the 
strategy's mean raw returns during the holding period. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on 
Newey-West autocorrelation consistent standard errors. *denotes significance at the 5% level. 
The sample period is January 1993 to December 2002. 
Residual Institutional Ownership (RIO) 
Book-to-Market RIOI 
R102 R103 R104 11105 11105 - RIOI (Low) (Iligh) 
BMI (Low) -1.82 -1.75 -1.32 -0.75 -0.49 1.33 (2.87*) 
BM2 -0.89 -1.03 -0.89 -0.80 -0.70 0.19(0.68) 
BM3 -0.73 -0.60 ' -0.71 -0.60 -0.39 0.35(l. 94) 
BM4 -0.28 -0.48 -0.16 -0.21 -0.25 0.03(0.18) 
BM5 (Iligh) 0.27 0.11 0.40 0.21 0.08 -0.18 (-1.14) 
BMS-BMI 2.09 1.86 1.72 0.96 0.57 -1-52 (-3.34*) (5.66*) (5.52*) (5.60*) (2.99*) (1.75) 
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3.8 Conclusions 
Extensive evidence on the persistence of momentum profits has challenged the rational 
expcctation-based predictions of modem finance theory, yet its causes and exploitability 
are unknown. To fill this gap, this chapter examined three issues. They are: (a) what are 
the possible sources of momentum profits? (b) to what extent are momentum profits 
linked to overconfidence, limits to arbitrage and divergence in opinion? and (c) are 
momentum profits exploitable? More specifically, following the predictions of Miller 
(1977) this chapter examines whether stocks charactcriscd with limits to arbitrage and 
high divergence in investors' beliefs contribute to momentum profits. Several conclusions 
emerge. 
This chapter finds that momentum profits come from loser stocks. There is strong 
evidence of a positive relationship between short-sale constraints and the magnitude of 
momentum profits. The.. -known_risk 
factors cannot exp)pin,,. the-momentpm-prof"its. 
However, the results are inconsistent with Miller's (1977) view that stocks that are 
subject to both short-sale constraints and high divergence in opinion are initially 
overvalued and generate low subsequent returns. This chapter find that momentum prorits 
might be linked with short sale constraints but not with divergence in opinion. On the 
other hand, excessive optimism together with self attribution bias leading to 
overvaluation and therefore low subsequent returns better explain momentum prorits. 
The findings of this chapter have several implications. First, momentum profits might not 
be exploitable easily as these are generated primarily by loser stocks that arc costly or 
impossible to sell short. Second, the investors' inability to short-sell loser stocks defeats 
the original theme of momentum trading that argues for a self-financing hedge portfolio. 
Third, the persistence in momentum profits might be caused by limits to arbitrage rather 
than investors under-rcacting to firm-specific information. Finally, the results support the 
view that momentum profit results primarily from mispricing due to limits to arbitrage 
and overconfidence, while divergence in opinion does not play a role in overvaluation. 
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4. Analyst Bias, Uncertainty and Momentum Profits 
4.1 Introduction 
There is overwhelming empirical evidence documenting the apparent success of the 
momentum strategy where buying stocks with high returns over the previous 3 to 12 
months and selling stocks with poor performance over the same period of time can 
generate significant abnormal returns over a medium holding period. The apparent 
momentum in stock prices appears to be strong in the US and Europe and to a lesser 
extent in Asia. Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) document that 17 of the 40 countries they 
studied display positive and significant momentum profits. In addition, they found that 
momentum profits for Asia arc substantially weaker than those around the world, 
particularly to Europe. Similarly, Rouwenhorst (1999) found weaker momentum profits 
for emerging markets. In addition, Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003) found that the 
momentum effect is generally weak in Asian countries. Although the literature has 
reached a consensus on the existence of momentum in stock prices, there is still no 
consensus on the source(s) of momentum profits. 
Previous works based on behavioural theories attempted to explain the payoff of 
. momentum strategies. Daniel ct al. (1998) and Hong and Stcin (1999), each employing 
different behavioural or cognitive biases, suggest that over-rcaction is the source of 
momentum prorits. Barberis et al (BSV, 1998) and Zhang (2006) suggest that investors 
under-react to new information and stock prices continue to move in the same direction. 
According to behavioural theories, stocks that are small, have less available information 
on fundamentals, fewer investors/analysts to follow their progress, whose businesses arc 
hard to value, implementation costs are high and arbitrage rather limited should exhibit 
higher momentu Howevcr, th e)jnt behavioural finance literature has not yet been 
able to provide unifying e ýlanation to momentum proffig. In addition, there are few 
attempts to search for behavioural explanations for momentum profits across countries. 
This chapter fills this gap 
The hypothesis of this chapter is based on works in the behavioural economics and 
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finance literature. Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2006), using information 
uncertainty variables as proxied by firm size, firm age, analyst forecast dispersion, 
leverage, return volatility, and cash flow volatility, show that momentum profits are linked 
with information uncertainty. In particular, Zhang (2006) shows that greater information 
uncertainty leads to relatively lower future stock returns following bad news and relatively 
higher future returns following good news, indicating that uncertainty prevents timely 
information incorporation into stock prices. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) propose a 
model of media bias that suggests that a media firm with a reputation concern will distort 
information in order to conform %ýith consumers' prior beliefs whenever the outcomes are 
difficult to observe. 
This chapter combines these two ideas and develops the hypothesis: if the momentum 
profits are linked to uncertainty, in particular, higher momentum profits when there is 
higher uncertainty and if investors are unable to gain access to their own source of 
information, their information set will be reliant on their agents i. e. analysts. Analysts 
who are concerned for their reputations will act on or reveal information depending on 
their clients' prior beliefs whenever possible in order to maximize their rewards. In sum, 
when there is more uncertainty, hence, when the true information is difficult to observe, 
analysts make earnings forecasts and recommendations that bias towards their client's 
desire, i. e. release positive news for winners stocks pushing prices upward and distort 
negative news for loser stocks pushing prices downward. As a result, momentum profits 
should be high when uncertainty and analyst bias are high. 
Risk factors are commonly used to explain the market anomaly, however, Fama and 
French (1996) concede that momentum trading is the only CAPM-related anomaly that 
their three-factor model fails to explain. In addition, the-extanLlitcrature-liasnot-yc-Uccn- 
able to identify any _ priate risk 
factors that might explain-the- momentum anomaly. 
Recently, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) showed that momentum profits are linked with 
the busin 
- 
ess-cycle. Avramov and Chordia (2006) suggest that although business cycle risk 
is captured by Treasury Bill yield, the term spread, and the default spread do not directly 
explain momentum profits, however, the sources of momentum prorits can be traced to 
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undiscovered risk factors associated with the business cycle pattern. Antoniou, Lam and 
Paudyal (2007) find similar results for European stock markets. Naranjo and Porter (2004) 
document that country-neutral momentum returns are significantly correlated across 
countries and are time-varying. Their results are in line with the notion that momentum 
strategies are exposed to some common yet unidentified price risk factor. 
Given that credit risk varies over the business cycle, Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and 
Philipov (2007) show that momentum profits are linked with credit rating. Their 
cross-sectional results show that momentum profits are concentrated on high credit risk 
firms only 35 . However, the time-series findings show that momentum profits are 
higher 
during expansionary periods where credit risks should be lower than those during 
recessionary periods. As a result, the inconsistency between the time-series and 
cross-sectional findings suggest that momentum profit is not a compensation for credit 
risks. This chapter attempts to examine the link between credit rating and momentum 
profits furthcr by incorporating analyst bias. 
Using a sample of 22033 stocks covering 41 countries over the periods from 1983 to 
2002 for the US, and from 1987 to 2002 for the rest of the world, this chapter finds that, 
consistent with the existing literature, momentum strategies are largely profitable on 
average around the world, and momentum profits for Asia are distinctly weaker than for 
Europe. In addition, the findings suggest that stocks with I/B/E/S coverage earn higher 
momentum profits than stocks that are not covered. The results show that the sample of 
I/B/E/S coverage firms is representative. 
Trading strategies conditional on three dispersion of analyst forecast (Disp) and three prior 
six month return groups yield momentum payoffs that increase monotonically with the 
dispersion of analyst forecast across countries. The results are more pronounced for 
countries that have experienced momentum payoffs. Similarly, based on three uncertainty 
35 Avramov and Hore (2008) build a theoretical model show that momentum profits exist in high 
information uncertainty and high credit risk stocks, suggest that the combination of leverage, which proxies 
for credit risk and information uncertainty, which represents risky cash flow firms could generate risk 
factors that could explain the momentum profits. 
90 
Chaptcr 4 
(V) and three past return portfolios, momentum payoffs increase monotonically with 
uncertainty. On the other hand, based on three diversity of analyst forecast (1-p) and three 
past return groups, the momentum profits drop monotonically with increase in diversity of 
analyst forecast, suggesting that momentum profits are stronger with higher 
agreemcnt/consensus among investors. In addition, within each of the uncertainty groups, 
the extreme winner and loser portfolios are among higher analyst bias groups. The 
findings suggests that analysts with reputational concerns report forecasts in accord with 
client's beliefs, hence greater analyst bias when there is greater uncertainty. The extreme 
winner and loser stocks continue to move in the same directions reflecting investors' 
beliefs promoted by analyst bias rather than the true set of information. , 
This chapter also examines the link between credit rating, analyst bias and momentum 
profits in the US". The results show that momentum profits are concentrated among high 
credit risks and high analyst bias firms during expansionary periods, and loser stocks are 
the dominant source of the profitability of momentum strategies. The findings suggest that 
analysts with reputation concern report earnings forecasts in accord with the client's desire 
and distort bad news for the poorest credit quality firms whenever the outcomes are 
difficult to detect and/or mistakes are less painful to absorb i. e. during expansionary 
periods. During recessionary periods, however, analysts will choose to forecast earnings 
close to if not the same as the consensus forecast since mistakes are more costly and 
painful. 
Finally, the chapter reports a head-to-head comparison of a strategy that based on 
uncertainty, by buying low uncertainty winners and selling high uncertainty losers, with the 
traditional Jegadeesh-Titman momentum strategy. The findings show that the uncertainty 
momentum strategy is superior to the Jegadeesh-Titman momentum strategy. 34 of 41 
countries display momentum profits for uncertainty momentum strategy compared to 24 
of 41 countries for the Jegadeesh-Titman momentum strategy. 
36 Due to lack of data available for the credit rating by S&P of other countries, this chapter only examines 
the effect on US Data. 
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This chapter makes several contributions to the behavioural economics and finance 
literature. First, this chapter establishes a strong link between uncertainty and momentum 
profits across countries. Second, the findings report that greater uncertainty with greater 
analyst bias leads to negative returns for loser stocks, and hence greater momentum 
profits. As a result, the momentum effects are more likely to reflect slow absorption of 
ambiguous information into stock price because analysts with reputational concerns 
report forecasts in accord with client's beliefs rather than the true set of information. The 
findings provide empirical evidence for the economic theory of 'herding on the priors' 
and reputational effects in sender-receiver games", as well as the finance literature on the 
sources of momentum profits. Third, this chapter provides evidence on global data that 
analysts' forecast dispersion reflects uncertainty rather than disagreement, consistent with 
Johnson (2004)". Fourth, the chapter suggests that the strong link between credit rating 
and momentum profits in the US documented by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov 
(2007) can be explained by analyst bias. Finally, the chapter finds that profits from a 
momentum strategy based on uncertainty, by buying low uncertainty winners and selling 
high uncertainty losers, are greater (includes most Asian countries) than the 
Jegadeesh-Titman momentum strategy. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2discusses the related 
literature and develops the testable hypotheses. Section 4.3 discusses the sample data and 
methodology. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results. Section 4.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
4.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Risk and uncertainty 
Conventional finance theory assumes complete agreement among investors about the 
probability distribution of future payoffs on assets. As a result, investors will accurately 
process all available information about the distribution of future payoffs and have 
37 For the related literature on 'herding on the priors' and rcputational effects in scnder-receivcr games, see' 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006). 
38 Johnson (2004) suggests that the negative relation between dispersion in analysts' forecast and future 
returns may be due to the uncertainty (or risk) rcflecting in dispersion, the option value of the firm increase 
and result in low subsequent returns. 
92 
Chapter 4 
complete knowledge of the distribution. In other words, the future stock return payoff is 
known with certainty. In reality, however, investors are uncertain about the true 
probability structure of stock return payoffs. Consequently, uncertainty about the future 
stock returns payoffs could influence asset prices. In particular, Knight (1921) makes a 
distinction between risk and uncertainty. Risk exists when a probability based on past 
experience can be attached to an event, whereas uncertainty exists when there i's no 
objective way to place a probability on an event. More importantly, he argues that 
investors dislike uncertainty more than risk. As a result, investors will show an extra 
aversion to uncertainty beyond their aversion to risk. Ellsberg (1961) shows that 
individuals may prefer to gamble with precise probabilities, hence risk, than to gamble 
with unknown odds, hence uncertainty. Rigotti and Shannon (2005) suggest that high 
uncertainty stops some assets being traded due to uncertainty aversion. The distinction 
between uncertainty and ! isk suggests that while higher risk is associated with higher 
expected returns, higher uncertainty could be associated with lower expected returns. 
4.2.2 Measures of uncertainty and disagreement 
Using dispersion of analyst's earnings forecasts to proxy for divergence of opinion, 
Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002), hereafter DMS (2002), found that stocks with 
higher dispersion in analyst's earnings forecasts tend to have lower future stocks market 
returns. They suggest that because the marginal investor fails to fully account for the 
correlation between analyst disagreement and forecast bias, high dispersion stocks are 
likely to be overvalued and to underperform otherwise similar stocks in the future. 
Another reason why increased dispersion of beliefs should be associated with lower 
prices comes from the fact that uncertainty aversion should generally increase with belief 
dispersion; that is, the fact that different investors more strongly disagree about subjective 
probabilities attached to some states is indicative of a greater difficulty of estimating 
these probabilities, and hence of greater uncertainty. Then, because of uncertainty 
aversion, the market prices for claims to states should be lower with greater dispersion of 
beliefs. Since the current findings as to whether dispersion in analysts' forecast captures 
the nature of disagreement or uncertainty are not conclusive, it is ultimately an empirical 
question. 
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Baron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998), hereafter BKLS (1998), argue that dispersion in 
analysts' forecasts is likely to be a poor proxy for investor disagreement. Along this line, 
Doukas et al. (2006) found that the negative relation between dispersion in analysts' 
forecasts and ex-post stock returns documented by DMS (2002) were reversed once they 
controlled for uncertainty in analysts' earnings forecasts. 
BUS argue that forecast dispersion reflects both the degree of non-redundancy in 
individual analysts' information and the lack of precision of individual analysts' forecast. 
The BUS uncertainty and diversity in analysts' forecast can be measured as follows: 
Dispersion (Disp) = V(l - p) 
Consensus =p= I-DisplV 
Diversity (Disagreement) = (I- p) 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
Where, Disp is dispersion in analysts' forecasts", i. e., the sample variance of the 
individual forecasts (FC) around the mean forecast (FC) , measured as 
n 
(FC, - TC-)'An-1), where n is the number of forecasts. p is consensus, V is 
uncertainty, i. e., the mean of the squared differences between -individual analysts' 
forecasts (FCj) and reported earnings per share (EPS) measured as 1: (FC, - EPS)21n. 40 
1-1 
If DMS' demonstration that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts' earnings forecast 
earn significantly lower future returns that otherwise similar stocks is correct, and if 
BKLS's argument on dispersion in analysts' forecast captures uncertainty is also correct, 
the combined effects suggest the testable proposition as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: the higher the uncertainty, the lower the future returns for loser stocks and 
39 It is also a product of uncertainty (V) and diversity in analysts' forecasts (I-p) 
40 The relations this chapter reports between dispersion, consensus, and uncertainty are not merely 
mechanical. Theoretically, which component, V or (1-p), has more explanatory power for dispersion is, ex 
ante, not clear (Barron et al. 1998). Also see Section 4.3 for empirical evidence that this relation is not 
merely mechanical. 
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hence the higher the momentum profits. 
4.2.3 Behavioural Theories 
Daniel et al. (DHS, 1998) suggest investor overconfidence causes over-reaction and 
generates momentum, the over-reaction in prices will eventually be corrected in the long 
run as investors observe future news and realize their error. As a result, increased 
overconfidence generates momentum in the short run and reversal in the long run. Hong 
and Stein (HS, 1999) argue that private information diffuses only gradually through the 
marketplace leading to an initial under-reaction to news; subsequently positive serial 
correlation in returns attracts the attention of the momentum traders who trade actively 
and over-react. Eventually, prices revert back to their fundamental levels. Hong, Lim, and 
Stein (2000) test the HS model and found that the diffusion of information is lower for 
momentum stocks. 
The under-reaction hypothesis has also been used to explain the momentum anomaly. 
Barberis et al (BSV, 1998) show that investors are subject to a conservatism bias which 
causes them to under-react to earnings and other corporate news, causing short-run 
positive autocorrelation, but when they observe trends of earnings rising, the positive 
signal causes them to switch to over-reaction, causing long-run negative autocorrelation. 
Zhang (2006), based on the under-reaction hypothesis, argues that momentum effects are 
more likely to reflect slow absorption of ambiguous information into stock price than 
reflect missing risk factors; such under-reaction prevents timely new information being 
incorporated into stock prices. 
Another common corollary of behavioural theories is that momentum could be the result 
of mispricing, such that overpriced stocks earn predictably low future returns and 
underpriced stocks cam predictably high returns. Ali and Trombicy (2006) found that 
momentum profits arc positively related to short sales constraints, suggesting that the 
persistence of momentum profits may be due to the fact that arbitrage is costly and any 
systematic mispricing would not be traded away quickly and completely in situations 
where arbitrage costs exceed arbitrage benefits. 
95 
Chapter 4 
4.2.4 Analyst Bias 
A Bayesian consumer who is uncertain about the quality of an information source will 
infer that the source is of higher quality when its reports conform to the consumer ý prior 
expectations. (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006, JPE) 
Based on the above statement, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) developed a new model of 
media bias. The model is based on the assumption that in order to build a reputation for a 
media firm, it will distort information to make it conform to consumers' prior beliefs 
rather than report true information or the true belief/opinion of the firm. Such behaviour 
is motivated by the fact that consumers always want to receive confirmation of their 
priors from the third party. However, the incentives to distort information from a media 
firm drop when the true state of the world becomes easier to observe. In other words, a 
media firm will choose to report information close to the truth rather than in accord with 
consumers' beliefs if the outcomes are soon to be observable. In addition, the model 
predicts that competition can reduce media bias. 
Since analysts care about reputation as much as media firms do, this chapter applies the 
media bias model to test if analysts are more likely to distort information and predict 
earnings in favour of his client's priors when the actual earnings are difficult or 
immediately observable. In addition, the model assumes that bias is most severe when 
clients are at their most uncertain about the future prospects of a company. 
The media bias model argues that the two key elements to determine the strength and 
direction of bias are feedback and competition. Feedback has an inverse relationship with 
bias. When feedback- is immediate i. e. the truth is easily and quickly observable, media 
firms need to make sure that their reports are close to if not the same as to the outcome. 
Applying this to analyst bias suggests that when an earnings announcement is 
approaching, analysts tend to forecast earnings very close to if not the same as the actual 
earnings i. e. the forecast error will be low. On the other hand, analysts will make their 
forecast close to their client's belief when the publication of the forecast is some time 
away from the earnings announcement. The model suggests that competition also has an 
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inverse relationship with bias. The more analysts who follow a firm, the more 
difficult/costly it is for an analyst to report an at odds forecast, as a result, competition 
reduces the forecast error. This chapter measures analyst bias as follows: 
Prior to the end of the fiscal year 
ABp =I Fp - Ap I/ SD p (4.4) 
where: ABp = Analyst bias of stockj at time t 
Fj, t = Mean forecast prior to cutoff date 
Ap = Actual earnings per share for stockj 
SD p= Standard deviation of earnings forecast 
Analyst bias is measured as the absolute forecast error, computed as the absolute value of 
the difference between mean forecast and actual EPS, and deflated by the standard 
deviation of analyst forecast. The absolute forecast error captures the feedback from the 
media bias model and the standard deviation of earnings forecast captures the feedback. 
As a result, the equilibrium analyst bias is high when forecast error is high (feedback is 
high) and the standard deviation is low (competition is high). 
Traditional interpretations on optimistic earnings forecasts tend to be that analysts want 
to win favour with firms and therefore be able to gain access to private information. 
Applying the media bias suggests that the bias does not arise from consumer choice for 
confirmatory information or analysts' incentives to express their own views. Instead, it is 
because analysts' desiring to build a reputation report forecast in accordance with their 
client's desire whenever the actual earnings are yet to be observed. 
In the presence of uncertainty, the analyst bias could influence future returns of winner 
and loser stocks differently, analysts report an increase in earnings forecast and/or 
recommendation to buy winner stocks to meet their client's desire, and therefore stock 
prices continue to increase. On the other hand, analysts knowing that clients do not want 
to realize losses on loser stocks try not to report earnings decreases and/or 
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recommendations'to sell loser stocks. This chapter therefore formulates the hypothesis as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Expected momentum profits are high when uncertainty and analyst bias arc 
high. 
4.2.5 Credit rating in the US 
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007) suggest that momentum profits that arc 
mainly contributed by loser stocks are -concentrated among the highest credit risk firms. 
However, previous empirical evidence also suggests that momentum prof"Its are high 
during expansion periods, when credit risks are generally lower than during recessionary 
periods. To illustrate, Figure 4.1 shows the credit risk where 4 is the highest and I is the 
lowest. 
Figure 4.1 The disagreement between time-series and cross-scctional analysis 
Business cycle 
Credit risk 
High Low 
Expansion 
1 -- 
3 1 
[--Ke 
cession 4 2 
The puzzle lies in the fact that momentum profits are concentrated on stocks with credit 
risk equal to 3 rather than 4. Analyst bias offers an explanation for this puzzle, since 
analyst bias suggest that analysts with reputation concern continue t6 find times when 
they can report forecast in accordance with clients' desire. Stocks with high default risks 
are harder to detect, or investors are feeling less vulnerable and mistakes are less painful 
to absorb during good periods and when the market is confident. Since the true status is 
harder to detect, analysts therefore choose to recommend to buy winner stocks and to 
hold loser stocks, since investors want to realize gains but not to realize losses. . 
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4.3 Data and methods 
4.3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
This section describes the data sources and the sample selection. Data on stock returns, 
market capitalisation and book to market value are from the Thomson Datastrearn (TDS) 
database. This chapter uses analyst forecasts information included in the Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Detail History dataset and Summary History 
datasets". The sample of 22033 stocks covers 41 countries over the periods from 1983 to 
2002 for the US42 , and from 1987 to 2002 
for the rest of the world. This choice of sample 
has been guided by the availability of data from I/B/E/S. Only common and non-financial 
stocks are included. Results are reported in local currency returns. 
For current companies, this chapter match between Datastream and I/B/E/S databases 
through the SEDOL code. For dead companies, this chapter manually match the two 
databases by the company name. Stocks that are covered by I/B/E/S and with available 
returns data from Datastrearn are classified as 'Stocks with I/B/E/S coverage'. Stocks that 
are not covered by I/B/E/S but with available returns data from Datastream are classified 
as 'Stocks without I/B/E/S coverage'. 
Since a reasonable number of stocks are needed to form momentum portfolios, this 
chapter required each country to have at least 30 stocks that meet the stock selection 
criteria in any month during the sample period. Furthermore, this chapter required each 
momentum portfolio in each country to have a return history of at least five years. 
Because of the last two criteria, the sampl e includes only forty-one countries, with a total 
of 22033 individual stocks. 
Following Diether et al. (2002), this chapter computed month-end averages and standard 
deviations from the individual estimates in the Detail History file by extending each 
forecast until its revision date. For examPle, if the forecast was made in May and was last 
41 Note that although the I/B/E/S summary suffers the problems of rounding procedure (see Payne and 
Thomas (2003), the empirical results are qualitative unaffected 
42 Ince and Porter (2006) compare Datastrearn and CRSP datascts for US equities and show that after 
careful screening, inferences drawn from Datastrearn are similar to those drawn from CRSP, in particular 
for data from 1987 onward. 
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confirmed as accurate in July, it will be used in the computation of averages and standard 
deviations for May, June, and July. If an analyst makes more than one forecast in a given 
month, only the last forecast is used in the calculations. In some records, a revision date 
precedes the actual forecast date, which constitutes an error on the part of I/B/E/S. In this 
case, the forecast will be assumed to be valid only for the month in which it was made. 
This chapter deletes observations for which the absolute value of earnings forecast 
revision exceeds 100% of the prior year-end stock price. Analyst forecast data are 
adjusted for stock-split using the adjustment factor provided by Datastream. 
4.3.2 Momentum strategies 
For the computation of momentum strategies, this chapter follows the most widely 
reported results of the 6 x. 6 strategy. For each month t, all stocks in each country are 
allocated into three portfolios based on their six-month formation-period from 0 to t-2: 
Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the worst-performing 30%, 
portfolio P2 contains the middle 40%, and portfolio P3 includes the bcst-performing 30%. 
The position is held for the following six-month period Q to 1+5). This chapter employs 
one month gap between the formation and holding period to avoid the momentum cffect 
with very short-term reversals and the bid-ask bounce effects established by previous 
studies (See Jegadeesh (1990), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995)). As in Jegadccsh and 
Titman (1993), to increase the power of the tests this chapter constructs overlapping 
momentum portfolios 
4.3.3 Uncertainty and the Divergence of Opinion Measure 
As argued by Baron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998) and proved by Doukas et al. (2006), 
the dispersion in analysts' forecasts is likely to be a poor proxy for investor disagreement 
since it is vitiated by the effects of uncertainty in individual forecasts about the future 
payoffs of stocks. As a result, using dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts as a proxy 
for divergence of opinion to assess its relation with stocks returns and momentum profits 
could be erroneous. This chapter therefore uses the diversity measure of BKLS's (1-p) 
instead to proxy for divergence of opinion. BKLS show that forecast dispersion can be 
expresse d as D=V (1-p), where V is uncertainty and (1-p) is diversity (disagreement) in 
100 
Chapter 4 
analysts information. Diversity of analyst forecast (1-p) is defined as one minus the 
consensus (i. e. the degree of common beliefs among analysts), measured by the 
correlation in forecast errors across analysts. ' In this case, unlike previous studies, this 
chapter uses V to measure the uncertainty and (1-p) the diversity measure as a true 
measure for divergence of opinion. 
4.3,4 Credit Rating in the US 
This section uses data stocks that are rated by Standard & Poor's Long-Term Domestic 
Issuer Crediting Rating on Compustat on a quarterly basis. This chapter extract monthly 
returns on all stocks from Datastream. This chapter then match rated stocks with the 
I/B/E/S database, leaving us with 1256 rated firms with I/B/E/S coverage over the period 
July 1985 through December 2002. The beginning of the sample is guided by the first time 
firm ratings by Standard & Poor's become available on the COMPUSTAT tapes. 
Following Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007), this chapter transforms the 
S&P rating into conventional numerical scores. Explicitly, I represents a rating of AAA 
and 22 reflects aD rating". As a result, a higher numerical score is equal to a higher credit 
risk, or lower credit rating. The equally weighted average rating of the 1256 rated firms is 
12.09 (compared to 8.83 by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov, 2007), and the 
median is 12 (1313). This suggests that analysts are more interested in following high 
credit risk firms. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Summary Statistics by Country 
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for the sample. This section splits the sample into 
two subsamples, (i) Stocks with I/B/E/S coverage (ii) Stocks without I/B/E/S coverage. 
The purpose is to make sure that the sample of stocks with I/B/E/S coverage is 
representative. First, this section identifies an interesting feature in EPS forecasts revision. 
The negative revisions are higher than positive revisions in most countries. This implies 
43 The complete list of ratings is as follows. AAA=I. AA+=2, AA=3, AA-4, A+=5, A=6, A-7, BBB+=8, 
BBB=9,131313-10, BB+=Il, 1313=12, B13-13, B+=14,13=15,13-16, CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC-19, 
CC=20, C=21, D=22. 
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that initially the analysts publish optimistic estimates (evidence of this is well 
documented in the literature) and subsequently they revise the forecasts downwards. The 
findings are in line with Richardson et al. (2004) suggesting that analysts aim to maintain 
the flow of orders trade and provide accuracy to verify their expertise. 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics by Country 
Mean size is the time series average market value of all firms in the sample and displays in millions of units 
of local currency. Number of stocks is the total number of firms in the sample. The forecast revision is the 
average of individual revisions by analysts who covered the firm in both months W and t. Panel A (B) 
contains stocks with (without) FB/E/S coverage. Begin dates t are as shown, and the ending date is 
December 2002. 
Panel A: Stocks with 1/130S Panel B: Stocks without I/B/LUS 
coverage cover ge 
B i Total No. No, M Si 
Forecast Revision No, M Si eg n Stocks Stocks ean ze Negative Zero Positive Stocks 
ean ze 
Africa 
Israel 8701 588 56 2554 18% 59% 23% 532 165 
South Africa 8701 1060 532 2282 32% 45% 23% 528 360 
Americas (ex. U. S. ) 
Argentina 9207 130 89 492 30% 45% 25% 38 160 
Brazil 9207 804 296 11366 27% 47% 26% 508 1578 
Canada 8501 4532 1015 391 33% 42% 25% 3517 271 
Chile 9210 220 127 167966 28% 41% 31% 93 51645 
Colombia 9406 145 34 356627 23% 56% 22% 111 78167 
Mexico 9205 265 135 5193 33% 38% 29% 146 1266 
Peru 9406 140 1 56 404 32% 44% 24% 73 423 
Asia 
Australia 8701 1881 940 470 39% 33% 27% 941 368 
China 9304 1244 296 1821 21% 62% 17% 943 3212 
1 long Kong 8701 896 640 5038 34% 40% 26% 256 2755 
India 9301 1185 489 8586 29% 48% 23% 696 6773 
Indonesia 9005 373 238 614522 33% 40% 27% 131 573206 
Japan 8701 2725 2580 178156 34% 45% 21% 101 165587 
Korea 8801 1837 989 231709 30% 44% 27% 848 44202 
Malaysia 8701 850 634 714 32% 40% 28% 216 562 
New Zealand 8701 283 157 934 38% 35% 27% 126 325 
Pakistan 9301 284 163 1694 22% 59% 18% 121 321 
Philippines 8801 291 184 6417 35% 41% 24% 107 3435 
Singapore 8701 576 342 598 33% 42% 26% 227 628 
Taiwan 8801 744 612 17568 33% 41% 26% 130 3048 
Thailand 8709 576 339 3854 33% 40% 27% 229 3967 
Europe 
Austria 8701 244 112 606 30% 48% 23% 117 1276 
Belgium 8701 591 144 2467 33% 41% 26% 428 5415 
Denmark 8701 403 244 1835 32% 39% 29% 151 1493 
Finland 8804 270 161 648 33% 41% 26% 109 636 
France 8701 2005 919 1428 34% 43% 23% 1083 4141 
Germany 8701 3489 922 919 32% 46% 22% 2560 2217 
Greece 9211 450 262 3578 32% 44% 24% 188 2356 
Ireland 8701 115 82 482 26% 50% 24% 30 421 
Italy 8701 544 332 65596 32% 43% 24% 196 35832 
Netherlands 8701 476 295 1323 32% 43% 25% 181 3304 
Norway 8701 460 234 2201 34% 37% 28% 226 1745 
Portugal 9104 216 93 1157 30% 46% 24% 123 2705 
Spain 8701 240 175 5361 31% 43% 25% 59 21508 
Sweden 8701 1034 376 4936 34% 40% 26% 658 5326 
Switzerland 8701 739 248 2458 33% 44% 23% 490 4389 
Turkey 9112 335 313 87 28% 46% 25% 22 5 
UK 1 8701 1 3780 1999 1 2381 33% 45% 22% 1779 1200 
us 1 8301 1 7122 4143 1 2148 26% 50% 24% 2979 1236 
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In addition, this section find that, for most countries, the mean size for stocks that are 
covered by I/B/E/S and with available returns data from Datastrearn is higher than stocks 
that are not covered by I/B/E/S. This is consistent with findings in previous literature that 
smaller firms are more likely to be followed by fewer analysts, as the cost of infori-nation 
acquisition is considerably higher for smaller firms than for the large ones. 
4.4.2 Momentum Profits by Country 
This section report, for each country, the profitability of momentum strategies that form 
portfolios based on the stocks' past six-month returns and holds the stocks for six months. 
For each market, stocks with performance in the bottom one-third are assigned to the 
loser (L) portfolio, while those in the top one-third are assigned to the winner (W) 
portfolio. These portfolios are equally weighted. This section uses the top and bottom 
one-third rather than the 10% cutoffs used by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) because of 
the smaller sample sizes in most countries. 
Table 4.2 displays average winner minus loser profits for each country in local currency. 
In Panel A, this section restricts the sample to stocks with analyst coverage only. 
Consistent with the overwhelming evidence documented in the literature, this section 
finds that momentum strategies are largely profitable on average around the world. 
Despite the fact that the number of stocks used in Panel A has been restricted only to 
those with I/B/E/S coverage, the momentum returns in this chapter are similar to those 
reported in Griffin et al. (2003), suggesting that this chapter is focusing on the same 
group of stocks. 24 of 41 countries display positive momentum profits. In addition, this 
chapter collects data on whether short selling is practiced from Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu 
(2007) - Table 1. Their data is constructed using indications from market participants, 
market regulators, or institutions within a country that short selling is a common practice. 
The results show that 18 of 23 countries display positive price momentum when short 
selling is a common practice. 12 of 17 countries do not experience any momentum profits 
when short selling is not practiced. Since Hong et al. (2000) document that momentum 
profits are substantially contributed by the short side, the results suggest that momentum 
profits could be practically implementable. However, the results do not suggest that 
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momentum profits are necessarily linked with short-selling activity, since in most 
countries, short-selling is allowed only for certain stocks, in most cases, large firms. 
While stocks that contribute to momentum prorits are smaller firms (see Hong et a], 
2000). As a result, the reported results are only informative rather than conclusive. 
Interestingly, this section also finds that most of the Asian countries do not experience 
momentum, except Australia and New Zealand stocks which exhibit significant 
momentum in the Asian pacific region. One question that naturally arises is why 
momentum profits for Asia are distinctly weaker than those around the world, especially 
in contrast to Europe. 
Earlier studies such as Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) suggest that that momentum profits 
are most pronounced for small firms, growth firms and firms with low analyst coverage. 
If this is correct, this section should expect to see that stocks with no analyst coverage 
display stronger momentum and expect the sources of momentum profits to be consistent 
with the Hong and Stein (1999)'s gradual-information-diffusion model. Table 4.2 (Panel 
B) presents the momentum strategy using sample stocks that are not covered by I/B/E/S 
but with available returns data from Datastream. The table shows that 15 of 41 countries 
display momentum profits compared to 24 of 41 countries for the sample of stocks with 
I/B/E/S coverage in Panel A. Besides, the magnitude of the momentum prorits in Panel A 
is much stronger than those in Panel B. The results show that the sample of stocks with 
I/B/E/S coverage is representative. 
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Table 4.2 Momentum Profits (with and without I/B/E/S coverage) 
At the end of each month t, all stocks in each country are allocated into three portfolios based on their six 
month formation period from 0 to t-2: Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the 
worst-performing 30%, portfolio P2 contains the middle 40%, and portfolio P3 includes the 
best-performing 30%. The position is held for the following six-month period Q to t+5). This table reports 
the strategy's mean raw returns during the holding period. Begin dates are as shown, and the ending date is 
December 2002. Panel A (B) contains stocks with (without) I/B/E/S coverage. Number of stocks is the total 
number of firms in the sample. Countries are listed as Developed or Emerging based on the International 
Finance Corporation's (IFC) categorizations. t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation. ' 
Data is obtained from Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (JoF, 2007) Table 1. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10) 
per cent level. 
Whether Panel A: Stocks with I/ BVS coverage Panel B: Stoc ks without I1B/FJS coverage 
Begin short 
selling is No P3 PI P3-PI 
P3-PI No. P3 PI P3-PI P3-PI 
practiced' Stocks 
(t-stat) Stocks (t-stat) 
Africa 
Israel 8701 No 56 -0.51 1.08 . 1.59 (-2.63*) 532 -0.66 -0.04 -0.62 (-1.35) 
South Africa 8701 Yes 532 1.10 -0.66 1.76 528 . 0.36 -1.51 1.15 (3.26*) 
Americas (ex. U. S. ) 
Argentina 9207 No 89 0.41 -0.07 0.48 (0,62) 41 -0.69 0.49 -1.18 (498) 
Brazil 9207 No 296 4.99 5.49 -0.50 (-0.33) 508 5.67 5.53 0.14 (0.10) 
Canada 8501 Yes 1015 0.58 -1.08 1.66 (5.74*) 3517 -0.78 -1.79 1.01 (2.860) 
Chile 9210 No 127 1.00 0.23 0.77 (1.89**) 93 0.72 1.11 -0.39 (4,06) 
Columbia 9406 No 34 0.25 -0.91 1.16 (3,110) 111 0.45 0.02 0.43 (1.21) 
Mexico 9205 Yes 135 1.34 0.21 1.13 (3.22*) 130 1.33 0.67 0.66 (1.51) 
Peru 9406 No 56 0.70 0.78 1 -0.08 (. 0.10) 84 . 1,85 . 0.41 . 1.44 (488) 
Asia 
Austral ia 8701 Yes 940 0.14 . 1.08 1.22 (3.670) 941 -0.71 -0.76 0.05 (0.12) 
China 9304 No 296 1.04 0.74 0.30 (0.50) 948 0.47 0.21 0.26 (0.45) 
1 long Kong 8701 Yes 640 -0.89 -0.58 -0.31 (-0.65) 256 . 1.29 -0.80 -0.49 (-0.88) 
India 9301 489 0.48 -0.65 1.13 (1.88**) 696 . 0.47 -0.29 -0.18 (-0.32) 
Indonesia 9005 No 238 -1.14 -0.54 . 0.61 (-0.97) 135 . 0.38 -0.51 0.13 (0.21) 
Japan 8701 Yes 2580 -0.79 -0.84 0.05 (0.15) 145 . 0.63 . 1.06 0.43 (1.08) 
Korea 8801 No 989 -1.17 -0.93 -0.24 (-0.42) 848 -1.55 -1.09 -0.46 (. 0.81) 
Malaysia 8701 Yes 634 0.04 0.05 -0.01 (-0.01) 216 -0.53 0.17 -0.70 (. 1.03) 
New Zealand 8701 No 157 0.58 -0.62 1.20 (4.220) 126 0.47 -0.91 1.37 (3.00*) 
Pakistan 9301 No 163 -0.81 -0.44 -0.36 (-0.70) 121 0.09 0.09 0.00 (0,00) 
Philippines 8801 No 184 . 0.40 -0.67 0.27 (0.51) 107 . 0.44 0.08 -0.52 (497) 
Singapore 8701 Yes 342 0.05 -0.23 0.27 (0.62) 234 -0.51 -0.60 0.09 (0.17) 
Taiwan 8801 No 612 -0.78 -0.93 0.14 (0.24) 132 -1.19 -1.91 0.72 (1.13i 
Thailand 8709 Yes 339 -0.70 -0.32 -0.38 (477) 237 1 -0.20 . 0.36 0.16 (0,29) 
Europe 
Austria 8701 Yes 112 0.32 -0.57 0.89 (2.78*) 132 0.47 -0.51 0.98 (2.88*) 
Belgium 8701 Yes 144 0.76 -0.40 1.17 (4.57*) 447 0.40 0.75 1.15 (4,56*) 
Denmark 8701 Yes 244 0.57 -0.36 0.93 (3.58*) 159 0.49 -0.17 0.66 (2,74*) 
Finland 8804 No 161 0.25 -0.55 0.80 (1.86") 109 0.13 . 0.48 0.61 (1.59) 
France 8701 Yes 919 0.39 -0.95 1.35 (4.16*) 1086 -0.12 -0.82 0.70 (2.92*) 
Germany 8701 Yes 922 0.16 -1.64 1.80 (5.12*) 2567 -0.47 -1.96 1.49 (3.51*) 
Greece 9211 No 262 1.36 0.51 0.84 (1.19) 188 0.89 0.46 0.43 (0,581- 
Ireland 8701 Yes 82 0.47 -0.88 1.36 (4.02*) 33 . 0.25 -0.84 0.59 (1,23) 
Italy 8701 Yes 332 0.39 -0.34 0.73 (2.17*) 212 0.43 -0.39 0.82 (2.31 *) 
Netherlands 8701 Yes 295 0.51 -1.35 1.86 (5.35*) 181 0.44 -0.95 1.39 (5.28*) 
Norway 8701 Yes 234 0.32 -0.54 0.86 (1.86**) 226 . 0.40 -1.64 1.24 (2.70*) 
Portugal 9104 Yes 93 0.15 -0.59 0.74 (2.20*) 123 -0.47 . 0.32 -0.15 (-0.48) 
Spain 8701 No 175 0.46 -0.40 0.86 (2.45*) 65 0.13 -0.60 0.73 (2.130) 
Sweden 8701 Yes 376 0.23 -0.98 1.21 (2.49*) 658 -0.25 -1.63 1.38 (2.70*ý 
Switzerland 8701 Yes 248 0.71 -0.90 1.61 (4.91 *) 491 0.05 -0.68 0.73 (2.810) 
Turkey 9112 No 313 3.66 4.44 -0.78 (493) 22 2.15 4.32 -2.17 (. 1.92*41) 
UK 8701 Yes 1999 0.22 . 1.64 1.86 (6.14*) 1781 -0.13 . 1.82 1.69 (5.53*) 
us 8301 Yes 4143 0.54 -0.83 1.37 (4.93*) 2979 -0.54 . 1.35 0.81 
_ (2.77*) 
_ 
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4.4.3 A test ofthe gradual information diffusion model ofHong and Slein (1999) 
This section follows Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) to test empirically Hong and Stein's 
gradual information diffusion model. At the end of each month t, all stocks in each 
country are allocated into three portfolios based on residual analyst coverage. Portfolio 
(Cov)l is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 30%, (Cov)2 is the middle 
40%, and (Cov)3 is the highest 30%. For each of the residual analyst coverage portfolios, 
this section further sorts stocks into three portfolios based on returns from months 0 to 
t-2. Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the worst-pcrforming 30%, 
P2 is the middle 40%, and P3 is the highest 30%. Residual analyst coverage is estimated 
as follows: 
ln(AC,,, ) = a, +a, ln(Size,,, ) + el, t (4.5) 
where, AQ, is (I+number of analysts) of firm 1 at month t and Size,,, is the market 
capitalization of firm iat the beginning of month t. cllis the residual analyst coverage. 
Table 4.3 shows that momentum profits are concentrated on the highest residual analyst 
coverage groups (Cov3) and decrease monotonically as residual analyst coverage 
decreases. The findings sharply contradict Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) who found that 
momentum profits in the US are most severe among low residual analyst coverage 
firmS44 . This inconsistency leads this chapter to search for alternative behavioural based 
explanations. 
44 One of the possible reasons that the UK results differ from the US might be due to the difference in 
ownership structure. In particular, 38% of the total market value of equities are held by individuals in 
the US (see http: //fic. wharton. upenn. edii/fic/Xapers/02/0216. pdf p. 14) which might follow analyst 
opinions more than 14.9% are held by individual shareholders in the UK (see Chapter 3, 
p. 58) Therefore, the analyst coverage effect are much stronger in the US and in the UK. 
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Table 4.3 Momentum Profits and Residual Analyst Coverage 
This table reports average monthly portfolios returns sorted by residual analyst coverage (Cov) and price 
momentum. At the end of each month 1, all stocks in each country are allocated into three portfolios based 
on residual analyst coverage. Portfolio (Cov) I is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 30%, 
(Cov)2 is the middle 40%, and (Cov)3 is the highest 30%. For each of the residual analyst coverage 
portfolios, this table further sort stocks into three portfolios based on returns from months 0 to t-2. 
Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the worst-pcrforming 30%, P2 is the middle 40%, 
and P3 is the highest 30%. Residual analyst coverage is estimated by regressing the log (I+Analysts) on 
market capitalisation and log (Size). #(") represents countries with momentum in Table 4.2 at 5(10)% 
significant level. t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for autocorrelation. *(**) Denotes significance at 
the 5(10) per cent level. 
Cov3 (Iligh) COV2 Cov I (Low) 
P3-P1 P3-PI P3-PI 
P3 Pi P3-Pl (t-stat) P3 PI P3-PI (t-stat) P3 P1 P3-PI (t-stat) 
Africa 
Israel 1,04 0.58 0.46 (0.74) 0.85 -0.05 0.90 (1.75**) 0.18 -0.83 1.01 (1.61) 
South Africa 1 0.54 -0.84 1.38 (3.75*) 0.67 -0.53 1.20 (3.42*) 0,69 -0.45 1.14 (3.39*) 
. 
Americas (ex. U. S. ) 
Argentina -0.90 -1.94 1.04 (1.51) . 0.04 -1.26 1.23 (2.07*) -0.3S -1.18 0.84 (1.19) Brazil . 1.20 -1.41 0.21 (0.30) -0.35 -0.88 0.53 (0.71) -0.50 -0.81 0.30 (0.37) 
Canada' 0.14 . 2.00 2.14 (8.28*) 0.41 -1.31 1.72 (6.780) 0.70 -0.84 1.54 (5.76*) 
Chile "' 0,08 -1.08 1.16 (2.42*) 0.48 -0,23 0.71 (1.60) 0.52 . 0.14 0.66 (1.57) 
Columbia . 1.11 -2.87 1.76 (1.93**) -0.59 . 2,24 1.65 (2.52*) -0.31 . 0.98 0.67 (1.12) Mexico 0 0.31 0.56 -0.25 (-0.52) 0.66 -0.06 0.72 (1.41) -0.77 . 0.88 0.11 (0.16) 
Peru -0.91 . 2.00 1.09 (1.37) -1.74 -1.68 -0.06 (407) -0.52 . 0.23 -018 (437) 
Asia 
Australia 0 0.37 -2.53 2.90 (8,91 0.49 . 1.16 1.65 (5.98*) 0.99 . 0.84 1.83 (6.02*) China -0.60 -1.29 0.69 (0.89) 0.47 0.26 0.21 (0.27) 1.14 0.40 0.74 (0.83) 
1 long Kong -0.29 -1.38 1.09 (2.30*) 0.16 -0.79 0.95 (2,140) -0.07 . 0.82 0.75 (1.62) 
India " -0.99 -2.54 1.54 (2.39*) 0.00 . 1.79 1.79 (3.08*) 0.85 -0.63 1.48 (2,164) 
Indonesia . 1.75 -1.90 0.15 (0.19) . 0.92 -1.15 0.23 (0.34) -0.71 . 0.97 0.26 (0.35) 
Japan . 0.92 . 1.02 0.10 (0.32) -0.78 . 0,79, 0.01 (0.03) -0.38 . 0.52 0.14 (0.41) 
Korea . 0.28 -0.47 0.19 (0.33) -0.77 -0.80 0.03 (0.06) -1.14 -1.00 -0.14 (426) 
Malaysia 0.29 0.01 0.28 (0.54) 0.32 . 0.12 0.44 (0.89) 0.29 0.00 0.29 (0.53) 
New Zealand 0 0.76 -1.76 2.52 (6.19*) 0.94 -0.81 1.75 (5.72*) 0.91 0.59 0.32 (0.81) 
Pakistan -0.57 -0.66 0.09 (0.11) -0.94 . 1.28 0.34 (0.45) -1.39 -0.09 -1.30 (-1.65) 
Philippines . 1.39 -1.32 -0.07 (-0.08) . 0.35 . 2.23 1.88 (2.54*) . 1.90 -1.66 -0.24 (436) 
Singapore -0.05 -0.56 0.51 (1.03) 0.06 . 0.47 0.53 (1,28) -0.04 . 0.20 0.16 (0.35) 
Taiwan -0.61 -0.64 0.03 (0.05) -0.90 -0.53 -0.37 (461) -0.64 -0.51 -0.13 (-0.21) 
Thailand -1.18 . 1.46 0.28 (0.44) -0.58 -1.21 0.63 (1.18) -0.68 -1.08 0.40 (0,68) 
Europe 
Austria' 0.32 -0.63 0.95 (2.09*) 0.13 . 0.76 0.89 (2.19*) 0.08 . 0.44 0,52 (1.38) 
Belgium 0 0.80 -0.12 0.92 (3.25*) 0.64 -0.44 1.08 (3.49*) 0.73 -0.25 0.98 (3.05*) Denmark 0.42 . 1.01 1.43 (4.39*) 0.85 -0.49 1.34 (4.92*) 0.62 . 0.45 1.07 (3.56*) Finland 0.85 0.53 0.32 (0.59) 0.67 -0.18 0.85 (1.65) -0.65 -1.01 0.36 (0.65) France" 0.43 -1.48 1.91 (4.41 *) 0.67 -0.75 1.42 (4.00*) 0.53 . 0.39 0.92 (2.74*) Germany -0.72 -2.08 1.36 (2.85*) . 0.43 -1.58 1.15 (2.70*) -0.05 -1,05 1.00 (2,92*) Greece 0.88 0.53 0.35 (1.65) 1.26 0.24 1.02 (1.13) 1.08 0.18 0.90 (1,01) 
Ireland 0 0.63 -1.40 2.03 (4.15*) 0.92 -0.63 1.55 (3.99*) -0.09 . 0.26 0.17 (0.43) Italy' 0.13 -0.71 0.84 (2.18*) 0.38 -0.64 1.02 (2.90*) 0.22 -0.36 0.58 (1.59) Netherlands 0.87 . 1.50 2.37 (5.24*) 0.78 -0.72 1.50 (4.310) 0.37 -0.55 0.92 (2.72*) Norway -0.44 -0.64 0.20 (0.35) 0.49 -0.55 1.04 (2.21*) 0.59 . 0.77 1.36 (2.70*) Portugal 0.38 -0.74 1.12 (1.85**) 0,89 0.16 0.73 (1.57) 0.21 0.03 0.18 (0.38) 
Spain 0 -0.11 -0.96 0.85 (2.01 *) 0.57 -0.15 0.72 (2.05*) 0.67 0.32 0.35 (0.93) Sweden 0.71 -1.11 1.82 (3.35*) 0.13 -1.22 1.35 (2,83*) 0.28 -0.78 1.06 (2.3 5 *) Switzerland 0.36 -1.03 1.39 (3.82*) 0.36 -0.77 1.13 (3.21 *) 0.48 -0.60 1.08 (3.30*) Turkey 3.37 4.61 -1.24 (-1.30) 3.25 4.79 -1.54 (-1.59) 3.23 4.79 -1.56 (-1.54) UK 0 0.42 . 1.83 2.25 (6.76*) 0.35 . 1.01 1.36 (4,99*) 0.28 . 1.19 1.47 (4ý65*) 
us, 0.40 -0.32 022 (3.85*) 0.55 -0.85 1.30 (5.86*) 1 0.45 -1.10 1.55 (7.15*) 
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4.4.4 Dispersion in analystsforecast and momentum projIls 
Using dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts to proxy for divergence of opinion, 
Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) find that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts' 
earnings forecasts tend to have lower future returns. On the other hand, Zhang (2006) 
employ dispersion of analysts' forecasts to proxy for information uncertainty, and find 
that higher dispersion in analysts' forecast stocks experience higher momentum profits 
that are mainly contributed from the loser stocks i. e. lower future returns. This section 
examines the link between dispersion in analyst forecast and momentum profits for the 
global data. 
Table 4.4 presents the payoff of momentum portfolios sorted on dispersion in analystSO 
earnings forecast (Disp). At the end of each month t, all stocks in each country are 
allocated into three portfolios based on forecast dispersion. Portfolio DispI is an equally 
weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 30%, Disp2 is the middle 40%, and Disp3 is 
the highest 30%. For each of the forecast dispersion portfolios, this section further sorts 
stocks into three portfolios based on returns from months 0 to t-2. Portfolio PI is an 
equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the worst-performing 30%, P2 is the middle 40%, 
and P3 is the highest 30%. 
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Table 4.4 Portfolios Returns by Price Momentum and Dispersion of Analysts 
Forecast (Disp) 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorts by dispersion of analysts' forecast (Disp) and 
price momentum. At the end of each month 1, all stocks in each country are allocated into three portfolios 
based on forecast dispersion. Portfolio Displ is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 30%, 
Disp2 is the middle 40%, and Disp3 is the highest 30%. For each of the forecast dispersion portfolios, this 
table further sorts stocks into three portfolios based on returns from months 0 to t-2. Portfolio PI is an 
equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the worst-performing 30%, P2 is the middle 40%, and P3 is the 
highest 30%. Disp is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in month t scaled by the prior year end 
stock price. 0ý') represents countries with momentum in Table 4.2 at 5(10)% significant level. t-statistics in 
parentheses are adjusted for autocorrelation. *(**) Dcnotes significance at the 5(l 0) per cent level. 
Disp 3 (1 ligh) Disp 2 Disp I (Low) 
P3-PI P3-PI P3-PI 
P3 PI P3-PI (t-stat) 
. 
P3 PI P3-PI (t-stat) P3 PI P3-PI (t-stat) 
Africa 
Israel -0.13 0.41 -0.54 (-0.63) 1.47 0.76 0.71 (1.48) 0.99 0.68 0.31 (0,61) 
South Africa 0.74 -0.77 1.51 (3.68*) 0.83 -0.28 1.11 (3.02*) 0.81 0.37 0.44 (1.21) 
Americas (ex. U. S. ) 
Argentina -2.96 -3.57 0.61 (0.73) -0.46 -0.55 0.09 (0.14) 0.07 -0.23 0.30 (0.43) Brazil 0.81 1.58 -0.77 (-0.73) 1.01 1.52 . 0.51 (-0.68) 0.57 0.78 . 0.21 (-0.18) Canada' -0.16 -2.30 2.14 (7.01 *) 0.43 -0.69 1.12 (4.340) 1.09 -0.09 1.19 (4,150) Chile " 0.23 0.41 . 0.18 (-0.36) 0.35 . 0.07 0.42 (0,98) 0.09 0.17 -0.08 (-0,19) Columbia 0 1.14 -1.55 2.69 (2.93*) -0.85 -1.39 0.54 (0.73) 0.32 0.00 0.32 (0,37) 
Mexico' -0.96 -2.17 1.21 (2.01 *) 0.25 -0.60 0.85 (1.49) 0.47 0.11 0.36 (0.74) 
Peru 0.16 . 1.89 2.05 (1.76**) . 1.61 . 1.79 0.19 (0.25) -2.10 0.23 . 2.33 (-2.66*) 
Asia 
Austral ia 0.40 -1.52 1.92 (6.66*) 0.51 -0.97 1.48 (5.60*) 0.89 . 0.13 1.02 (4.850) China -0.83 -0.69 -0.14 (-0.16) 0.09 0.35 -0.26 (-0.29) 0.31 0.14 0.17 (0.18) 
1 long Kong -0.03 -0.82 0.79 (1.80**) -0.11 -0.53 0.42 (0.91) 0.40 -0.11 0.51 (1.12) India "' -0.29 -2.30 2.01 (2.48*) 0.34 -1.05 1.39 (2.68*) 1.40 -0.03 1.43 (2,29*) Indonesia -1.59 -1.70 0.11 (0,17) . 1.48 . 0.69 -0.79 (. 0.99) . 1.16 0.05 1.21 (-1.47) 
Japan -0.47 -1.01 0.54 (1.47) -0.55 -0.54 -0.01 (-0.04) -0.71 -0.65 -0.06 (-0.17) Korea -0.91 -0.48 -0.43 (-0.76) -0.88 0.09 -0.97 (-1.910*) -0.36 0.01 -0.37 (-0.73) Malaysia 0.51 -0.09 0.60 (1.04) 0.49 0.31 0.18 (0.36) 0.56 0.72 . 0.16 (-0.29) New Zealand 0 -0.18 . 2.94 2.76 (5.35*) 0.35 -1.20 1.55 (4.22*) 1.12 . 0.17 1.29 (3.33*) Pakistan -1.13 -1.53 0.40 (0.42) -1.12 -1.33 0.21 (0.25) -0.62 0.11 -0.73 (489) Philippines -0.86 -2.25 1.39 (2.24*) -0.87 . 1.54 0.67 (1.04) -0.36 -1.26 0.90 (1.44) Singapore 0.22 -0.57 0.79 (1.78**) 0.39 -0.15 0.54 (1.20) 0.39 0.11 0.28 (0,64) 
Taiwan -1.64 -1.38 -0.26 (-0.43) -0.27 0.10 -0.37 (-0.75) 0.73 O. S2 0.21 (0.42) 
Thailand -1.32 -1.04 . 0.28 (-0.43) . 1.46 -1.41 -0.05 (-0.09) . 0.58 -0.92 0.34 (0.56) 
Europe 
Austria 0.15 -1.20 1.35 (2.75*) 0.21 . 0.33 0.54 (1.49) 0.59 0.44 0.15 (0.36) 
Belgium 0.26 0.19 0.07 (0.25) 0.30 -0.37 0.67 (2.52*) 1.31 0.04 1.27 (4.46*) Denmark 0.08 -0.92 1.00 (2.79*) 0.35 -0.10 0.45 (1,58) 1.02 0.41 0.61 (1.83") Finland 0.44 -0.29 0.73 (1.08) 0.85 0.47 0.38 (0.73) 1.17 0.93 0.24 (0,38) 
France ' 0.04 -0.83 0.87 (2.50*) 0.53 0.05 0.48 (1.55) 1.46 0.56 0.90 (2.3 3 *) 
Germany -2.92 -5.82 2.90 (3.46*) . 1.50 -4.29 2.79 (3.27*) . 1.54 . 3.19 1.65 (2.200) Greece 1.23 0.28 0.95 (1.49) 1.22 1.05 0.17 (0.22) 1.82 0.95 0.87 (0.98) 
Ireland 0 -0.24 -2.22 1.98 (3.75*) 0.96 0.03 0.93 (2.78*) 0.62 0.42 0.20 (0.43) 
Italy 0 -0.44 -1.10 0.66 (1.52) 0.35 0.11 0.24 (0.69) 1.15 0.79 0.36 (0.89) 
Netherlands 1 -0.05 -1.00 0.95 (2.21 *) 0.81 0.09 0.72 (2.46*) 1.23 0.54 0.69 (2.24*) 
Norway -0.08 -0.17 0.09 (0.15) 0.42 0.44 -0.02 (-0.04) 1.60 0.33 1.27 (2.760) 
Portugal -0.15 -1.12 0.97 (1.77**) 0.52 0.39 0.13 (0.30) 1.59 0.85 0.74 (1.55) 
Spain " -0.06 . 1.46 1.40 (2.88*) 0.43 -0.08 0.51 (1.35) 0.71 0.63 0.08 (0.25) Sweden -1.37 -1.30 -0.07 (-0.11) 0.42 0.44 -0.02 (-0.05) 1.74 1.21 0.53 (1.35) Switzerland 0 -0.29 -1.08 0.79 (1.87**) 0.71 0.11 0.60 (1.990) 1.31 0.52 0.79 (2.68*) 
Turkey 2.73 4.36 -1.63 (-1.68**) 3.19 4.58 -1.39 (-1.44) 3.85 4.78 -0.93 (-0.97) UK 01 -0.17 -2.47 2.30 (6.19*) 0.32 -1.06 1.38 (4.760) 0.79 . 0.67 1.46 (5.190) 
us, 1 -0.54 . 1.95 1.41 (4.16*) 0.34 -0.34 0.68 (2.770) 1.45 0.67 0.78 (3.83*) 
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Table 4.4 shows that momentum profits are concentrated on the highest dispersion in 
analysts' forecast groups (Disp 3) and decrease monotonically as dispersion in analysts' 
forecasts decrease. 17 of 24 countries that have experienced momentum Prorits in Table 
4.2 display this pattern. Remarkably, countries such as Peru, Hong Kong, Philippines and 
Singapore which display no momentum profits in Table 4.2 have also documented the 
above pattern. The results are contributed substantially by loser stocks that earn lower 
future returns. As a result, the findings are consistent with Zhang (2006) who used 
dispersion in analysts' forecast to proxy for uncertainty rather than divergence in opinion 
as suggested by Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002). 
4.4.5 Uncertainty and momentum profits 
One major problem of using dispersion in analysts' forecasts to proxy for uncertainty is 
that forecast dispersion is contaminated by the effect of investors' disagreement (see 
Baron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998)). As a result, this section examines the link between 
BKLS measure of uncertainty and momentum profits to the global data. 
Table 4.5 reports average monthly portfolio returns sorts by uncertainty (V) and price 
momentum. At the end of each month t, all stocks in each country are allocated into three 
portfolios based on uncertainty. Portfolio VI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in 
the lowest 30%, V2 is the middle 40%, and V3 is the highest 30%. For each of the 
uncertainty portfolios, this section further sorts stocks into three portfolios based on 
returns from months 0 to t-2. Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in 
the worst-performing 30%, P2 is the middle 40%, and P3 is the highest 30%. 
Table 4.5 presents a strong link between uncertainty and momentum proflts. Momentum 
profits are concentrated on the highest uncertainty groups, (V3) and decrease 
monotonically as uncertainty decreases. 15 of 24 countries that have experienced 
momentum profits in Table 4.2 display this pattern. Interestingly, Peru and Greece which 
display no momentum profits have also documented the above pattern. The findings are 
consistent with hypothesis I suggesting a strong link between momentum profits and 
uncertainty measured by dispersion in analysts' forecast and BKLS's uncertainty. 
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Table 4.5 Portfolios Returns by Price Momentum and Uncertainty (V) 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by uncertainty (V) and price momentum. At the 
end of each month t, all stocks in each country are allocated into three portfolios based on uncertainty. 
Portfolio VI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 30%, V2 is the middle 40%, and V3 is 
the highest 30%. For each of the uncertainty portfolio, this table further sorts stocks into three portfolios 
based on returns from months 0 to t-2. Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the 
worst-performing 30%, P2 is the middle 40%, and P3 is the highest 30%. V, the uncertainty measure, is 
computed as in BKLS (1998). N(OO) represents countries with momentum in Table 4.2 at 5(10)% significant 
level. t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for autocorrelation. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10) per 
centlevel. 
V3 (Iligh) V2 VI (LOW) 
P3-P1 P3-P1 P3_P1 
P3 PI P3-PI (t-stat) P3 PI P3-PI (t-stat) P3 PI P3-PI (t-stat) 
'Africa 
Israel 0.12 -0.90 1.02 (1.22) 1.31 0.35 0,96 (1.940*) 0.72 0.06 0.66 (1.14) 
South Africa 0 0.14 -1.62 1.76 (3.89*) 0.62 0.33 0.29 (0.81) 1.17 0.57 0.60 (1.9600) 
Americas (ex. U. S. ) 
Argentina -3.19 -3.47 0.28 (0.35) -0.90 . 0.93 0.03 (0.05) 0.47 . 0.28 0.75 (1.17) 
Brazil 0.82 1.69 -0.87 (-0.86) 0.84 1.03 . 0.19 (-0.23) 0.70 1.08 -0.38 (-0.35) 
Canada' -0.96 -2.51 1.55 (4.97*) 0.93 -0.44 1.37 (5.11*) 1.42 0.53 0.89 (3.69*) 
Chile " -0.37 -0.33 -0.04 (-0.08) 0.69 0,26 0.43 (0,99) 0.50 0.79 -0.29 (-0.76) 
Columbia # 1.17 -1.76 2.93 (3.48*) . 0.49 -0.50 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 0.49 . 0.48 (-0.61) 
Mexico . 1.45 -2.43 0.98 (1.70**) -0.02 -0.78 0.76 (1.25) 0.36 . 0.02 0.38 (0.74) 
Peru . 0.57 4.33 3.76 (2.57*) . 1.61 -0.83 -0.78 (. 0.99) . 1.61 0.89 -2.50 (-2.94*) 
Asia 
Australia 0 -0.22 -2.10 1.88 (5.75*) 0.78 -0.32 1.10 (4.460) 1.11 0.48 0.63 (3.5 1 
China -1.02 . 1.00 -0.02 (-0.01) 0.06 0.59 -0.53 (0.60) 0.50 0.83 -0.33 (-0.36) 
I long Kong -1.36 -1.41 0.05 (0.09) 0.04 . 0.10 0.14 (0.30) 0.97 0.68 0.29 (0.74) 
India " -0.68 . 2.45 1.77 (2.250) 0.48 . 0.82 1.30 (2.110) 1,03 0.17 0.86 (1.52) 
Indonesia -2.28 -1.88 -0.40 (-0.55) . 1.28 -0.70 -0.58 (-0.74) -0.76 . 0.08 -0.68 (. o, 96) 
Japan . 1.16 . 1.28 0.12 (0.30) -0.41 -0,44 0.03 (0.07) -0.27 . 0.28 0.01 (0.01) 
Korea -1.76 -0.83 . 0.93 (. 1.50) -0.56 0.07 -0.63 (. 1,26) . 0.03 0.38 -0,41 (-0.90) 
Malaysia 0.50 -0.22 0.72 (1.24) 0.66 0.57 0.09 (0.16) 0.45 0.71 . 0.26 (-0,54) 
New Zealand -1.07 . 2.65 1.58 (3.220) 0.94 -0.05 0.99 (2.99*) 1.24 0.51 0.73 (2.3 8 *) 
Pakistan -2.74 -1.63 . 1.11 (4.13) -0.69 -1.00 0.31 (0.34) -1.22 . 0.53 . 0.69 (-0.79) 
Philippines -1.89 -3.21 1.32 (1.70**) -0.40 -0.61 0.21 (0.32) 0.50 . 0.87 1.37 (2.110) 
Singapore -0.34 -0.55 0.21 (0.43) 0.35 . 0.16 0.51 (1.14) 0.66 0.47 0119 (0.44) 
Taiwan -1.57 -1.53 -0.04 (-0.07) 0.00 0.08 -0.08 (-0.16) 0.46 0.44 0.02 (0.03) 
Thailand -2.52 . 1.24 . 1.28 (-1.74*0) . 1.22 -0.97 -0.25 (-0.45) -0.18 460 0.42 (0.79) 
Europe 
Austria 0 -0.11 -0.99 0.88 (1.98*) 0.50 -0.23 0.73 (1.960*) 0.47 0.77 -0,30 (-0.83) 
Belgium 0 -0.26 -0.33 0.07 (0.19) 0.54 0.07 0.61 (2.46*) 1.37 0.28 1.09 (4.37*) 
Denmark 0 -0.28 -1.58 1.30 (3.18*) 0.37 0.29 0.08 (0.28) 1.41 0.62 0.79 (2.97*) 
Finland -0.72 -0.20 -0.52 (-0.76) 0.94 0.07 0.87 (1.41) 1.32 0,87 OAS (0,93) 
France' -0.66 -1.62 0.96 (2.34*) 0.73 -0.15 0.88 (2.33*) 1.55 0.91 0.64 (2.03*) 
Germany 1 -1.13 -2.27 1.14 (2.30*) 0.17 -0.57 0.74 (1.95**) 0.73 -0.09 0.82 (2,66*) 
Greece 1.21 -0.20 1.41 (1.86**) 1.14 0.82 0.32 (0.43) 1.71 1.40 0.31 (0.40) 
Ireland 0 . 0.49 -2.46 1.97 (3.57*) 0.82 0.66 0.16 (0,44) 1.25 0.97 0.28 (0.77) 
Italy 0 -0.43 -1.07 6.64 (1.48) 0.44 . 0.04 0.48 (1.34) 1.01 0.77 0.24 (0.65) 
Netherlands 0 -0.68 -1.03 0.35 (0.84) 1.06 0.03 1.03 (3.02*) 1.43 1.08 0.35 (1.45) 
Norway -1.09 -0.29 -0.80 (-1.25) 0.32 0.26 0.06 (0.14) 1.97 0.92 1.05 (2.68*) 
Portugal -0.18 -0.97 0.79 (1.36) 1.07 -0.16 1.23 (2.60*) 1.40 1.12 0.28 (0.65) 
Spain 0 -0.62 -1.60 0.98 (1.96**) 0.54 0.34 0.20 (0.54) 1.03 0.72 0.31 (0.99) 
Sweden -1.31 -0.97 -0.34 (-0.58) 0.21 -0.02 0.23 (0.51) 2.19 1.31 0.88 (2,510) 
Switzerland 1 -0.07 -0.89 0.82 (2.14*) 0.60 -0.23 0.83 (2.480) 1.40 0.43 0.97 (3.33*) 
Turkey 2.58 3.82 . 1.24 (-1.23) 3.12 4.88 . 1.76 (. 1.80*0) 3.92 4,95 -1.03 (. 1.06) 
UK 0 -0.15 -2.38 2.23 (5.63*) 0.62 -0.64 1.26 (4.920" 0.89 -0.22 1.11 (4.58*) 
us, -0.64 -3.21 2.57 (6,82*) 0,40 -1.21 1.61 6.650) 1 1.25 006 1.19 (6.310) 
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4.4.6 Diversity of analysts'forecast and momentum profits 
Results in the previous section demonstrate that the level of analysts' f6recasts mainly 
reflects uncertainty. This section examines the relation between diversity of analyst 
forecast (1-p) that proxy for disagreement and momentum profits. Since winner stocks 
continue to go up and loser stocks continue to go down a high level of consensus is 
required. This chapter hypothesises that expected momentum profits are high when 
diversity of analysts' forecasts are low. 
Table 4.6 reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by diversity in analyst forecast 
(1-p) and price momentum. At the end of each month t, all stocks in each country are 
allocated into three portfolios based on diversity of analyst forecast. Portfolio (1-p)l is an 
equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 30%, (1-p)2 is the middle 40%, and 
(1-p)3 is the highest 30%. For each of the diversity in analyst forecast portfolios, this 
section further sorts stocks into three portfolios based on returns from months 0 to t-2. 
Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the worst-performing 30%, P2 
is the middle 40%, and P3 is the highest 30%. 
Table 4.6 establishes a strong link between diversity in analysts' forecast and momentum 
profits. In particular, this section finds that 16 of 24 countries experience the highest 
momentum profits among the lowest diversity in analyst forecast groups and decrease 
monotonically when diversity in analysts' forecast increaseS45. Since the success of 
momentum strategies require a high level of agreement among investors in order to push 
prices into the same direction, the findings show that momentum profits are concentrated 
in low diversity in analysts' forecast stocks (i. e. low disagreement). As a result, the 
findings in this section provide empirical evidence to support the view that diversity in 
analysts' forecast is a better proxy for disagreement. 
45 One of the possible reasons that the UK results differ from the US might be due to the difference in 
ownership structure. (see footnote 44, p106) 
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Table 4.6 Momentum Profits and Diversity of Analyst Forecast (1- p) 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by diversity in analyst forecast (1-p) and price 
momentum. At the end of each month t, all stocks in each country are allocated into three portfolios based 
on diversity of analyst forecast. Portfolio (1-p)l is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 
30%, (1-p)2 is the middle 40%, and (I. p)3 is the highest 30%. For each of the diversity in analyst forecast 
portfolio, this table further sorts stocks into three portfolios based on returns from months 0 to t-2. 
Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the worst-performing 30%, P2 is the middle 40%, 
and P3 is the highest 30%. (1-p), the diversity of opinion measure, is computed as in BUS (1998). 0(*0) 
represents countries with momentum in Table 4.2 at 5(10)% significant level. t-statistics in parentheses are 
adjusted for autocorrelation. *(**) Dcnotes significance at the 5(10) per cent level. 
(1-p) 3 High (1-p) 2 (1-p) I Low 
P3-P1 P3-PI P3-PI 
P3 Pi P3-PI (t-stat) P3 Pi P3-PI (t-stat) P3 PI P3-PI (t-stat) 
Africa 
Israel 1.33 1.43 . 0.10 (-0.18) 0.77 0.47 0.30 (0.51) 0.51 0.15 0.36 (0.51) 
South Africa 0.70 0.36 0.34 (0.92) 0.84 . 0.34 1.19 (3.41*) 0,48 . 0.94 1.32 (3.21*) 
Americas (ex. U. S. ) 
Argentina -0.56 -0.92 0.36 (0.51) -1.26 -1.71 0.45 (0.60) -1.66 . 2.36 0.70 (0.99) 
Brazil 0.76 1.63 -0.87 (-0.86) 0.86 1.41 -0.55 (-0.64) 0.14 1.03 -0.89 (484) 
Canada' 1.00 -0.48 1.48 (5.97*) 0.72 -0.98 1.70 (6.45*) 0.25 -1.67 1.92 (6.60*) 
Chile " 0.95 0.54 0.41 (1.04) -0.11 0.27 -0.38 (-0.84) -0.07 . 0.40 0,33 (0.69) 
Columbia 1 1.26 -0.52 1.78 (2.09*) -0.37 -0.52 0.15 (0.23) 0.57 . 0.97 1.54 (2.11 *) 
Mexico' 0.32 -0.11 0.43 (0.73) 0.06 -0.62 0.68 (1.28) 0.31 . 1.34 1.65 (2.72*) 
Peru . 1.63 -0.37 . 1.26 (. 1.20) . 0.29 -1.22 0.93 (0.92) . 2.60 . 2.77 0.17 (0.19) 
Asia 
Australia 0.86 -0.27 1.13 (4.79*) 0.64 -0.68 1.32 (5.49*) 0.19 -1.46 IAS (5.970) 
China 0.42 1.22 -0.80 (-0.92) 0.01 0.20 -0.19 (-0.21) -0.39 -0.95 0.56 (0.59) 
Hong Kong 0.41 0.36 0.05 (0.12) 0.30 -0.27 0.57 (1.32) -0.74 . 1.21 0.47 (0.89) 
Ind ia '0 0.56 -0.55 1.11 (1.60) 0.53 . 1.69 2.22 (3.640) 0.08 . 1.60 1.68 (2.34*) 
Indonesia -0.79 -0.39 . 0.40 (-0.54) . 1.38 . 0.89 -0.49 (-0,70) . 2.14 . 1.59 . 0.55 (-0.64) 
Japan -0.43 -0.52 0.09 (0.27) . 0.54 -0.61 0.07 (0.21) -0.92 . 1.05 0.13 (0,37) 
Korea -0.44 0.18 -0.62 (. 1.30) . 0.69 . 0,04 . 0.65 (-1.24) -1.00 -0.51 -0.49 (-0.83) 
Malaysia 0.33 0.43 -0.10 (-0.20) 0.49 0.25 0.24 (0,44) 0.63 0.27 0.36 (0.64) 
New Zealand 0.73 -0.48 1.21 (3.28*) 0.61 -0.78 1.39 (4.20) 0.27 . 1.41 1.68 (4.550) 
Pakistan -1.88 . 1.29 -0.59 (-0.56) -0.39 -1.6S 1.26 (1.43) -1.36 0.34 -1.70 (. 1.930*) 
Philippines 0.64 -0.60 1.24 (1.870*) . 1.02 -1.36 0.34 (0.54) -1.09 -2.39 1.30 (1.710*) 
Singapore 0.67 0.13 0.54 (1.23) 0.34 -0.19 0.53 (1.20) 0.04 -0.32 0.36 (0.76) 
Taiwan 0.04 0.18 -0.14 (-0.29) -0.18 -0.32 0.14 (0.27) -0.53 -1.07 0.54 (0.88) 
Thailand -0.50 -1.19 0.69 (1.21) -1.32 . 1.43 0.11 (0.18) . 1.81 . 0.82 . 0.99 (. 1.42) 
Europe 
Austria 0 0.27 -0.09 0.36 (0.95) 0.52 -0.12 0.64 (1.57) 0.48 . 0.64 1.12 (2.56*) 
Belgium 1 0.66 0.26 0.40 (1.60) 0.68 -0.01 0.69 (2.06*) 0.40 -0.42 0.82 (2.32*) 
Denmark 0 0.32 -0.15 0.47 (1.75*0) 0.77 0.18 0.59 (1.92**) 0.13 -0.98 1.11 (3.01 *) 
Finland 1.04 0.07 0.97 (1.59) 0.62 0.42 0.20 (0.40) 0.72 0.42 0.30 (0.42) 
France' 0.81 0.39 0.42 (1.30) 0.83 -0.21 1.04 (2.99*) 0.35 -1.66 2.01 (4.46*) Germany 0.43 -0.65 1.08 (3.20*) 0.20 -1.05 1.25 (3.37*) -0.32 . 1.89 1.57 (3.33*) Greece 1.19 0.88 0.31 (0.41) 1.17 0.93 0.24 (0.32) 1.47 0.79 0.68 (0.83) 
Ireland 0 0.42 -0.28 0.70 (1.71**) 1.05 -0.18 1.23 (2.93*) 0.38 . 1.43 1.81 , (3.42*) 
Italy' 0.52 0.13 0.39 (0.96) 0.48 . 0.02 0.50 (1.30) 0.08 . 0.56 0.64 (1.54) 
Netherlands 0.98 -0.42 1.40 (3.92*) 0.91 0.35 0.56 (1.70**) 0.38 . 0.41 0.79 (2,40*) Norway 0.92 0.52 0.40 (0.79) 0.91 0.35 0.56 (1.22) -0.11 . 0.42 0.31 (0.54) Portugal 0.76 0.01 0.75 (1.56) 0.86 -0.05 0.91 (2.06*) 0.61 . 0.77 1.38 (2.42*) Spain 0 0.85 0.36 0.49 (1.33) 0.68 -0.04 0.72 (2.04*) . 0.25 -1.25 1.00 (2.22*) Swcden'v 1.23 0.34 0.89 (2.19*) 0.67 -0.25 0.92 (2.33*) 0.06 -1.01 1.07 (1.89**) Switzerland 0.81 0.18 0.63 (2.05*) 0.73 -0.14 0.87 (2.87*) 0.55 -0.77 1.32 (3.220) Turkey 3.08 4.83 -1.75 (-1.83**) 3.22 4.35 -1.13 (. 1.16) 3.34 4.70 -1.36 (-1.33) UKO 0.73 -0.56 1.29 (3.31*) 0,52 -0.96 1.48 (4.97*1 0 . 54 . 1.61 2.15 (5.85*) us 0 -0.18 -1.63 1.45 (5.02*) 0.30 -0.60 0.90 (3.49*) 
j 
12-7 0.13 1.14 (4.45*) 
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4.4.7 Uncertainty, analyst bias and momentum profits 
This section examines the link between uncertainty, analyst bias and momentum profits. 
Zhang (2006) suggests that momentum profits are high when uncertainty is high. In 
addition, greater information uncertainty produces higher future returns following good 
news and lower future returns following-bad news. The author traces the sources of 
momentum profits to the slow absorption of ambiguous information into stock price. This 
section incorporates analyst bias to examine how information incorporates into prices 
slowly under high uncertainty. 
This section performs a three dimension analysis by first sorting stocks at the end of each 
month t into three portfolios based on uncertainty (V). This section then independently 
sorts stocks into three portfolios based on analyst bias (AB). All stocks within each 
element of the matrix (V x AB) are then allocated into three portfolios based on their 
prior six-month returns. PI includes the worst performing 30%, P2 includes the middle 
40% (unreported), and P3 includes the best performing 3 0%46. 
Table 4.7 reports the portfolio's mean raw returns during the six months holding period 
(Rct 7-12) and the next six months after the holding period (Ret 13-18)41. Momentum 
profits are most concentrated among the high uncertainty and high analyst bias group, 
decreasing monotonically with uncertainty and analysts' bias decrease. In addition, loser 
stocks are the dominant source of return continuation and the proritability of momentum 
strategies. 23 of 41 countries display such a pattern. Moreover, the results show that, in 
most countries, loser stocks continue to perform poorly during the next six months after the 
holding period (Ret 13-18), suggesting that loser stocks continue to lag behind, this is 
consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) findings that the serial correlation of returns 
can be found up to the 12 month horizon. 
46 The number of firms that is left in to each ultimate portfolio as a result of sorting procedure is ranging 
from 10 to 236 firms. 
47 Table 4.7 drops Israel, Brazil, Columbia and Peru for insufficient data. 
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Chapter 4 
Overall, the findings are consistent with hypothesis 2 suggesting that under huge 
uncertainty, analysts report earnings forecasts and recommendations in accord with their 
client's desire when the actual earnings are not yet observable. As a result, analysts 
continue to report favourable news to winner stocks and distort/delay unfavourable news 
to loser stocks. In sum, the slow absorption of ambiguous information into stock price, in 
particular for loser stocks, reflects investors' desire rather than inability to react to the 
news. 
4.4.8 Uncertainty momentum strategy vs. Standard momentum strategy 
This section computes a head-to-head comparison of a strategy based on uncertainty with 
the standard Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) (JT henceforth) momentum strategies. As in 
Table 4.2 Panel A, this section calculates the standard JT momentum strategy based on 
the past return performance of individual stocks and take a long (short) position in the 
30% of top (bottom) performing stocks. This section measures the uncertainty 
momentum strategy by buying the low uncertainty winner portfolio and selling the high 
uncertainty loser portfolio and holding the position for six months. Low uncertainty 
winner (LVW) reports the average monthly portfolio returns from portfolio VI x P3 in 
Table 4.5. High uncertainty loser (HVL) reports the average monthly portfolio returns 
from portfolio V3 x PI in Table 4.5. Table 4.8 reports, for each country, the average 
monthly portfolios returns for the uncertainty momentum strategy against the standard JT 
momentum strategy. 
The findings indicate that the uncertainty momentum strategy is more profitable than the 
standard JT momentum strategy. 34 of 41 countries display statistically and economically 
significant profits for the uncertainty momentum strategy compared to 24 of 41 countries 
for the JT momentum strategy. More interestingly, the results show that 7 of 12 Asia 
countries (except Australia and New Zealand) generate significant momentum profits by 
uncertainty compare to I of 12 Asian countries for the JT momentum strategy. This 
indicates that, unlike previous studies, momentum strategy can be profitable in Asia using 
a refined strategy based on uncertainty. 
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Table 4.8 Standard momentum strategy vs. Uncertainty momentum strategy 
The standard momentum strategy is extracted from Table 4.2 (Panel A). The uncertainty momentum 
strategy is extracted from Table 4.5. Low uncertainty winner (LVW) reports the average monthly portfolio 
returns from portfolio VI x P3. High uncertainty loser (HVL) reports the average monthly portfolio returns 
from portfolio V3 x Pl. The uncertainty momentum strategy involves buying the low uncertainty winner 
portfolio and selling the high uncertainty loser portfolio and holding the position for six months. 
Denotes significance at the 5(10) percent level. 
Standard Moment urn Stratesty Uncertainty mo enturn Stra egy 
Begin No. W L W-L W-L LvW IIVL LVW - 
LVW 
-IIVL Stocks ( t-stat) IIVL (t-stat) 
Africa 
Israel 8701 56 -0.51 1.08 -1.59 (-2.63*) 0.72 -0.90 1.62 (2.320) 
South Africa 8701 1 532 1.10 -0,66 1.76 (5-51 1.17 -1.62 2.79 (6.670) 
Americas (ex. U. S. ) 
Argentina 9207 89 0.41 -0.07 0,48 (0.62) 0.47 . 3.46 3.93 (5.37*) 
Brazil 9207 296 4.99 5.49 -0.50 (-0.33) 0.70 1.69 -0.99 (. 1.00) 
Canada 8501 1015 0.58 -1.08 1.66 (5.74*) 1.42 . 2.51 3.93 (14.15*) 
Chile 9210 127 1.00 0.23 0.77 (1.89*0) 0.49 -0.32 0.81 (1.77**) 
Columbia 9406 34 0.25 -0.91 1.16 (3.110) 0.01 -1.76 1.77 (2.660) 
Mexico 9205 135 1.34 0.21 1.13 (3.22*) 0.36 . 2.43 2.79 (4.960) 
Peru 9406 56 0.70 0.78 . 0.08 (-0.10) . 1.61 4.33 2.72 (3.16*) 
Asia 
Australia 8701 940 0.14 -1.08 1.22 (3.67*) 1.11 -2.10 3.21 (11.380) 
China 9304 296 1.04 0.74 0.30 (0.50) 0.53 -1.01 1.54 (1.65) 
I long Kong 8701 640 . 0.89 -0.58 . 0.31 (-0.65) 0.97 -1.40 2.37 (2.090) 
India 9301 489 0.48 -0.65 1.13 (1.88**) 1.03 -2.45 3.48 (4.700) 
Indonesia 9005 238 -1.14 -0.54 . 0.61 (-0.97) -0.76 -1.88 1.12 (1.45) 
Japan 8701 2580 -0.79 . 0.84 0.05 (0.15) -0.41 -0.88 0.47 (2.480) 
Korea 8801 989 -1.17 . 0.93 -0.24 (-0.42) -0.02 -0.82 0.80 (1.42) 
Malaysia 8701 634 0.04 0.05 -0.01 (. 0.01) 0.45 -0.22 0.67 (1.25) 
New Zealand 8701 157 0.58 . 0.62 1.20 (4.220) 1.24 -2.65 3.89 (9.08*) 
Pakistan 9301 163 -0.81 . 0.44 -0.36 (. 0.70) . 1.22 -1.63 0.41 (0.41) 
Philippines 8801 184 -0.40 -0.67 0.27 (0.51) 0.50 -3.21 3.71 (5.15*) 
Singapore 8701 342 0.05 -0.23 0.27 (0.62) 0,66 -0.55 1.21 (2,660) 
Taiwan 8801 612 -0.78 -0.93 0.14 (0.24) 0.46 -1.53 1.99 (3.46*) 
Thailand 8709 339 -0.70 -0.32 -0.38 (-0.77) -0.18 . 1.23 1.05 (1.71*0) 
Europe 
Austria 8701 112 0.32 . 0.57 0.89 (2.78*) 0.47 -0.99 1.46 (3.39*) 
Belgium 8701 144 0.76 -0.40 1.17 (4.57*) 1.37 -0.33 1.70 (5.140) 
Denmark 8701 244 0.57 -0.36 0.93 (3.58*) 1.40 -1.58 2.98 (8.27*) 
Finland 8804 161 0.25 -0.55 0.80 (1.86*0) 1.32 -0.19 1.51 (2,52*) 
France 8701 919 0.39 -0.95 1.35 (4.160) 1.5S -1.62 3.17 (8,00s) 
Germany 8701 922 0.16 . 1.64 1.80 (5.120) 0.73 -2.03 2.76 (6.80*) 
Greece 9211 262 1.36 0.51 0.84 (1.19) 1.71 -0.19 1.90 (2.47*) 
Ireland 8701 82 0.47 -0.88 1.36 (4.020) 1.25 -2.46 3.71 (7.90*) 
Italy 8701 332 0.39 -0.34 0.73 (2.17*) 1.01 -1.06 2.07 (5,250) 
Netherlands 8701 295 0.51 -1.35 1.86 (5.350) 1.43 -1.03 2.46 (6.92*) 
Norway 8701 234 0.32 -0.54 0.86 (1.86*0) 1.97 -0.29 2.26 (3.99*) 
Portugal 9104 93 0.15 -0.59 0.74 (2.20$) 1.41 -0.94 2.35 (4.24*) 
Spain 8701 175 0.46 -0.40 0.86 (2.45*) 1.03 -1.60 2.63 (5.79*) 
Sweden 8701 376 0.23 -0.98 1.21 (2.49*) 2.19 -0.97 3.16 (6.10*) 
Switzerland 8701 248 0.71 -0.90 1.61 (4.910) 1.40 -0.90 2.30 (6.37*) 
Turkey 9112 313 3.66 4.44 -0.78 (-0.93) 3.92 3.82 0.10 (0.09) 
UK 8701 1999 0.22 -1.64 1.86 1 (6.14*) 0.89 . 2.39 3.28 (9.01*) 
us 8301 4143 0.54 -0.83 1.36 1 (4.92*) 1.25 -3.21 4.46 (12.76*) 
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Figure 4.2 Time series average of analyst dispersion between Asia and Europe 
Analyst Dispersion 
0.18 -1 
0.16 
0.14 
0.12 
0.1 
0.08 
0.06 
0.04 
0.02 
0 
Z///Z/////// 
Timo 1 --s- Europe 
Figure 4.3 Time series average of uncertainty between Asia and Europe 
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Figures 4.2 and 4.3 plot the time series average of dispersion in analysts' forecast and 
uncertainty between Asia and Europe respectively. The figures show that both dispersion 
and uncertainty in Europe are higher than those in Asia. Interestingly, both dispersion and 
uncertainty jump up during the Asian crisis suggesting investors face hugh uncertainty 
towards the future prospective about the Asian economy. It is therefore not surprising to 
see why momentum profits are more pronounced in Europe if momentum profits have 
positive association with uncertainty. 
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4.4.9 Crediting Rating in the US 
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007) report that the profitability of momentum 
strategies in the US is large and significant among high credit risk firms, but it is 
nonexistent among low credit risk firms. More importantly, they identify a puzzle in the 
disagreement between cross-sectional and time series findings. In particular, they show 
that momentum profits are concentrated on high credit risks firms during expansionary 
periods rather than recessionary, which in general should have more defaults and hence 
higher credit risks than expansionary periods. This section reproduces the findings of tile 
link between momentum profits and credit rating, and examine whether analyst bias 
could explain the puzzle. In order to make sure that the sample of stocks is representative 
and comparable to Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007), Panel A of Table 4.9 
present the monthly returns for the loser portfolio (PI), the winner portfolio (P3), and tile 
momentum strategy of buying the winner and selling the loser portfolio (P3 - PI) for 
rated and unrated firms with I/B/E/S coverage. The evidence suggests that both rated and 
unrated firms generate significant momentum profits. In particular, the average monthly 
momentum profits is 0.77 (t-stat = 3.22) for rated firms and 1.44% (t-stat = 4.70) for 
unrated firms. 
The next step is to examine the link between momentum profits and credit risk, this 
section examines the average numerical credit rating for each of the three momentum 
portfolios over formation periods of six months. The results are reported in Panel B of 
Table 4.9. For each of month t, the sample is divided into the low/high credit risk group 
(group I/group 3) containing the 30% best/worst rated stocks based on their S&P rating 
for this particular month 48 . 
The average profits to the P3 -PI strategy is 0.02% (t-stat = 0.10) for the low credit risks 
group (rating of 10.23 BBB-) and 0.20% (t-stat = 0.97) for the medium credit risks 
group (rating of 12.7 BB-). The profit is much larger as well as statistically and 
economically significant at 1.96% (t-stat = 5.25) for the highest credit risk group (rating 
of 15.87 z B-). In line to Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007), the evidence 
48 The number of firms that is left in to each ultimate portfolio is ranging from 74 to 139 firms. 
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shows that momentum profits are concentrated among low-grade firms, and are 
nonexistent among high-grade firms. In addition, among the low rated firms, loser stocks 
are the dominant source of return continuation and the profitability of momentum 
strategies. 
Table 4.9 Price Momentum, Credit Rating in the US' 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns. For each month t, all firms that are covered by 
I/B/E/S are included in the sample. Portfolios in Panel A are formed on all firm's six-month 
formation-period from 0 to t-2: Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the 
worst-performing 30% and portfolio P3 includes the best-performing 30%. The position is held for the 
following six month period Q to t+5). Portfolios in Panel B are formed on three credit rating groups by S&P 
(top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30%). Data on credit rating are collected from COMPUSTAT on a 
quarterly basis starting in 1985. The numeric S&P rating is presented in ascending order by credit risk, i. e. 
I=AAA, 2=AA+, 3=AA, ..., 21=C, 22=D. For each credit rating groups, this table further sorts stocks into 
three portfolios based on returns from months 0 to t-2. Portfolio PI is an equally weighted portfolio of 
stocks in the worst-performing 30% and P3 is the highest 30%. The average monthly portfolios returns for 
winner, loser and winner minus loser portfolios are reported for each of the credit rating x analyst bias 
groups. The sample period is July 1985 to December 2002. *(**) Denotes significance at the 5(10) per cent 
level. 
Panel A: Raw Momentum in Rated and Unrated Firm 
All Firms Rated Firms Unrated Firms 
Number of Firm 4143 1256 2887 
1.37 0.77 1.44 P3-P1 (4.93*) (3.22*) (4.79*) 
Pi -0.83 -0.22 -1.16 
P3 0.54 0.55 0.28 
Panel B: Momentum and 3 Credit Rating Groups 
Rating Group (1=Lowest Risk, 3=11ighest Risk) 
1 2 3 
P3-P1 0.02 0.20 1.96 (0.10) (0.97) (5.25*) 
Pi 0.84 0.50 -1.71 
P3 0.86 0.70 0.25 
As mentioned earlier the empirical evidence on the impact of credit rating on the 
momentum strategy suggests that momentum payoffs are concentrated among stocks with 
high credit risks during expansionary periods, this contradicts the fact that recessionary 
periods should generally have more defaults and hence high credit risks. This section 
proposes that the analyst bias hypothesis may offer potential explanations to the puzzle. 
This section performs a three dimension analysis by first sorting stocks at the end of each 
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month t into three portfolios based on credit risk group. This section then independently 
sorts stocks into three portfolios based on analyst bias. All stocks with each of the credit 
risk x analyst bias groups are then allocated into three portfolios based on their prior 
six-month returns. PI includes the worst performing 30%, P2 includes the middle 40%, 
and P3 includes the best performing 30%. Panel A of Table 4.10 reports the portfolio's 
mean raw returns during the holding period (t to t+5). The results show that momentum 
profits are most concentrated with the highest credit risk x highest analyst bias group. 
The results are driven primarily by loser stocks. This finding indicates that the impact of 
credit ratings on momentum profitability is entirely explained by stocks with high analyst 
bias that realize lower returns. 
Panel B and Panel C of Table 4.10 split the full sample in Panel A into expansionary and 
recessionary periodS49 . During expansions, the momentum profits are again concentrated 
among stocks with the highest credit risk x. analyst bias group. The payoffs are 
statistically and economically significant 2.68% per month (t-stat = 5.34) for the poorest 
credit quality, highest analyst bias firms. On the other hand, during recessions, the 
momentum strategy payoffs in all groups are statistically insignificant". The findings thus 
reinforce the hypothesis that analyst bias might be the reason why momentum profits are 
concentrated on high credit risk firms during expansionary periods. 
49 Recessionary and expansionary months are collected from NBER (www. nber. org/cycles. htmi) 
50 It is important to note that the results should be treated with caution since the US economy experienced 
long expansionary periods during the 80's and 90's. The sample for expansionary periods consists of 184 
months compared to recessionary periods of 17 months. 
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Table 4.10 Price Momentum, Credit Rating and Analysts' Bias in the US 
This table reports the average monthly portfolios returns. For each month 1, all firms that are covered by 
I/B/E/S are included in the sample. Portfolios in Panel C are formed on three credit rating groups. Credit 
rating is calculated in the same manner as Table 4.9. For each credit rating group, stocks are further sorted 
into three portfolios based on analyst bias. Analyst bias is the absolute forecast error scaled by standard 
deviation. The average monthly portfolios returns for winner, loser and winner minus loser portfolios are 
reported for each of the credit rating x analyst bias groups. Recessionary and expansionary months are 
collected from Nl3ER(www, nberorUZg ýIs. hLt_ml). The sample period is July 1985 to December 2002. 
Denotes si2nificance at the 5(l 0) ner cent level. 
Analyst Bias Rating 
Group 
1 
(I=Lowest Risk, 3=11ighest Risk) 
23 
P3-Pl= 0.01 P3-Pl= 0.37 P3-Pl= 2.70 
(0.06) (1.45) (5.45*) 
AB3 Pl= 0.57 Pl= -0.03 Pl- -3.10 
P3= 0.58 P3= 0.33 P3= -0.40 
P3-Pl= -0.02 P3-Pl= 0.21 P3-Pl= 0.94 
(-0.10) (1.00) (2.87*) 
Overall AB2 Pl= 0.81 Pl= 0.51 Pl= -0.97 
P3= 0.79 P3= 0.72 P3= -0.03 
P3-Pl= 0.05 P3-Pl= 0.16 P3-Pl= 1.35 
(0.28) (0.85) (3.88*) 
ABI Pl= 1.18 Pl= 1.00 Pl= -0.35 
P3= 1.23 P3= 1.16 P3= 1.00 
P3-Pl= 0.12 P3-Pl= 0.22 P3-Pl= 2.68 
(0.60) (0.94) (5.34*) 
AB3 Pl= 0.55 PI= 0.09 Pl= -3.00 
P3= 0.67 P3= 0.31 P3= -0.32 
P3-Pl= 0.03 P3-Pl= 0.23 P3-Pl= 0.82 
(0.17) (1.18) (2.62*) 
Expansion AB2 Pl= 0.80 Pl= 0.57 Pl= -0.81 
P3= 0.83 P3= 0.80 P3= 0.00 
P3-Pl= 0.05 P3-Pl= 0.17 P3-Pl= 1.17 
(0.30) (0.85) (3.53*) 
AM Pl= 1.22 Pl= 1.00 pl=. -0.19 
P3= 1.27 P3= 1.17 P3= 0.98 
AB3 
P3-Pl= -1.12 
(-1.13) 
Pl= 0.76 
P3= -0.35 
P3-Pl= 1.96 
(1.20) 
Pl= -1.36 
P3= 0.60 
P3-Pl= 2.95 
(1.30) 
Pl= -4.18 
P3= -1.23 
Recession AB2 
P3-Pl= -0.55 
(-0.57) 
Pl= 0.89 
P3= 0.34 
P3-Pl= 0.00 
(0.00) 
Pl= -0.11 
P3= -0.11 
P3-Pl= 2.34 
(1.20) 
Pl= -2.68 
P3= -0.34 
P3-Pl= 0.04 P3-Pl= 0.06 P3-Pl= 3.29 
(0.03) (0.05) (1.62) 
AM Pl= 0.71 Pl= 0.95 Pl= -2.09 
P3= 0.75 P3= 1.01 P3= 1.21 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Using a sample of 22033 stocks covering 41 countries over the periods from 1983 to 
2002 for the US, and from 1987 to 2002 for the rest of the world this chapter establishes a 
strong link between uncertainty and momentum profits across countries. In addition, the 
empirical findings show that greater uncertainty with greater analyst bias leads to positive 
returns for winner stocks and negative returns for loser stocks. As a result, the momentum 
effects are more likely to reflect slow absorption of ambiguous information into stock 
prices that could result from analysts with reputational concerns report forecasts in accord 
with client's beliefs rather than the true set of information. The findings provide empirical 
evidence for the behavioural economics theory on 'herding on the priors' and rcputational 
effects in sender-receiver games, as well as the finance literature on the sources of 
momentum profits. This chapter further provides evidence based on global data that 
analysts' forecast dispersion reflects uncertainty rather than disagreement, consistent with 
Johnson (2004). The chapter suggests that the strong link between credit rating and 
momentum profits in the US documented by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov 
(2007) could be explained by an4jyst bias. Finally, the chapter rinds that profits from a 
momentum strategy based on uncertainty, by buying low uncertainty winners and selling 
high uncertainty losers, are superior to the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum 
strategy. 
Overall, this chapter contribution to the behavioural economics and finance literature in 
twofold. First, the sources of momentum profits are more likely to have originated in an 
incomplete flow of information into stock prices due to analyst bias and uncertainty, 
leading investors to make decisions based on their priors rather than the true set of 
information. Second, the dispersion in analyýts' forecasts that is commonly used to reflect 
investors' disagreement is in fact indicative of uncertainty. In addition, while risk is 
compensated by higher stock returns, uncertainty has the opposite effect. 
The findings of this chapter have important policy implications to policy makers and 
financial market. In particular, the results of analyst bias, which is the tendency that 
analysts report earnings forecasts and recommendations in favour with client's desire 
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rather than reflecting the true set of information, could have a negative impact to 
financial market and investors. Such biased opinion, however, are hard to detect or 
determine. Inaddition, the deviation of stock prices to reflect the true information could 
result to a less efficient market. Nevertheless, policy makers should help investors to raise 
enough caution to all the public information during their investment decision makigg. 
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5. Conclusion 
A momentum trading strategy, buying stocks which have exhibited high returns over the 
previous 3 to 12 months and selling stocks with poor performance over the same period 
of time can generate significant abnormal returns. A plethora of explanations have been 
put forward for this in the past decade, both risk-based and behavioural-based. This topic 
is very important since it touches central themes of modern financial economics; 
specifically the efficient market hypothesis and asset pricing model. This thesis has aimed 
1) to search for risk factors to explain momentum payoffs, 2) to examine the link between 
limits to arbitrage and momentum profits, also to investigate whether momentum profits 
are exploitable, 3) to propose another behavioural explanation based on analyst bias to 
explain momentum profits on a global basis. 
Chapter 2 investigates whether the apparent profitability of momentum trading can be 
explained by business cycle variables and behavioural characteristics in thrce major 
European markets namely France, Germany and the UK. The results show evidence of 
price momentum in all three countries. However, possibly due to some limitations 
inherent in the model, the predictive regression framework of Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002) based on business cycle variables cannot capture momentum Profits in these 
markets. The conditional asset pricing model of Avramov and Chordia (2006), that 
allows factor loadings to vary with firm specific variables, overcomes some of the 
limitations of the predictive regression model of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). 
Therefore, this chapter also applied the Avramov and Chordia (2006) model to the 
European markets investigated. In line with the findings of Avramov and Chordia (2006), 
the chapter shows that momentum Profits in Europe are largely attributable to asset 
mispricing that varies systematically with global business conditions. This confirms that 
the idiosyncratic component of stock returns does not play any prominent role in 
explaining momentum profits in European r etsjut; -L e qr Lables may -- uglark , _bpiness_qyc 
offer a better explanation. 
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Inspired by recent developments in the behavioural finance literature, especially by the 
ongoing debate on the role of investors' behaviour on price momentum, the Avramov and 
Chordia (2006) model was extended to incorporate behavioural variables. The results 
display a mixed role for behavioural variables across the countries, illustrating that 
investors' behaviour is less likely to be correlated to the business cycle and is unlikely to 
explain momentum profits. Moreover, the inclusion of behavioural variables does not 
affect the notion that momentum patterns are risk-based. This confirms that the findings 
of Avramov and Chordia (2006) hold for the major European financial markets and their 
model is robust to the inclusion of behavioural variables. Thus, the profitability-of 
momentum strategies in Europe could be ex lained b riqk- fir-mm, which are undetected 
thus far and are largely attributable to the business cycle. Overall, the finding of this 
chapter suggests that the apparent momentum profits are really just a premium that 
compensates for time-varying risk that could systematically link to business cycles or 
external shocks. This chapter contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the 
potential risk-based explanation to the momentum anomaly. 
Chapter 3 examines whether stocks characterised with limits to arbitrage and high 
divergence in investors' beliefs contribute to momentum profits. This chapter finds that 
momentum profits come from loser stocks. There is strong evidence of a positive 
relationship between short-sale constraints and the magnitude of momentum profits. The 
known risk factors cannot explain the momentum profits. However, the results are 
inconsistent with Miller's (1977) view that stocks that are subject to both short-sale 
constraints and high divergence in opinion are initially overvalued and generate low 
subsequent returns. This chapter finds that momentum profits are linked with short sale 
constraints but not with divergence in opinion. On the other hand, the excessive optimism 
together with self attribution bias leading to overvaluation and therefore low subsequent 
returns explains the momentura profits. 
The findings of this chapter have several implications. First, momentum profits are not 
exploitable as these are generated primarily by loser stocks that are costly or impossible 
to sell short. Second. the investors' inability to short-sell loser stocks defeats the original 
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theme of momentum trading that argues for a self-financing hedge portfolio. Tbird, the 
persistence of momentum profits is caused by limits to arbitrage rather than by investors 
under-reacting to firm-specific information. Finally, the results support the view that 
momentum profit results Primarily from mispricing due to limits to arbitrage and 
overconfidence; divergence in opinion does not play a role in overvaluation. This primary 
contribution of this chapter is that plementing thq- 
momenturn--strategy must be high, prices therefore move away --frqm 
the fundamental 
values and limits to arbitrage. 
Chapter 4 establishes a strong link between uncertainty and momentum profits across 
countries. In addition, the empirical findings show that greater uncertainty with greater 
analyst bias leads to positive returns for winner stocks and negative returns for loser 
stocks. As a result, the momentum effects are more likely to reflect slow absorption of 
ambiguous information into stock prices because analysts who are concerned for their 
reputations report forecasts in accordance with clients' beliefs rather than the true set of 
information. The findings provide empirical evidence for the behavioural economics 
theory on 'herding on the priors' and reputational effects in scnder-recciver games, as 
well as the finance literature on the sources of momentum profits. This chapter further 
provides evidence based on global data that analysts' forecast dispersion reflects 
uncertainty rather than disagreement, consistent with Johnson (2004). The chapter 
suggests that the strong link between credit rating and momentum profits in the US 
documented by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007) can be explained by 
analyst bias. Finally, the chapter shows that profits from a momentum strategy based on 
uncertainty, by buying low uncertainty winners and selling high uncertainty losers, are 
superior to the Jegadeesh-Titman momentum strategy. 
Overall, this thesis contributes to the behavioural. economics and finance literature in a 
number of ways. First, there is a business cycle pattern within momentum profits, but 
whether this pattern captures any kind of risk factors remains unknown. Second, the risks 
and the costs involved in implementing the momentum strategy must be high, prices 
therefore move away from the fundamental values, and arbitragers are able to restore the 
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price value identity. Third, the sources of momentum profits are more likely to have 
originated in an incomplete flow of information into stock prices due to analyst bias and 
uncertainty, leading investors to make decisions based on their priors rather than the true 
set of information. Finally, the dispersion in analysts' forecasts that is commonly used to 
reflect investors' disagreement is in fact indicative of uncertainty. In addition, while risk 
is compensated by higher stock returns, uncertainty has the opposite effect. 
Nevertheless, this thesis is subject to a number of limitations on data availability and both 
theoretical and empirical arguments. As a result, one should exercise caution. In addition, 
based on the limitations of this thesis, there are several suggestions for further work. First, 
the findings of Chapter 2 show that momentum profits are linked to some kinds of risk 
factors with business cycle pattern. Future work could explore new risk factors with such 
pattern that could explain firm-level momentum, one suggestion steams from the recently 
proposed distress risk by Agarwal and Taffler (2008) and credit risk with uncertainty by 
Avr4mov and Hore (2008). Along this line, risk factors that are capturing part of the 
investor's behaviour but also with business cycle pattern could be the way forward. 
Second, the thesis does not examine the direct effect of trading costs to implement 
momentum strategies. One exception is that findings in Chapter 3 provide evidence on 
limits to arbitrage in line with Lesmond et al. (2004), who suggest that the momentum 
profits cannot be exploited by investors as these are driven by small illiquid stocks which 
are costly or impossible to sell short. In addition, Taffler et al. (2004) report that 
profitable opportunities to arbitrage underperformance of going-concern stocks are 
severely limited due to high trading costs. Although the measure of trading costs, in 
particular, the costs of short-selling are not easily observable. The effect of the trading 
costs is important to the success of the profitability of momentum strategies. Further 
work could explore how trading costs affect the momentum profits during 
implementation on a global basis. 
Third, Chapter 4 shows the strong relationship between momentum, analyst bias and 
uncertainty. Recently, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) show that distress risk factor could 
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explain momentum profits. In addition, Avramov and Hore (2008) show that a combine 
of credit risk and information uncertainty could explain momentum under a risk-based 
explanation framework. Further work could therefore explore how analyst bias could 
integrate into distress risk factor and uncertainty to generate enough risk aversion to 
explain the momentum anomaly. Overall, the momentum anomaly remains to be one of 
the most interesting challenge to the modem finance theory. 
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Appendix 1: Cluster Adjusted t-statistics' 
In the presence of clustering, the observations within a given cluster may not be 
treated as independent, even though the clusters themselves may be considered 
independent. The detailed calculation of the covariance matrix allowing for clustering 
is given as follows, comparing it to the OLS estimator, and the White estimator. 
OLS Variance Estimator: 
VOLS = S2 (X'X)-i 
where: s2 =( 1 
)ie, 2 
Nk j-, 
Robust (White) Unclustered Variance Estimator: 
n 
Vrob = (X'X)-' j: (ejxj)'(ejxj) (X'X)-' 
[J. 
1 
I 
Robust Cluster Variance Estimator: 
(X, X)-l [ Uýuj 
](XX)-l 
where u, = Dixt 
JIA.. 
In the calculations, e, is the Ph residual and x, is a row vector of 
predictors. 
The variance of the clustered estimator will be higher than the robust estimator when 
there is positive correlation between elements of the cluster. Positive correlation 
means the cluster sums have more variability than the individual elements. Negative 
correlation within a cluster will have the reverse effect. 
" Source: http: //www. stata. com/support/fags/stat 
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Appendix 2: Performance of momentum strategies over the 
business cycle 
This table reports the strategy's monthly profits in the holding periods. The classifications of 
the expansionary and contractionary periods are obtained from the Economic Cycle Research 
Institute (ECRI). This table also shows the average coefflicients when momentum strategy 
payoffs (W-L) are regressed against two dummy variables indicating the state of the cycle: Rt 
ý aE Dexpt + aE Drect + et where R, is the momentum strategy payoffs during the holding 
period Q to t+5). Dexpt (Drec, ) is a dummy variable equal to I when the economy is in 
expansion (recession) at time t, OLE (OCE) is the average returns during an expansion (recession) 
and e, is an error term. Sd refers to the standard deviations of the profits. t-statistics are 
adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasti city and reported in parenthesis. *denotes 
significance at the 5% level. 
Expansionary periods 
UK 
Germany 
France 
W-L Sd (W-L) 
01/77 - 06/79 
0.93 1 04 (3.10) . 
06/81 - 05/90 
1.05 
(2.56) 1.82 
04/92 - 12/01 
2.34 3.19 (4.82) 
1.68 
aE (5.45) 
01/77 - 01/80 
1.02 0 64 (2.32) . 
11/82 - 01/91 
1.07 1.72 (2.91) 
05/94 - 01/01 
1.94 2.60 (3.58) 
1.41 
aE (6.17) 
01/77 - 08/79 
0.72 1.91 (0.78) 
07/80 - 04/82 
0.99 1.84 (1.44) 
Contractionary periods 
W-L Sd (W-L) 
07n9 - 05/81 
2.26 1.41 (5.38) 
06/90 -03/92 (4: 
14 1.32 7 10) 
3.37 
ac 
---(9.66) 
02/80 - 10/82 
1.06,1.28 
(3.09) 
02/91 - 04/94 
0.64 1.55 (1.21) 
02/01-12/01 12.26 4.38 (7.28) 
2.37 
ac (2.70) 
09/79 - 06/80 
1.80 1.37 (2.47) 
05/82 - 12/84 ( 
1: 73) 1.32 375 
01/85 - 02/92 
1.19 2.37 03/92 - 08/93 
1.92 2.24 2.09) (2.10) 
09/93 - 12/01 
1.55 2.53 (3.60) 
aE 
1.29 
CEC 
1.80 
(4.94) 
--(5.63) 
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Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics of business cycle variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics of business cycle variables used in this chapter. YLD 
is measured by the rate of return on short-term financial securities. DIV is measured by 
dividend on value-weighted broad based market index. DEF (default risk premium) is 
measured as 'the yield on corporate bonds' less 'the yield long-term government bonds'. 
TERM (term spread) is measured as 'the yield on long-term government bonds' less 'the 
yield on short-term financial securities'. The sources of the data arc described in Table 2.1. 
The sample period is January 1977 to December 2002. 
Mean Median St. dev. Observations 
DIV 0.043 0.043 0.012 305 
YLD 0.091 0.091 0.033 305 
UK 
TERM 0.004 0.003 0.022 305 
DEF 0.010 0.010 0.004 305 
DIV 0.024 0.022 0.008 305 
YLD 0.059 0.051 0.025 305 
Germany 
TERM 0.008 0.012 0.013 305 
DEF 0.002 0.001 0.003 305 
DIV 0.038 0.033 0.015 305 
YLD 0.083 0.084 0.035 305 
France 
TERM 0.011 0.014 0.014 305 
DEF 0.003 0.003 0.005 305 
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Appendix 4: Summary statistics of firm characteristics 
Time-series averages of equal-weighted cross-sectional means and standard deviation of the 
return predictors used in this chapter. Residual of institutional ownership (RIO) is the residual 
of equation (3.2), Firm size (S) is measured by market capitalization in millions. Divergence 
in opinion on each stock (Disp) is measured by the standard deviation in EPS forecasts made 
in 3-months prior to the formation period scaled by the stock price per share at the beginning 
of the month of forecast. Trading volume (VO) is measured as the ratio of the number of 
shares traded to the number of shares outstanding. Analyst recommendation (Rec) is 
measured as described in Section 3.3.5. Analyst forecast revisions (Fred) is, measured as 
described in Section 3.3.6. RET12 (momentum) is the total individual stock return over the 
previous 12 months. All statistics are calculated cross-sectionally each month and are then 
averaged across time. The sample period is January 1993 to December 2002. 
Mean Std dev Number of obs (average) 
RIO 0.36 0.30 1500 
Firm size (S) 1183.68 739.40 1504 
Disp 0.02 0.08 512 
VO 1010.59 306.21 1003 
Rec 2.12 0.13 134 
FRev -0.11 0.12 182 
Ret12 -0.70 0.18 1400 
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Appendix 5: Raw momentum strategy payoffs on overlapping 
portfolio strategies 
For each month t, all stocks are allocated into deciles based on their returns over past J 
months V= 3,6,9,12). Decile portfolios are formed monthly by weighting equally all firms 
in that decile ranking. The subsequent holding periods begin one month after the formation 
period ends. The position is then held for the following K months (K = 3,6,9,12). The 
winners (losers) portfolio refers to the decile portfolio containing stocks ranking highest 
(lowest) on prior returns. The winner-loser refers the arbitrage portfolio formed by buying 
winners and selling losers. This table reports the strategy's raw returns during the holding 
period. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. * 
denotes significance at the 5% level. The sample period is January 1993 to December 2002. 
Winner (W) Loser(L) W-L T-stat 
3x3 -0.20 -2.05 1.85 3.54* 
6x6 0.03 -2.89 2.91 5.66* 
9x9 -0.19 -1.79 1.60 4.57* 
12 x 12 -0.48 -1.31 0.83 2.56* 
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